Hui-Chieh Loy

Since at least the nineteenth century, Singapore has hosted a multicultural society, and so inherited several philosophical traditions. Philosophical activity in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries included discussions of the Straits Philosophical Society and in the Straits Chinese Magazine. Academic philosophy began with the founding of the University of Malaya in 1949, where the department of philosophy was established in 1952, under the influence of the school of ordinary language philosophy then dominant in England. It was joined in 1956 by Nanyang University, which hosted courses in Chinese philosophy, as well as some Western philosophy. During the transition to independence from Britain and Malaysia, the University of Malaya was renamed the University of Singapore. Philosophers there continued to be influenced by international trends in analytic philosophy, but also pursued their own interests in Chinese philosophy and instigated a debate over liberalism culminating in the inception of the Asian-values debate in the 1970s. Philosophy in Singapore since 1980 will be taken up in a sequel to this paper.

Historical Perspectives on East Asian Science, Technology, and Medicine brings together over fifty papers by leading contemporary historians from more than a dozen nations. It is the third in a series of books growing out of the tri-annual International Conference on the History of Science in East Asia, the largest and most prestigious gathering of scholars in the field. The current volume broadens the field's traditional focus on China to include path-breaking work on Vietnam, Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and even the transmission of Asian science and technology to Europe and the United States. Topics covered include: traditional Chinese, Vietnamese, and Filipino medicines; Chinese astronomy; Japanese earthquakes; science and technology policy; architecture; the digital revolution; and much else.

Reshaping Confucianism is a compact compendium of the philosophical work that Li Chenyang has been doing over the course of a long and distinguished career. The book seeks to achieve two things—it is both a research monograph presenting original scholarship and also an “introductory textbook” for progressive Confucianism, “showcasing both the depth and breadth of recent insight into the Confucian legacy as well as how it continues to influence the present-day world” (p. 1).1 But it does not aim to “systematically present one particular formulation of a comprehensive Confucianism”; rather, the “explorations are open-ended and call for further discourse” (p. 5). It is thus very much in response to this call that this... Read More.

The paper discusses five conceptions of knowledge present in texts traditionally associated with the thought of such thinkers as Kongzi, Mozi, Mengzi, Xunzi, Laozi, Zhuangzi, and Hanfeizi. The first three maps onto conceptions of knowledge familiar to contemporary ears: skill knowledge (knowing-how), propositional knowledge (knowing-that) and objectual knowledge (knowing by acquaintance); while the next two map onto less commonly discussed conceptions of knowledge: motivational knowledge (knowing-to) and applied knowledge (knowing-how-to). The discussion aims to complement existing projects in the literature that look at related issues more explicitly from the standpoint of the ‘native’ concepts. The paper concludes with some comments on the early Chinese philosophical concerns with knowledge and its relation to broader conceptions of ‘philosophical’ projects.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and History, Customs and EthicsHui-Chieh Loy (bio)Origins of Moral-Political Philosophy in Early China: Contestation of Humaneness, Justice, and Personal Freedom. By Tao Jiang. New York: Oxford University Press, 2021.Tao Jiang's Origins of Moral-Political Philosophy in Early China is a serious tour de force of a study. In many ways, I am reminded of Angus Graham's Disputers of the Tao and Benjamin Schwartz' The World of Thought in Ancient China—but updated. A signal difference is that it is more constrained in its coverage of figures, texts, and especially in having the topical focus upon moral-political philosophy. At the same time and within the chosen (narrower) confines, it often examines its subject in greater detail and draws on more recent discussions.One neat thing that Jiang does is to deliberately weave in explicit discussions of how each subsequent thinker or text incorporated or criticized ideas associated with earlier thinkers. (I formulated it this way since there isn't enough historical evidence about who-actually-read-what in the ancient world, citation practices being what they were.) In this regard, I am especially heartened to read, for example, the sections on "Traces of Mohist Elements in the Laozi" (3.3.2), and "Mohist Elements in Han Feizi's Thought" (7.3.3).By no means should the desultory remarks below be counted as a full review or assessment (impressionistically, this is the sort of book I will recommend that my grad students read—there, I've said it). Think of them as humble shards of pottery thrown in the hope for some jade in response. To make my task more focused, I will comment on the Sinology versus Philosophy distinction, and Jiang's treatment of the Mohists.I. Philosophy and History of PhilosophyAn important part of Jiang's Introduction is devoted to discussing the situation of Chinese Philosophy as a field in the Western Academy, caught between Sinology on the one hand and academic Philosophy on the other. Due to the different scholarly objectives and norms in the two disciplines, scholars working on Chinese Philosophy often find themselves caught [End Page 420] between two distinct audiences who demand different things. Jiang's aim is to propose an "interpretive model to distinguish two sets of scholarly objects operative in Sinology and philosophy. These objects are related and at times overlap, but they are also often irreducibly distinct, i.e., original text versus inherited text, historical author versus textual author, and authorial intent versus textual intent, with the former in the pairs belonging to Sinologists and the latter to philosophers" (p. 7). In general, I am highly sympathetic to the distinctions Jiang draws. But I do wonder if we need to step back and start from a wider context involving what is potentially a deeper divide.Now, it is entirely a caricature but the joke around the water cooler is that philosophers—especially those of a more "analytic" bent—often exude the attitude that they are not in the business of reading old books. Their project is one focused on issues and problems and puzzles that are ultimately about the natural and human world, rather than about texts and their interpretation, or even the historical thinkers themselves. To give some obvious examples, the intellectual questions they see themselves as answering are the likes of:• Can we know that God exists, if God exists at all?• What is the nature of moral claims? Do they admit of truth and falsity?• How is causation related to possibility?• Is a logic that dispenses with the law of non-contradiction viable?• What are the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge?• Is abortion morally justifiable?Sometimes the questions they ask even infringe on the results and insights from nearby fields, for instance linguistics and the natural and empirical sciences:• What is time?• Can a presentist conception of time be made consistent with contemporary physics?• What is the nature of consciousness? How is it related to physical neural states or informational computational processes?• Can computers be sentient?• How is morality related to the passions?• In what sense is a political order that does justice to diversity of moral beliefs...

