İ. Berk Özcangiller

Bu çalışmanın amacı eski zamanda olduğu kadar şimdide de ahlaki, politik, dini, epistemolojik, metafizik pek çok tartışma ve yaşam alanının sorunlarını kuşatan tolerans kavramına dair hem genel bir çerçeve sunmak hem de yeni bir öneri de bulunmaktır. Tarih boyunca farklı tolerans anlayışları yaşamaya ilişkin sorunlara çare bulmak adına ortaya konulmuştur. Bu tolerans anlayışları nelerdir? Bunları birleştiren ortak unsurlar var mıdır? Farklı tolerans anlayışları neye çare aramaktadırlar? Bu tolerans anlayışlarının artı ve eksi yanları nelerdir? Son olarak yeni bir tolerans anlayışı ortaya koymak mümkün müdür? Bu gibi sorular bu makalenin cevaplamayı amaçladığı soruları oluşturur. Bunun için de öncelikle tolerans kavramın etimolojisi ve anlamları, sonrasında tolerans kavramının ana bileşenleri, bunu takiben farklı tolerans biçimleri analiz edilecek ve son olarak da yeni bir tolerans anlayışının imkânı tartışılacaktır.

In Ancient Greek, different philosophical teachings agree that the distinctive characteristic of human is reason (logos, ratio). According to Platonist, Aristotelian and Epicurean views, human beings, unlike plants or animals, attain the highest good, i.e., happiness when they live under the guidance of reason without denying their irrational nature. However, Stoicism differs from these teachings with regard to the relation between the irrational and rational nature of humans. The main reason for this difference is due to the difference in Stoic view regarding the nature of the soul. Contrary to Platonic, Aristotelian and Epicurist views, in the traditional Stoicism, the soul is not separable into parts, instead it has an integral structure. That is precisely why Stoic theory of emotion (pathos) differs from other theories of emotion too. While other teachings defend the view that in order to achieve happiness emotions should be simply moderated, Stoics argue that to achieve happiness, emotions must be completely eliminated. Another argument that they use to defend this view is that emotions are judgments. In this respect, Stoicism introduces a novelty both with its teachings regarding the nature of the soul and with respect to the relationship between emotion and reason. While in other philosophical views, reason and emotion are different parts of the soul that can coexist simultaneously, in Stoicism emotion and reason are two faculties of the soul that cannot be present at the same time. In other words, when the soul has the faculty of reason, it cannot have the faculty of emotion, and vice versa. In brief, the aim of this paper is to explain why the Stoics argue (based on their unique account of human soul) that in order to achieve happiness, emotions should be completely eliminated.

The aim of this essay is to elucidate the emergence of the concept of Spirit, which constitutes the concrete unity of the oppositions encountered by consciousness, through the lens of Hegel’s theory of action. The key section of Phenomenology of Spirit that serves as the focal point of this inquiry is the moment of Reason titled "The Spiritual Animal Kingdom and Deceit, or the Matter in Hand Itself." In its pursuit of self-realization, Reason presents various forms of the relationship between individuality and its opposite, universality. Initially, rational consciousness seeks to discover itself in the external world through a theoretical and passive approach. However, the inability to reconcile this opposition compels Reason to transition into practical reason, attempting to actualize itself through its own activity. At this juncture, Hegel’s concept of action becomes crucial for resolving the tension between individuality and universality in the transition from Practical Reason to Spirit. Through this concept of action, Hegel reveals a fundamental truth: individuality and universality are not mutually exclusive but rather interdependent for their very existence. In this study, the dialectic between the individual and the universal will first be examined in the context of the relationship between action and work, and subsequently through the notion of "the matter in hand itself" as action. Finally, the conclusion will offer an assessment of the role of action in facilitating the transition from Practical Reason to Spirit.

The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between subject and object—or more broadly, the problem of thought and being—which stands as one of the most fundamental issues in the history of philosophy, particularly in modern philosophy. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit serves as our primary guide in addressing this problem, as it provides the most foundational framework for understanding and resolving the subject-object relationship within the context of Hegel’s concept of subjectivity. This thesis aims to explore how Hegel approaches the subject-object problem in a manner distinct from other modern philosophers, emphasizing his unique conception of subjectivity. To achieve this, we will closely follow the dialectical path laid out in Phenomenology of Spirit. As we traverse the various stages of consciousness outlined in the work, we will ultimately arrive at Hegel’s conception of truth—not merely as substance, but equally as subject—thereby revealing a resolution to the subject-object problem.

Bu makalede Takiyettin Mengüşoğlu’na göre din ile felsefe arasındaki ilişki incelenecektir. Öncelikle Mengüşoğlu’nun felsefe ve özelde de felsef antropoloji anlayışı ve ardından da din anlayışı açıklanacaktır. Bunu takiben, Mengüşoğlu’nun Kantçı bir yaklaşımla felsefeyi dinden ayırıp her ikisine de mutlak bir otonomluk vererek bağlantısız kılması Hegel’in din ve felsefe anlayışı temelinde eleştiriye tabi tutulacaktır. Buna göre makalenin ana sorusu şudur: Eğer din, bir yandan felsef antropolojinin ve felsefenin önemli bir problemi olup, inanma fenomeni olması bakımından da insanın bir varlık koşuluysa, diğer yandan sorulara verdiği yanıtların insanın yapıp-etmelerine etkide bulunmaması nasıl mümkün olabilir? Başka bir deyişle, umutsuz yaşaması olanaksız olan insanın, “Ne umabiliriz?” sorusuna cevap veren dini, gerçek dünyaya ve insan işlerine etkisiz ve ayrı bir alanda bırakabilmesi olanaklı mıdır? Bu sorulara cevap olarak Mengüşoğlu’nun metinlerine dayanarak din ile felsefe ilişkisinin onun iddia ettiği gibi birbirlerine nüfus etmeyen bağımsız alanlar olamayacakları savunulacaktır. Bu savunmayı yaparken din-felsefe ilişkisi Hegelci bağlamda yeniden kurulacaktır.

