Hugo El Kholi

As a fascinating study of global justice in Asia, this book presents a series of contributions reflecting upon the conditions of a greater involvement of East Asian traditions of thought in the debate on global justice. Including chapters on diverse issues such as global social inequalities, human rights practice and the functioning of international institutions, this book examines the political cultures of East Asia in order to help political theorists better appraise the distinctiveness of non‐Western ideas of justice. Confirming the persistence of a strong social ethos, the contributions also demonstrate the long-lasting influence of Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism in shaping East Asian public conceptions of justice. Bringing much needed non-Western voices to the global justice debate, this book will appeal to students and scholars of politics, law and philosophy, as well as activists involved in the global justice movement.

The purpose of this introduction is two-fold. First, it is to provide readers unfamiliar with the debates on practice-dependence with the insight necessary to fully comprehend the different contributions to this volume. Second, it is to make readers already well versed in practice-dependence more sensible to the substantive nature of this view and to provide them with a workable typology. After establishing a first distinction between metaphysical, relational and practice-dependent conceptions of justice, I draw a line, among practice-dependent views, between institutionalism and cultural conventionalism. I complete the typology by differentiating between three forms of institutionalism according to how they regard the institutional fact, namely the fact that individuals are always already placed in a state of submission to existing institutions. Whereas de facto institutionalism describes this fact as a mere factual reality which imposes itself upon human beings, de jure institutionalism regards it as a practical necessity that stands in need of justification to each and every individual. Finally, moral institutionalism accounts for the institutional fact in terms of moral duty , namely the duty to contribute to the emergence of a state of affairs in which everyone’s freedom of choice is respected.

The practice-dependence approach offers a new way of theorizing about human rights and distributive justice that promises to settle some of the ongoing disputes about their justification, content, and scope. In sharp contrast with naturalistic theories, which conceive of human rights as an abstract moral ideal, practice-dependence theories regard human rights as a public political doctrine constructed to play a specific regulatory role in contemporary world politics. They maintain accordingly that the content of those rights should be determined in light of the role played by human rights in the contemporary practice of international politics. Similarly, those theories do not conceive of distributive justice simply as a moral virtue proper to all human beings, but rather as a political value arising as necessary to the regulation of certain social and political practices. In this view, the content and scope of justice should depend on an interpretation of the structure and point of the practices in question. The articles gathered in this volume propose a comprehensive introduction to the practice-dependence approach by some of its major supporters, as well as a critical discussion of its theoretical promises.