ABSTRACTThe response comments upon the idea of there being a multidimensionality to reality that G.E.R. Lloyd introduced in recent works. The idea is that while different equally intelligent perceivers might inhabit one and the same world, there can be a plurality of equally valid accounts. In putting forward the idea, Lloyd sought to strike a balance between ‘realism’ and ‘relativism.’ The response proposes two main points. First, the most interesting version of the thesis will have to be about how otherwise incompatible accounts may be equally valid, as for instance, Greek versus early Chinese cosmology. Second, the relevant comparison needs to be between epistemic peers of a certain sort. But once both points are admitted, then it becomes possible for us to make the judgment that entire classes of accounts can be set aside as no longer supported given better evidence as, for instance, in a contest between both Greek and early Chinese cosmologies, and a modern counterpart. This outcome puts some pressure on the relativist aspects of Lloyd's thesis.

: It is argued here that Mozi's critique of warfare in the chapter "Against Offensive War" ("Fei gong") cannot be fully understood without the arguments presented in the chapter "Explaining Ghosts" ("Ming gui"). For Mozi, the problem of war can only be resolved if the existence of providential ghosts can be proven. But he indicates in his arguments concerning the existence of ghosts that it is doubtful whether such a condition can be met. Consequently, despite the apparently optimistic tenor of chapters such as "Imperial Love" ("Jian ai"), Mozi's political thought reveals an implicit understanding of the rational limits of resolving fundamental problems of injustice in the world

According to A. C. Graham, ‘the crucial question’ for the early Chinese thinkers was ‘Where is the Way [dao]?’–‘the way to order the state and conduct personal life’ rather than ‘What is the Truth?’1 This observation is most apt when applied to the thinking of Mozi and his followers as it is exemplified in the ethical and political chapters of the eponymously named text .2 A striking feature of the Mohists’ thinking, however, is the concern they have with yan , and the role they assigned to yan in their ethical project. Part I of this article will outline the nature and scope of the Mohists’ concern with yan. In the Mohists’ conception, right yan is the linguistic counterpart to proper dao. And conduct that follows dao is a matter of affirming the right yan and taking it as a model in one’s actions. The Mohists’ concern with yan is prominently exhibited in their proposing objective standards, or ‘gauges’, by means of which any yan may be assessed. Part II introduces these gauges and discusses how they function as standards for right yan and right conduct. Given the generally pragmatic outlook of their thinking, the question remains as to whether, in their conception of yan, the Mohists conceived of language exclusively in terms of its action guiding function, and whether they deployed the notion of truth at all. Part III discusses this issue, arguing that there is a minimal sense in which yan that are positively assessed by the gauges are true, and that the Mohists are not insensitive to the distinction between descriptive as opposed to action guiding uses of language. Part IV briefly discusses how the Mohists’ attitude towards yan contrasts with those of early Confucian and Daoist thinkers

In all three versions of the “Jian’ai” 兼愛 Chapter in the Mozi 墨子, variations of a central argument may be found. This argument proceeds by advancing a diagnosis for what causes the various evils that beset the world, and it is on this basis that the Mohists propose jian’ai as the solution. The study examines this main argument in some detail, with the aim of improving both our understanding of the Mohist ethical doctrine and also our appreciation of their argumentative practices. The study shows that distinct ethical injunctions of varying degrees of stringency can be derived from the argument, though they all embody an underlying notion of impartiality. This impartiality—while in many ways recognizably attractive to us—puts Mohist jian’ai in tension with certain notions regarding the ethical significance of special relations. In addition, the paper argues that the Mohists main argument for jian’ai contains a critical flaw

In the first chapter of Confucius: The Secular as Sacred, Herbert Fingarette argues that in the Analects Confucius holds the essence of human virtue to be a kind of magic power and this magic can be explained in terms of J. L. Austin’s analysis of the “performative utterance.” This paper attempts to explicate what Fingarette’s claims concerning magic and the “performative” amount to. I will argue that even though there is something to the underlying spirit of Fingarette’s project, he either misused or simply misunderstood Austin and, because of this misuse or misunderstanding, he has possibly misunderstood Confucius as well.