Hunter Brown

This article argues against the longstanding view that William James's "Will to Believe" defends the "adoption" of certain beliefs, especially if such beliefs give rise to favourable consequences. I contend, rather, that James is resisting the cultural propensity to call for the "abandonment" of certain beliefs or propensities to believe. A failure to recognize this feature of his position has resulted from a widespread neglect of one of the three distinguishing characteristics of options and propositions which interest him in his essay: their liveness'. My analysis of liveness brings out its centrality and the impact of such centrality on James's position overall

Philosophy has traditionally engaged the problem of why there is something rather than nothing as a normal causal question. Such an approach, Hunter Brown proposes in Grace and Philosophy, does not do justice to the deep wonder and astonishment that the existence of the world elicits so widely among human beings. Such wonder has often been expressed in artistic and literary ways, including especially the language of grace, which captures the striking gratuity of existence and the spontaneous, grateful response so often evoked by it. Since the modern period, however, Brown argues, there has been a questionable narrowing of philosophy that privileges formal reasoning and theory over an engagement of immediate experience. Detached expertise, impersonal scholarship, and preoccupation with data have swept aside simple wonderment about the extraordinary gratuity of existence, and the remarkable ways in which such wonderment has been expressed. Against the grain of such widespread developments Grace and Philosophy proposes a perspective that maintains a place of importance in philosophy for such wonder and for the many forms in which it has manifested itself.

The purpose of this dissertation is to defend William James's will to believe doctrine from the main lines of criticism which have been levelled against it throughout the last century. Principal among such criticisms are accusations that James fideistically advocated an intrusion of the subject into doxastic practice which opens the door to wishful thinking, and that he confused belief and hypothesis-adoption. My defense of James against such charges will be based upon analyses of two important but neglected components of his position--the "liveness" of certain options and propositions, and the "strenuous mood"--and upon a contextualization of the role assigned by James to "passional nature" within the terms of reference of his work on immediate experience