Hunter Gentry

I argue that knowledge plays a distinctive role in psychological explanation that weaker epistemic states cannot because it is robust in the face of counterevidence in a way that they are not. Being robust in the face of counterevidence makes your belief robust in the face of counterargument. This makes knowledge well‐suited to facilitate epistemic social coordination. Since executive‐level belief revision works by running offline simulations that check for robustness in the face of counterargument, knowledge plays an explanatory role in executive‐level belief revision as well. The self‐monitoring system is in effect checking beliefs to make sure they are knowledge and revising them if they are not. It was selected for its ability to facilitate social coordination on the truth in this way. Assigning this explanatory role to knowledge allows us to see its importance while sidestepping major points of contention.

Simulation theory is a radical and yet increasingly popular view about episodic memory. It is the view that episodic memory and episodic simulation are the same natural kind. I argue that while simulation theory offers an important insight, it also makes an overreach. While episodic memory and episodic simulation likely reflect a common natural kind, they also differ in natural kind. They differ in natural kind because episodic memory is partly defined by projectible properties and memory trace mechanisms that episodic simulation lacks.

Verbal fluency tasks reveal clustering and switching patterns traditionally explained by strategic search or stochastic processes like Lévy or random walks. However, previous comparisons ignored how search processes interact with semantic structure, leaving unclear whether model performance reflects strategic mechanisms or fortuitous alignment with semantic organization. This study developed and validated a novel Area Restricted Search (ARS) agent‐based model of semantic memory retrieval, then systematically compared it against Lévy Walk (LW) and Random Walk (RW) models to investigate when different search mechanisms succeed under varying structural conditions. The model implements incremental decision‐making based on local information, without predetermined switching points or complete semantic space access. Semantic structure parameters were treated as free variables during optimization, allowing examination of process–structure interactions across diverse configurations. Performance was evaluated against 50 participants across three semantic categories using clustering, switching, and temporal variables. Two simulations examined model fit and adaptability to varying semantic structures. Different mechanisms require distinct semantic configurations: ARS performed well in moderate clustering, LW in sparse arrangements, and RW under dense clustering, but RW generated response distributions different from participants. However, when semantic density was constrained while varying cluster dispersion, ARS maintained human‐like performance across multiple configurations, while LW showed limited flexibility, and RW consistently failed to get close to participants' response distributions. These findings show that human‐like semantic memory retrieval across diverse contexts requires strategic mechanisms capable of dynamic adaptation to varying semantic organizations, rather than universal superiority of any single approach or of models based on context‐independent stochastic processes.

Which animals have episodic memory? One reason this is difficult to answer is that episodic memory could be expected to vary across species, making it hard to give a principled account of what ‘counts’ as an episodic memory system. In this paper, we propose that the investigation of episodic memory in animals should be guided by an account of its proximal proper functions: its most basic selected effects. In short, an animal has episodic memory if it has a memory system with the proximal functions of episodic memory. Whilst there are many accounts of episodic memory’s distal functions, little attention has been paid to its proximal functions. To remedy this, we develop a preliminary account of episodic memory’s proximal functions and use this to evaluate existing evidence about episodic memory in animals.

Neuroscientists are currently at loggerheads about whether to draw a distinction between the male brain and the female brain. The controversy is primarily rooted not in disagreement about first-order empirical results, but in conflicting assumptions about what is needed to establish a difference between two brain types. Understanding these commitments through the lens of philosophical work on natural kinds, I show that both sides of the debate adopt implausible assumptions about kindhood. Relying instead on a framework provided by cluster theories of natural kinds, I provide a philosophically- and empirically-motivated argument against the view that male and female brains are natural kinds. Because machine learning methods have played an increasingly important role in this debate, my argument has broader implications for the use of machine learning in science. I argue that we should not conflate supervised classification with scientific classification. Some unsupervised machine learning methods, however, might be able to help us identify natural kinds when applied with caution.

This paper provides a proof of principle for the philosophical theory of Trace Minimalism, a novel account of episodic memory. It claims that remembering goes without the storage of representational content in memory. Remembering rather consists in the construction of a representation of a scenario, previously experienced, through the interaction of minimal traces with acquired statistical regularities. A minimal trace merely constitutes a causal link to the experience but possesses no trans-temporally transmitted representational (viz. categorical and compositional) content. Our proof of principle uses a neuro-computational model that is based on an autoencoder modeling the visual pathway and a transformer modeling the semantic information network. It assumes the hippocampus as the host of minimal traces. Our model demonstrates that minimal traces, which lack sufficient information for reliable categorization and composition of content on their own, can be enhanced through interaction with semantic information. This process allows for the accurate construction of past scenarios, respecting regularities in the world and supporting the reliability of episodic memory. Our findings suggest that episodic memory relies on sparse, fragmentary information rather than stored content, providing a robust proof of principle that remembering is possible without representational memory traces.

This paper has two aims: first, to defend the claim that episodic memory is a distinct psychological capacity, and second, to propose a possible evolutionary function for this capacity. On the first score, I use two inferences to the best explanation to argue that it is likely that there is a human psychological capacity whose function it is to represent past experiences. To satisfy the second aim, I propose a distinct evolutionary function for the capacity of episodic memory, having to do with motivating prosocial behavior.

