Hristo Valchev

We can distinguish between conceptual analysis of terms in the communal language and conceptual analysis of terms in one’s own idiolect. The former can be called “communal conceptual analysis”, whereas the latter can be called “idiolectal conceptual analysis”. The present paper provides a systematic exposition and defence of idiolectal conceptual analysis, considering its possible and actual use in philosophical inquiry, as well as some of the most important criticisms that can be raised against it. The two most influential kinds of criticism that have been raised against conceptual analysis in general are based on semantic externalism and empirical studies of judgements about possible cases respectively. I argue that both of these kinds of criticism apply mainly to communal conceptual analysis and not to idiolectal conceptual analysis. Furthermore, I argue that even though there is some evidence that most well-known and widely discussed instances of using conceptual analysis have been instances of communal conceptual analysis, idiolectal conceptual analysis can also play a significant role in philosophical inquiry. Thus, the paper suggests a shift of focus from communal conceptual analysis to idiolectal conceptual analysis.

The paper proposes a general account of how real-life practical argumentation can be explained on the basis of empirical data regarding cultural value priorities. This general account is built upon Schwartz’s theory of human values and the value-based theory of normative reasons for action, as well as upon the principle that an agent ought to perform an action, if and only if the total weight of the reasons for the agent to perform the action is greater than the total weight of the reasons for the agent not to perform the action. The practical significance of this general account is demonstrated by applying it in case studies of two real-life instances of practical argumentation – the 2018 Bulgarian debate about the ratification of the Istanbul convention and the 2015 Putin-Obama discussion about the intervention in the Syrian civil war. In both case studies, empirical data regarding cultural value priorities is gathered from the results from the European Social Survey. The theoretical significance of the general account is demonstrated through comparison and contrast with related research.

In the present paper we investigate the role of human values in the reception of the Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence (better known as ‘the Istanbul Convention’) within the EU. By establishing a certain relationship between the most important arguments raised in favor of or against the convention and values from Schwartz’s theory of human values, we formulate certain hypotheses about the influence of the importance the people from a given EU member state ascribe to certain values on the decision of that EU member state on whether the convention should be ratified. We also hypothesize that human values have played the role of mediator between the decision in question and the waves of immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa to the EU. All hypotheses are tested using the results from the European Social Survey. These results suggest that: 1) a more positive attitude towards the convention is correlated with higher importance of the value ‘universalism-concern’ and lower importance of the value ‘tradition’; 2) the value ‘universalism-concern’ has played the role of mediator described above.

The present paper is concerned with the question of whether scientific conceptual analysis provides better justification than armchair conceptual analysis. In order to address this question, I provide exact definitions of armchair conceptual analysis and scientific conceptual analysis. Furthermore, I use a certain criticism of armchair conceptual analysis, raised by experimental philosophers, as a basis for an argument to the conclusion that scientific conceptual analysis provides better justification than armchair conceptual analysis, and consider the expertise defence as a possible response to this argument. The argument is based on the idea that the concept of a common usage implies a certain degree of uniformity among different speakers, and can be called ‘argument from uniformity of agreement’. The expertise defence can be understood as an attack of one of the premises of this argument. Finally, I present and discuss the results from an empirical study in which scientific conceptual analysis was used in order to gather evidence as regards the soundness of the argument from uniformity of agreement and the expertise defence.

In the present inquiry I explore the concept of conceptual analysis, looking for ways for it to be improved, and I come to the following conclusions. Conceptual analysis as ordinarily understood in analytic philosophy is a method which consists in drawing a conclusion about what the definition of a predicate is on the basis of an armchair investigation into whether the predicate is semantically applicable in different possible cases; but, the concept of conceptual analysis can be improved by making two changes to it: 1) the investigation into whether the predicate is semantically applicable in different possible cases is not to serve as a basis for a conclusion about what the definition of the predicate is, but as a basis for a conclusion about whether this-and-this is an only necessary, only sufficient, both necessary and sufficient, or neither necessary nor sufficient condition for the predicate’s semantic application; 2) the investigation into whether the predicate is semantically applicable in different possible cases is done not only from the armchair, but also empirically.

Conceptual analysis as traditionally understood can be improved by allowing the use of a certain kind of empirical investigation. The conceptual analysis in which the kind of empirical investigation in question is used can be called “empirical conceptual analysis”. In the present inquiry, I provide a systematic exposition of empirical conceptual analysis, so understood, considering what exactly empirical conceptual analysis is, the different kinds of empirical conceptual analysis, and the main application of the method within philosophy. It can be defined as a method that consists in drawing a conclusion about the semantic application conditions of a predicate on the basis of observation of the manifestations of semantic intuitions. The different kinds of empirical conceptual analysis are distinguished according to the way the manifestations of semantic intuitions are observed. The main application of the method is solving conceptual disputes – situations in which different competent speakers of a language disagree about the semantic application conditions of a predicate from that language, and their disagreement is caused by the fact that they have different semantic intuitions about that predicate.

The paper presents an analysis of the cultural embeddedness of arguments, raised as a part of the Bulgarian debate about the ratification of the Istanbul convention. The method I employed was the localization procedure of Generalized Argumentation theory. Through a qualitative analysis of empirical argumentation data, I identified arguments in favour of or against the ratification of the Istanbul convention. Information about the cultural background against which these arguments were raised, i.e. about Bulgarian culture, was gathered from the part of the ninth wave of the European Social Survey that used the Portrait Value Questionnaire—an instrument for measuring human values, based on Schwartz’s theory of human values. By establishing a certain relationship between the arguments and the cultural background information, I came to the conclusion that the debate between the proponents and the opponents of the ratification represented a conflict between the basic values of universalism and tradition, and more particularly, between the lower-order values of equality and respect for tradition.