Hong Wai Cheong

Recently, there has been much debate concerning the value of theorizing in terms of natural properties. In particular, some philosophers have sought to explain the greater objective value of theorizing truly in terms of natural, as opposed to non-natural, properties. This comes in response to an explanatory challenge raised by Dasgupta, who argues that there can be no such explanation to begin with. But this paper argues that the existing attempts at resolving Dasgupta’s explanatory challenge have largely been unsuccessful. Properly understood, Dasgupta’s explanatory challenge demands a more intuitive source for the objective value of theorizing in terms of naturalness than the ones provided. Instead, this paper approaches the challenge from a different angle, aiming at illuminating an intuitive explanatory pathway for how certain properties can even come to be objectively valuable to theorize upon to begin with. Paired with the view that natural properties are themselves primitive sources of objective (alethic) value, a satisfying response to the challenge can be forged.

Common‐sense morality has it that parents are morally justified in acting partially toward their own children. More controversial, however, is the form of partiality that obtains between prospective parents and their yet‐to‐be‐conceived future children – or ‘pre‐parental partiality’, for short. Is pre‐parental partiality morally justified? On one hand, our intuitions seem to tell us that it is. On the other hand, we have philosophers like Douglas and Podgorski seeking to undermine its moral justifiability by arguing that we possess no reasons of special concern at all to engage in pre‐parental partiality. This paper aims to rescue the moral justifiability of pre‐parental partiality in light of these arguments. In particular, a novel account of our pre‐parental partiality obligations is developed; one which sees our special reasons (as prospective parents) for engaging in pre‐parental partiality as arising from the special reasons for engaging in standard parental partiality that we come to possess (as parents) in the future. The result is a compelling moral justification for pre‐parental partiality that amends itself to a whole platitude of views of what our standard parental obligations of partiality amount to.