In the flurry of recent exchanges between defenders of moral encroachment and their critics, some of the finer details of particular encroachment accounts have only begun to receive critical attention. This is especially true concerning accounts of the putative wrong-making features of the beliefs to which defenders of moral encroachment draw our attention. Here I attempt to help move this part of the discussion forward by critically engaging two leading accounts. These come from Mark Schroeder and Rima Basu, respectively. The problem of explaining how the beliefs at issue have a morally significant impact on the people they are about will turn out to be difficult. However, this shouldn’t be taken to mean that the beliefs have no such significance. In any case, as I hope to show, there are resources available to the evidentialist for acknowledging that the beliefs at issue affect those they are about in morally relevant ways—indeed, that they harm the person in a way that results in a demand on even the most impeccably rational believer. This is not the demand that she abandon her belief, however. It is instead a demand for a substantial form of regret in relation to the belief, a doxastic analogue to Bernard Williams’ “agent-regret”. An evidentialism with space for this notion of regret shows promise for withstanding the moral encroachment challenge.

This paper focuses on the question of political anger's non-instrumental justification. I argue that the case for anger is strong where anger expresses a valuable form of valuing the good. It does so only when properly integrated with non-angry emotional responsiveness to the good. The account allows us to acknowledge the non-instrumentally bad side of anger while still delivering the intuitive verdict that anger is often justified. Moreover, it provides an avenue for criticizing much of the anger run amok in contemporary political life without directly engaging entrenched moral and political views.

When they are first introduced to the ethical study of humor, students and colleagues alike sometimes react skeptically. They worry that doing ethics about humor is somehow antithetical to the nature of humor, or that it risks impinging on what makes humor valuable. In this paper, I attempt to explore and explain this intuition. I provide an account of humor’s contribution to the good life which helps to explain how and in what sense we might think humor is resistant to ethics. I argue that humor, understood as a sort of play, is resistant to the introduction of practical ethical restrictions, which I call ethical taboos. This is because one of humor’s central contributions to the good life is in relieving us of the burdens of our social, moral, and political obligations. In this way, humor’s value is liberatory. Ethical taboos are exactly the sort of thing we engage in humor to escape, and so they counteract our reasons for engaging in the activity in the first place. I conclude this paper by discussing what some implications might follow from my account on humor ethics more generally. I argue that there may be ways to both preserve the integrity of humorous play and take deal with ethical issues unique to humor.

Simulation theory is a radical and yet increasingly popular view about episodic memory. It is the view that episodic memory and episodic simulation are the same natural kind. I argue that while simulation theory offers an important insight, it also makes an overreach. While episodic memory and episodic simulation likely reflect a common natural kind, they also differ in natural kind. They differ in natural kind because episodic memory is partly defined by projectible properties and memory trace mechanisms that episodic simulation lacks.

Embodied cognition is one of the foremost areas of study and research in philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology and cognitive science. The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition is an outstanding guide and reference source to the key topics and debates in this exciting subject and essential reading for any student and scholar of philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Extensively revised and enlarged for this second edition, it comprises forty-two chapters by an international team of expert contributors. Many existing chapters have been revised and seven new chapters added on: AI and robotics, predictive processing, second language learning, animal cognition, sport psychology, sense of self, and critiques of embodied cognition, bringing the handbook fully up to date with current research and debate.

The aim of this paper is to give an account of what it is to internalize a rule. I claim that internalization is the process of redistributing the burden of instruction from the teacher to the student. The process is complete when instruction is no longer needed, and the rule has reshaped perceptual classification of the circumstances in which it applies. Teaching a rule is the initiation of this process. We internalize rules by simulating instruction coming from someone else. Running these simulations enables us to toggle between the perspective of the instructor and our own perspective. By doing this we coordinate our perspectives with that of the teacher. The account given here provides a deeper explanation of why internalizing a rule involves the dispositions and reactive attitudes proponents of Rule Consequentialism often say it does, why moral reflection is variably demanding, how intergenerational moral progress is made possible by our cognitive architectures, and why the adoption of a rule should be understood in terms of teaching that rule.

How does the integration of mixed reality devices into our cognitive practices impact the mind from a metaphysical and epistemological perspective? In his innovative and interdisciplinary article, “Minds in the Metaverse: Extended Cognition Meets Mixed Reality” (2022), Paul Smart addresses this underexplored question, arguing that the use of a hypothetical application of the Microsoft HoloLens called “the HoloFoldit” represents a technologically high-grade form of extended cognizing from the perspective of neo-mechanical philosophy. This short commentary aims to (1) carve up the conceptual landscape of possible objections to Smart’s argument and (2) elaborate on the possibility of hologrammatically extended cognition, which is supposed to be one of the features of the HoloFoldit case that distinguishes it from more primitive forms of cognitive extension. In tackling (1), I do not mean to suggest that Smart does not consider or have sufficient answers to these objections. In addressing (2), the goal is not to argue for or against the possibility of hologrammatically extended cognition but to reveal some issues in the metaphysics of virtual reality upon which this possibility hinges. I construct an argument in favor of hologrammatically extended cognition based on the veracity of virtual realism (Chalmers, 2017) and an argument against it based on the veracity of virtual fctionalism (McDonnell and Wildman, 2019).

This paper offers a modeling account of episodic representation. I argue that the episodic system constructsmental models: representations that preserve the spatiotemporal structure of represented domains. In prototypical cases, these domains are events: occurrences taken by subjects to have characteristic structures, dynamics and relatively determinate beginnings and ends. Due to their simplicity and manipulability, mental event models can be used in a variety of cognitive contexts: in remembering the personal past, but also in future-oriented and counterfactual imagination. As structural representations, they allow surrogative reasoning, supporting inferences about their constituents which can be used in reasoning about the represented events.