Husein Inusah

The question of African science interrogates the possibility of devising an African- oriented methodology for scientific theorising. Apologias of African science propose at least three evidential rationales in defence of a scientific method claimed to be African – namely, (i) utility, (ii) uniqueness and (iii) secrecy. These three justifications enact theories of African science according to the article’s proposal of three major methodological perspectives – namely, (i) a functionalist perspective, (ii) a metaphysico-religious perspective and (iii) a critical-rationalist perspective. In an effort to explore the credentials of the discipline, scholars, by and large, have neglected a detailed analysis of the worth of the justifications that sustain African science. Consequently, the neglect has blurred an opportunity to appreciate the various ways in which the methodological justifications in themselves hand African science a spade to dig its own grave of stagnation. In this work, we take a holistic approach to enrich the discourse by examining the supposed justifications along with the methodological perspectives. Using the method of concept analysis, we establish that the sole focus on the much-exalted virtues used in justifying the legitimacy of African science inhibits growth by subtly echoing competition rather than complementarity. As such, consideration for growth should redirect the discipline to look beyond the interests of such justifications in pursuit of complementarity.

It is undeniable that people have beliefs about what actions are morally right. These beliefs play an important role in guiding moral action. Is it possible however to justify beliefs about what actions are morally right? How can beliefs of this sort be justified? Sinnott-Armstrong has advanced an epistemic regress argument against the justification of moral beliefs with the consequence that moral beliefs cannot be justified. This essay addresses the issue of the justification of moral beliefs to answer the question about how moral beliefs can be justified in response to Sinnott-Armstrong’s epistemic regress argument. It argues for the plausibility of Rawls’ reflective equilibrium as an adequate method of justification of moral beliefs. Three problems arise in the attempt to show that reflective equilibrium can adequately respond to Sinnott-Armstrong’s regress argument. These are vicious circularity, arbitrariness and epistemic moral disagreement. It is shown in this essay that these problems can be satisfactorily dealt with.

One of the main epistemic norms of mainstream epistemology revolves around how to reject epistemic relativism and embrace universalism. The argument has frequently been that different epistemological perspectives are incompatible and hence breed protracted disagreement. Being incompatible means that one cannot judge which of these incompatible epistemic viewpoints are valid. To mitigate this obstacle, it is argued that epistemic relativism should not be taken seriously because of its potential to promote protracted disagreement and conflict. In this essay, I argue that one of the foundations of cognitive injustices around the world emerges from this assumption that for there to be knowledge, one ought to embrace epistemological universalism while abandoning wholesale epistemic diversity. I do not only demonstrate that this assumption rests on a mistake but also that epistemological universalism, which is frequently deployed to support the norm of dissolving difference, is a hidden relativism. The rest of the essay examines the virtues of epistemic relativism to the prospect of epistemic diversity within the context of decoloniality.

A corporation’s moral obligation is said to be sustained by two viewpoints: the narrow and broad views. The narrow view restrains a corporation’s moral obligation to the corporation’s owners and shareholders while the broad view, which is often deployed to support Corporate Social Responsibility initiatives, extends the corporation’s moral obligation towards others beyond the confines of the corporation walls to include all stakeholders, and the environment in which the corporation operates and so on. We argue from an ethical perspective that this dichotomy is a facade. We conclude that the broad view is indeed a narrow view in disguise.