Hugo Luzio

This paper defends Forrest’s (2004, 2006) “Dead Past” response to the Epistemic Objection to the Growing Block theory, against the common charge—voiced by Braddon-Mitchell (2004, 2013), Grandjean (2022), and Graziani (2024)—that it populates the past with philosophical zombies. I argue that this objection rests on a mischaracterization of the nature of past beings in a “Dead Past” GB-universe, and support an inactivist account of the past. I then address a potential objection to this response and conclude by advancing what I take to be more pressing concerns about the nature of past beings within the “Dead Past” view, given my preferred inactivist account.

According to animalism, each of us is essentially a human organism. As such, the number of persons corresponds to the number of organisms. Dicephalic conjoined twins, such as the Hensel twins, challenge this view, as they appear to be two persons but only one organism. This is the dicephalus objection to animalism. In this paper, we address this problem. First, we introduce the Hensel case and outline the dicephalus objection (§1). We then discuss two prominent animalist responses: the indeterminacy solution, which holds that the Hensel twins are a borderline case of human animal (§2), and the overlap solution, which posits two overlapping organisms in the Hensel case (§3). We reject both views, arguing instead that there is exactly one organism and a single person with two functional brains (or psychological centers) and a highly disunified psychology. This is the psychological disunity solution (§4). We conclude by addressing potential objections to our view (§5).

Most animalists adopt a Lockean view of personhood. According to this view, what makes something a person is a matter of natural, non-conventional fact: it depends on the possession of complex psychological capacities (e.g., consciousness and the ability to think). Recently, however, some philosophers have argued that persons are not natural products but conventional constructs. In this chapter, I discuss the relation between animalism and the leading form of person conventionalism: person conativism. I argue that while animalism is incompatible with a substantial version of person conativism, it is compatible with a phasal one. I then develop a phasal person conativist version of animalism and argue that it offers significant advantages over the traditional animalist-Lockean combination.

In this dissertation, I intend to answer the following philosophical problem: which are the facts (if there are any facts) in virtue of which each person is the same over time? This is the problem of personal identity over time. To answer this problem, this dissertation is divided into three chapters. In the first chapter, which is essentially introductory in nature, I present the problem of personal identity over time, clarify the main concepts involved (in particular, the concepts of person and diachronic identity) and discuss how best to understand it, distinguishing between the main perspectives on the nature of personal identity that philosophers have been defending. In the second chapter, I present the main psychological views on the nature of personal identity, namely, the memory view, the psychological continuity view and the embodied mind view, I clarify the main concepts that each of these involves and discuss their merits and shortcomings. For different reasons, I argue that none of these views is capable of responding adequately to the problems that philosophers have been pointing out to them. Their merits do not outweigh their faults. As such, I argue that personal identity over time is not a relation of psychological continuity of any kind. In the third chapter, I present the main physiological view on the nature of personal identity, the biological view (or animalism), I clarify the main concepts it involves (in particular, the concepts of human organism and biological persistence) and I discuss how best to understand it. Then, I discuss the merits and shortcomings of this view. Although I consider that some of the main arguments for this view turn out to be insufficient, I argue that this perspective is able to respond adequately to the problems with which philosophers have been confronting it. As such, I seek to answer their main objections and argue that, ultimately, this is the best answer to the problem of personal identity over time: personal identity over time is a relation of biological continuity.

Neste artigo discuto a solução do faz de conta, de Kendall Walton, para o paradoxo da ficção. Na primeira secção, apresento o paradoxo da ficção, pondo em evidência a tensão entre as nossas crenças a respeito da natureza das personagens ficcionais e as emoções que sentimos em resposta às situações que atravessam nas histórias a que pertencem. Na segunda secção, apresento a solução do faz de conta, segundo a qual as nossas reacções emocionais às situações de personagens ficcionais se explicam em termos da nossa subscrição de um princípio de simulação. Na terceira e última secção defendo que esta solução não é convincente. Concluo com uma sugestão modesta a respeito do que creio ser uma linha de resposta mais plausível ao paradoxo da ficção.

In this paper, I discuss the nature of artistic style. First, I distinguishing between descriptive and evaluative senses of 'style', and I present the problem of artistic style (section §1). Then, I revisit Nelson Goodman’s “The Status of Style” (1975), a seminal contribution to this debate. I discuss three views on the nature of artistic style: the how-what view, the expressive view, and Goodman’s own metaphorical signature view (section §2). I argue that none of these views offers a satisfactory account of artistic style. I conclude by discussing Dale Jacquette’s (2000) pragmatic version of the how-what view, which I take to be more promising.

