Hyun Kim

Wie Marx geht auch Žižek davon aus, dass Gerechtigkeit nicht innerhalb eines kapitalistischen Gesellschaftssystems erreicht werden kann. Beide betonen die Notwendigkeit revolutionärer Veränderungen und kritisieren reformistische Bestrebungen, die dazu dienen, bestehende Verhältnisse zu stützen. Žižeks Sicht auf das Verhältnis von Recht, Gewalt und Gerechtigkeit ist hingegen von Benjamin beeinflusst. Für Benjamin ist ein jedes Rechtsystem eine Machtsetzung, die nur durch göttliche Gewalt überwunden werden kann. Žižek greift auf das Konzept der göttlichen Gewalt zurück und verbindet es mit seinem Begriff von revolutionärer Gewalt als Medium radikaler Politik.

Žižek geht von der Notwendigkeit von Gewalt für authentische Politik aus. Die Anerkennung von Gewalt zur Umwälzung bestehender Ordnungen und zur gesellschaftlichen Transformation ist ein wesentlicher Bestandteil von seiner politischer Philosophie. Žižek unterscheidet dabei zwischen subjektiver und objektiver Gewalt, die symbolische und systemische Gewalt umfasst. Diese Unterscheidung dient dazu, die objektive Gewalt als die grundlegendere Gewalt zu erkennen, die auf einer tieferen Ebene als Ursache für den Ausbruch subjektiver Gewalt fungiert. Beide Gewaltformen sind komplementär aufeinander verwiesen.

Mein Beitrag geht von der These aus, dass Gehlens Begriff vom ‚Mängelwesen‘ nicht im Sinne eines mangelhaften Wesens, sondern eines unfertigen bzw. unabgeschlossenen Wesens verstanden werden soll. Demzufolge ist der Mensch eine Entität, der es an sich selbst mangelt. Gerade diese fehlende Identität veranlasst ihn dazu, die Technik zu erfinden, mit der er sich selbst erst erfinden kann. Der Mensch ist ein leerer Platz, der durch die Erfindung der (Kultur-)Technik erst besetzt wird. Diese Konzeption des Menschen verlangt einen neuen Begriff der Agency sowie der Technik. Zum einen soll die gängige Auffassung, dass nur der Mensch eine Agency, eine Wirkmacht, besitze, kritisch revidiert werden. Zum anderen soll die Auffassung der Technik als Organerweiterung, -verstärkung, -ersatz, Prothese etc. kritisch überprüft werden. Die Technik ist weder Mittel noch Objekt, sondern vielmehr die materielle und technologische Bedingung, die die Beziehung zwischen Mensch und Umwelt erst konstituiert.

Background Conventional consent practices face ethical challenges in continuously evolving digital health environments due to their static, one-time nature. Dynamic consent offers a promising solution, providing adaptability and flexibility to address these ethical concerns. However, due to the immaturity of the concept and accompanying technology, dynamic consent has not yet been widely used in practice. This study aims to identify the facilitators of and barriers to adopting dynamic consent in real-world scenarios. Methods This scoping review, conducted in December 2022, adhered to the PRISMA Extension for Scoping Reviews guidelines, focusing on dynamic consent within the health domain. A comprehensive search across Web of Science, PubMed, and Scopus yielded 22 selected articles based on predefined inclusion and exclusion criteria. Results The facilitators for the adoption of dynamic consent in digital health ecosystems were the provision of multiple consent modalities, personalized alternatives, continuous communication, and the dissemination of up-to-date information. Nevertheless, several barriers, such as consent fatigue, the digital divide, complexities in system implementation, and privacy and security concerns, needed to be addressed. This study also investigated current technological advancements and suggested considerations for further research aimed at resolving the remaining challenges surrounding dynamic consent. Conclusions Dynamic consent emerges as an ethically advantageous method for digital health ecosystems, driven by its adaptability and support for continuous, two-way communication between data subjects and consumers. Ethical implementation in real-world settings requires the development of a robust technical framework capable of accommodating the diverse needs of stakeholders, thereby ensuring ethical integrity and data privacy in the evolving digital health landscape.

