Huang Min

This book aims to reclaim the significance of meaning within the philosophical thinking that has evolved from Descartes and Locke through Kant, Husserl, and Frege, focusing on intentionality-the mind's directedness toward the reality. The author opens with an epistemological account of analyticity and illustrates the central role of intentionality within it. A transcendentalist view on intentionality is then adopted, in contrast with the prevalent naturalist stance. Addressing key themes in the philosophy of language-truth, representation, propositions, predication, reference, and sense, the book presents a framework for a meaning-intentionality theory, which integrates key insights from Frege, Wittgenstein, Dummett, and Davidson. The book will appeal to scholars and graduate students of epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, theory of meaning, and theory of intentionality.

Articles followed by analysis and comparison of Moore, Malcolm and Wittgenstein's response to skepticism and their way of argument skills, demonstrated knowledge of the extent to which the foundation gives way to avoid skepticism. Article that Moore and Malcolm's argument is inadequate, Wittgenstein on grammar distinction between propositions and empirical propositions of which the missing part of the supplement, which is the role of a game misplaced argument. This means that, to avoid skepticism is a practical attitude. In this essay I compare GE Moore, Malcolm, and Wittgenstein in their way against scepticism, and show that in what sense common sense can offer a foundation to avoid scepticism. I maintain that Moore's and Malcolm's arguments are both insufficient and should be supplemented with Wittgenstein's distinction, supported by the argument from ill-formed language game, between grammar propositions and empirical propositions. That means, it is some practical attitude that can avoid skepticism