The possibility of artificial intelligence is usually discussed by philosophers as a problem about artificial thought: can an artificial system think? The production of intelligence in an artificial system would, however, give rise to an intelligent artificial being: an artificial thinker. As such, there is another, less explored way of discussing the possibility of artificial intelligence: can there be an artificial thinker? This is the problem of artificial thinkers (Olson 2018). In this essay, I discuss this problem. To do so, first, I present the problem of artificial thinkers and discuss how best to interpret it (section §1). Then, I discuss the three main views on the metaphysical nature of artificial thinkers: the hardware view, according to which artificial thinkers are intelligent artificial systems; the software view, according to which artificial thinkers are types or copies of programs for artificial intelligence; and finally, the CPU perspective, according to which artificial thinkers are intelligent spatial parts of artificial systems (section §2). All of these views have problems regarding their conception of the persistence conditions of artificial thinkers. Even so, I conclude, artificial thinkers are best conceived as functional artificial systems.

This paper discusses the state-of-the-art dispute over the ontological question of rock music: what is the work of art, or the central work-kind, of rock music, if any? And, is the work of rock music ontologically distinct from the work of classical music, which is the only musical tradition whose ontology is vastly studied? First, I distinguish between two levels of inquiry in musical ontology: the fundamental level and the higher-order level, in which comparative ontology – the project in which someone engages by considering that there is ontological variety among works of distinct musical traditions – falls. After addressing two general questions about rock music, I turn to Theodore Gracyk’s ontological account of rock music, according to which the primary focus of critical attention in rock music are recordings, or recorded tracks. This view has the consequence that ‘recordings’ is a fundamental concept of philosophy of music, necessary for us to understand rock music. Stephen Davies objected that Gracyk’s account fails to assign appropriate value to a valuable practice with which rock audiences are committed, live performance, and argued that the works of rock music are of the ontological kind for studio performance. Finally, Andrew Kania synthetized both views: rock recorded tracks are at the centre of rock as an art form, thus being the rock works. For, different reasons, none of these views is deemed satisfactory.

Animalism claims that we are animals, i.e. biological organisms of the primate species Homo sapiens. If there is a case in which the number of persons differs from the number of organisms, then animalism is false. Timothy Campbell and Jeff McMahan hold that there are, at least, two such cases: the dicephalus and the cephalopagus conjoined twinning cases. Recently, Eric Olson argued that either Campbell and McMahan's arguments assume the point at issue, rely on undefended assumptions, or constitute paradigmatic anti-animalist claims. After characterising animalism, we address Campbell and McMahan's arguments and Olson's replies. We endorse Olson's first general objection and reject the second and third, nonetheless concluding that animalism isn't undermined by conjoined twinning cases.

In the following sections we hold that physical continuity suffices personal persistence through time. First, we determine the theoretic and conceptual grounds of the metaphysical problem of personal identity, the relevant notion of «personal identity», the temporal persistence question simpliciter, what identity criteria and individuation principles are, and the formal properties of the identity concept. We differentiate between the simple and complex views, stating the reductionist thesis transversal to the latter. In the central sections, we discuss the main arguments and objections endorsed to the dominant identity criteria, namely, the lockean memory criterion, causal dependence criteria of psychological connectivity and continuity, the corporeal or physical criterion, the somatic view and the cerebral criterion. Psychological criteria are not considered promising. We hold the hypothesis that personal identity consists in a causal relation of brute physical continuity. For such, we refine the original corporeal criterion, showing that the defense of, at least, minimal physicalism about mind-brain identity ensure its reinforcement.

Discutimos o «problema das condições de individuação de obras musicais», a partir de duas teses concorrentes: o «sonicismo tímbrico», modulação teórica que procede de uma tese mais ampla, o «sonicismo», defendido (entre outros) por Julian Dodd (2007) em Confissões de um Sonicista Tímbrico Impenitente e o «instrumentalismo», defendido (entre outros) por Stephen Davies (2008) em Obras Musicais e Cor Orquestral. Dividimos a discussão em três momentos. Primeiramente, evidenciamos a centralidade do «problema das propriedades individuadoras de obras musicais» no âmbito próprio da indagação ontológica, em filosofia da música. Em seguida, analisamos criticamente os pontos estruturantes da argumentação sonicista de Dodd, tratando particularmente o chamado argumento do «Sintetizador Timbricamente Perfeito». Finalmente, formulamos algumas objeções expressivas ao anti-instrumentalismo e ao anticontextualismo que decorrem do «sonicismo tímbrico», defendendo a viabilidade da tese instrumentalista como resposta ao «problema das condições de individuação de obras musicais».