Hui Gao

After the beginning of the twentieth century, Chinese landscape painting came to be received on a large scale by Western cultural and academic circles. In the early twentieth century, German art historians developed a strong interest in Chinese landscape painting. Against this background, a series of scholarly discussions emerged, and related studies, including Fischer’s Chinese Landscape Painting, were published one after another. One issue that attracted particular attention among scholars was whether Chinese landscape painting had exerted an influence on Western painting. If so, in what ways did such influence manifest itself? By revisiting this nearly forgotten history, this intriguing question re-enters contemporary discussions of the westward transmission of Eastern learning and provides them with a more substantial historical perspective.

Fichte’s and Schiller’s “Horenstreit” marks a significant event in the history of aesthetics . This dispute primarily addresses three fundamental questions within aesthetics: whether philosophy and aesthetics arise from distinct spirits, whether an independent aesthetic drive exists, and how the relationship between image and concept should be understood. Analyzing these three questions helps clarify the position of Fichte’s aesthetics within his broader philosophical system and enables a reinterpretation of Fichte’s aesthetic theory. Based on this, it becomes possible to explore the potential for constructing an independent transcendental aesthetic system. Such a system differs from Kant’s aesthetic judgment, which serves as an intermediary between theoretical and practical reason, and from Hegel’s view of beauty as a sensuous manifestation of the Idea. Rather, it is an aesthetic system founded on imagination, sharing a common origin with philosophical spirit and possessing equal theoretical standing.

This article aims to reconstruct the core thesis of Fichte’s theory of language, namely the antinomy of language. To answer the question, whether the language is the necessary condition of human being as rational entities, two approaches can be taken: the historical-empirical and the transcendental. The thesis asserts that language serves as the necessary mediation for thinking as well as freedom. Conversely, the antithesis highlights the limitations of the faculty of language and argues that the absence of language does not alter the fact of the genesis of consciousness. The following research will show that the thesis and the antithesis are not contradictory, but rather two different perspectives that can be brought together to complete Fichte's transcendental philosophy.

Zusammenfassung Das Problem der Sprache nimmt in Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre eine fundamentale Stellung ein, auch wenn das nur sporadisch behandelt wird und eine explizite Sprachlehre in seinem System „ungeschrieben“ erscheint. Inspiriert von Herders Metakritik misst Fichte einerseits der Sprachtheorie große Bedeutung bei und versucht, die kritische Philosophie Kants auf der Metaebene der Sprache zu kritisieren, um die Philosophie zur Wissenschaft zu erheben.Andererseits distanziert sich Fichte von der Position des Wortfetischismus, der für die Vollendung der Philosophie durch sprachlichen Purismus plädiert. Daher schlägt Fichte eine Sprachantinomie vor, die auf der dialektischen Beziehung zwischen Geist und Buchstaben beruht. Die These betont die notwendige Funktion der Sprache als transzendentale Bedingung des Bewusstseins, während die Antithese die Unabhängigkeit und Absolutheit des Bewusstseins hervorhebt und die Gefahren der sogenannten Buchreligion aufzeigt. Durch eine Rekonstruktion von Fichtes Sprachlehre lässt sich zeigen, wie der Übergang von der sprachlichen Metakritik zur Begründung der Transzendentalphilosophie durch die Sprachlehre vollgezogen wird.

This article starts by analysing the fundamental position of speech act theory, namely whether language can be considered an act. Austin’s speech act theory raises the question of the illocutionary force. As a revision, Searle adopts Grice’s theory of meaning and introduces the concept of intention into the discourse. This article aims to reveal the presupposition in the position of speech act theory, which is inevitably caught in a circle. The cause lies in neglecting a distinction between the utterer of language and the performer of the actions belonging to different subjects. As a result, the theory presupposes language as a coercive force that constitutes the cause of the alter ego’s act. Fichte’s theory of language, deduced from his Freiheitsphilosophie, could be a possible solution to resolve this. It distinguishes language from action and explicates language as a guide rather than a hindrance to freedom. This position defends freedom against neglect by the speech act theory. The paper also attempts to reconstruct a dialogue between Fichte’s and contemporary analytical philosophies.

This article starts by analysing the fundamental position of speech act theory, namely whether language can be considered an act. Austin’s speech act theory raises the question of the illocutionary force. As a revision, Searle adopts Grice’s theory of meaning and introduces the concept of intention into the discourse. This article aims to reveal the presupposition in the position of speech act theory, which is inevitably caught in a circle. The cause lies in neglecting a distinction between the utterer of language and the performer of the actions belonging to different subjects. As a result, the theory presupposes language as a coercive force that constitutes the cause of the alter ego’s act. Fichte’s theory of language, deduced from his Freiheitsphilosophie, could be a possible solution to resolve this. It distinguishes language from action and explicates language as a guide rather than a hindrance to freedom. This position defends freedom against neglect by the speech act theory. The paper also attempts to reconstruct a dialogue between Fichte’s and contemporary analytical philosophies.