We argue that Schellenberg’s non-doxastic account of faith poses a challenge for his famous divine hiddenness argument. In his argument, Schellenberg presupposes that the belief that God exists is required for beginning and having a personal relationship with God. Yet this presupposition is challenged by the suggestion that belief-less faith is sufficient to provide a basis for a personal relationship with God. Schellenberg has recently presented two brief responses to this challenge. We argue t…
Read moreWe argue that Schellenberg’s non-doxastic account of faith poses a challenge for his famous divine hiddenness argument. In his argument, Schellenberg presupposes that the belief that God exists is required for beginning and having a personal relationship with God. Yet this presupposition is challenged by the suggestion that belief-less faith is sufficient to provide a basis for a personal relationship with God. Schellenberg has recently presented two brief responses to this challenge. We argue that neither of these responses is convincing, basing our own argument on the account of belief-less faith Schellenberg himself advocates. The upshot, of course, may not be a knockdown approach against Schellenberg’s divine hiddenness argument. However, the burden of proof is on Schellenberg to meet the challenge by showing that there is no conflict between the respective parts of his thought.