The aim of this article is to show that ontological toleration is an important component of recognition in the realization of ethical life (as “the living good”) and true freedom. To achieve this aim, I will propose a new reading of Hegel’s account of recognition and its union with toleration by appealing to his arguments of the master-slave dialectic in relation to “something and an other” and the One in the Science of Logic. By doing so, I hope to present a Hegelian account of toleration as a precondition for recognition, and thereby, fill a gap in the current literature on recognition and its relation to toleration. Although there are many articles on Hegel’s theory of recognition, there are only a few texts on Hegel’s account of toleration, which shows that it has been a largely neglected topic in the literature. As I will demonstrate in this article, toleration, specifically −what I call− ontological toleration is an important and an indispensable part of Hegel’s theory of recognition, which plays a foundational role for his account of ethical life and true freedom.

Hem günümüz tartışmalarını daha iyi anlayabilmek hem de ruh üzerine kendi düşüncelerimizi oluşturabilmek adına daha önce konuyla ilgili ortaya konmuş farklı teorilerin ve argümanların bilinmesini elzem bulduğumuzdan felsefe tarihinin önemli filozofarının ruh üzerine düşüncelerini inceleyen ve günümüzdeki tartışmalara ışık tutan makaleleri sizin için derledik. Amacımız hem konuyla ilgili akademik literatüre katkı sağlamak hem de bunu yaparken herkesin anlayabileceği bir dil kullanarak, akademinin dışında felsefeyle ilgilenenlere de ulaşabilmektir. Bu kitap ile meslektaşlarımızın ve felsefe öğrencilerinin yararlanacağı bir kaynak ve felsefeye ilgi duyan herkesin okuyup konuya dair merakını giderebileceği kapsamlı bir çalışma ortaya koymayı diliyoruz.

Nicolaus Cusanus, considered one of the most important German thinkers by many historians of philosophy, has yet to receive the recognition he deserves in the phil-osophical circles in Turkey. However, the philosophical writings of Cusanus contain the seeds of the thoughts of many modern philosophers such as Descartes, Berkeley, Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel. For this reason, studies on Cusanus are an essen-tial stopping point in the history of philosophy, especially for the Renaissance period and the transition to modern philosophy. Despite this, texts examining Cusanus' thoughts are limited in foreign languages and Turkish. Towards the end of the 19th century, studies on Cusanus started and recently the worldwide interest in Cusanus has increased. Although there are different theses about the original as-pect of Cusanus’ thoughts in these sources, his theory of knowledge and the rela-tionship of this theory with the contemporary subject of philosophy of subjectivity attract attention. The reason for this is that Cusanus, unlike his contemporaries, as a result of his views on the human mind, makes the human center in the act of knowing and puts everything else into the mind's mediation. That is why people can know things not as they are in themselves, but only in so far, they are part of the conceptual world, that their own mind constructs that. This is a system of thought that on the one hand puts the human mind at the center through its act of knowing on the other hand, limits its knowledge. This centrality of the human mind led Cusanus to characterize man as the second god on earth. The main reason for characterizing man as the second god is the activity of knowing and the act of measuring that lies at the core of this activity. Despite its significance, there is no study focusing on man’s creativity in this world through the relationship between Cusanus’s conception of man as the second god and the human mind’s activity of measurement, which reveals the originality of Cusanus’ thought. This study aims to fill this gap in the literature. To achieve this aim, this study examines the act of measurement of man as the second god, which reveals the originality of Cusanus’ theory of knowledge associated with modern and contemporary philosophy.

The relationship between God and humans has been a matter of controversy that interests both philosophers and theologians alike. Establishing a relationship between the infinite God and finite human is particularly challenging if one admits that God and humans are substantially different from each other. The biblical doctrine of the image of God responds to this challenge by stating that the relationship between God and humans is a kind of likeness or assimilation. This doctrine does not only establish the nature of the relationship between God and humans but also views both God's and humans’ nature in a particular way and determines humans’ purpose and distinguishing feature in relation to God. While there is a very long and extensive tradition focusing on identifying the similarities and differences between God and humans to determine the precise relationship between them in light of this doctrine, this paper will focus on Nicolaus Cusanus' original contribution to this long-lasting debate. In order to emphasize Cusanus' differences from his predecessors, I will present a general historical background of the doctrine of the image of God. In particular, I will point out the main tenets of Greek and Latin patristic traditions by identifying their differences and shared assumptions. Additionally, I will briefly present Augustine's dynamic account of the image of God, which holds an important place both in the discussion among these traditions and in the development of Cusanus' doctrine of the human mind as the living image of God. As this paper will demonstrate, Cusanus improves upon Augustine's account by allowing humans to be considered as an equal image of God, which was attributed only to Jesus by Augustine. Cusanus thinks that the human mind can be considered equal to the divine mind because it demonstrates characteristics of free creative activity and being the cause of something from nothing in cognition. Moreover, to elaborate Cusanus' original contribution to this debate, I will explain how the human mind reflects the triadic nature of divine mind in itself through its cognitive activity by giving a detailed account of Cusanus’ theory of cognition as assimilation. This explanation will also show how reading Cusanus' theory of cognition as assimilation alongside the concept of equality exhibits the principle of ‘identity in difference’ in both the nature of the human mind and its relationship with the divine mind.