This paper examines Kierkegaard’s concept of the leap, Carl Schmitt’s concept of the exception, Benjamin’s concept of the origin and the extreme and tries to demonstrate that they all derive from a contingent foundation stipulating that the reason can fulfill its founding function only because of its own absence. According to these concepts, not the reason itself but the very absence of the last reason makes the foundation of the multiplicity of reasons possible. They assume a paradox figure of the reason, in which the figure of the foundation coincides with the figure of the withdrawal.

The task of defining intentional action has given rise to heated debates in contemporary philosophy. I will show that it is not enough to fully understand the phenomena of intentional action by analyzing only the agent’s reasons that accompany each type of action. The solution for the problem generated by the Standard Account in explaining intentional action is to rethink the notion of intentional action and I approached the issue of intentional action by focusing on the role of normative considerations in determining whether an action was performed intentionally. The reason why we need to take normative considerations is derived from the falsity of the Simple View, which is to say that there is a gap between what is required for intending to Φ and what is sufficient for intentionally Φ-ing. By focusing on this aspect I provide a novel definition of intentional action. The definition recommends itself as being capable of dealing with many problems, including the problems raised by unintended side effects and lucky actions.

BackgroundExperience with open disclosure and its study are restricted to certain western countries. In addition, there are concerns that open disclosure may be less suitable in non-western countries. The present study explored and compared the in-depth perceptions of the general public and physicians regarding open disclosure in Korea.MethodsWe applied the COREQ checklist to this qualitative study. We conducted 20 in-depth interviews and four focus group discussions with 16 physicians and 18 members of the general public. In-depth interviews and focus group discussions were performed according to semi-structured guidelines developed according to a systematic review of open disclosure. We conducted a directed content analysis by analyzing the verbatim transcripts and field notes in accordance with the predetermined guidelines.ResultsOpen disclosure perceptions were summarized in terms of the “five Ws and one H”. All physician and general public participants acknowledged the normative justifiability of open disclosure. The participants mostly agreed on the known effects of open disclosure, but the physicians had negative opinions on its expected effects, such as decreased intention of the general public to file lawsuits and increased credibility of medical professionals. Generally, the participants thought that open disclosure is required for medical errors causing major harm. However, the physicians and general public had conflicting opinions on the need for open disclosure of near misses. Most physicians did not know how to conduct open disclosure and some physicians had bad experiences due to inappropriate or incomplete open disclosure.ConclusionPhysicians and the general public in Korea acknowledge the need for open disclosure. Guidelines according to the type of patient safety incident are required to encourage physicians to more readily conduct open disclosure. Furthermore, hospitals need to consider organizing a dedicated team and hiring experts for open disclosure.

The problem of mental causation results from some unwarranted metaphysical assumption: the Principle of Nomological Character of Causality. However, there is little reason to understand causation in the manner required to make NCC work. The motivation for the demand for laws in action explanations stems at least in part from the fact that the laws cited in explanations are the laws that subsume events in naturalistic causal relations. By rejecting the idea that causal explanation is causal because it is grounded in natural causal relations, the motivation for requiring laws in explanations disappears. I claim that this is the reason why we need to pay attention to our practice and explanatory strategies. By rejecting NCC we can in fact arrive at a sustainable, defensible and rewarding account of mental causation. The primacy of explanatory practice over the ontological commitment reverses such that an explanation is causal if we accept it as such. By reinterpreting the notion of causation we regain the causal efficacy of the mental. We look to a theory of intentional action for help in answering the problem of mental causation. In this work I provide a novel conception of intentional action by distinguishing normative reasons from motivating reasons. The proposal recommends itself as being capable of dealing with many problems, including the problems raised by unintended side effects and lucky actions. More importantly, the proposal is able to deal with the problem of causal deviance and consequently is promising in that it avoids epiphenomenalism of mental properties. I conclude the criteria for intentional action must be wide enough to include the normative perspectives of a third-point of view as well as the psychological perspectives.