Ian J. Campbell

According to the orthodox interpretation of Zeno's plurality paradoxes defended by Platonists, these arguments indirectly defend Parmenidean monism by showing that things are not many. But Simplicius, and the various other orthodox interpreters whom he discusses, were aware of and attempted to undermine a competing ‘heterodox’ interpretations, which were prominent in the peripatetic tradition, according to which some of Zeno’s arguments pose a threat to, or even specifically target, Parmenides. I argue that our surviving peripatetic reports according to which Zeno challenged the idea that any being qualifies as a 'one' are credible and that attempts by ancient orthodox interpreters to accommodate these heterodox reports are not successful.

Some Aristotle-inspired theorists contend that agents possess and exercise two-way causal powers: a single power that has two distinct and opposed manifestations, at least one of which is an action. In this paper, I argue that Aristotle recognizes no such power. The possessor of a rational power—which I argue is the most plausible candidate for such a two-way power in Aristotle (§2)—can bring about two distinct and contrary changes. But the immediate activity of a rational power itself is simply a matter of contemplating the account of one or the other of two contrary objects of knowledge (§§3-4). This ‘two-way’ character of knowledge does not reflect a special feature of human knowers: a rational power that consists in knowing the account of one contrary (F+) enables one to know the account of the other (F–) simply because what it is to be F+ is part of what it is to be F– (§5). Rational powers are thus not single origins of the opposed changes that their possessors produce. Instead, the account of F+ is one power in a causal chain involving a plurality of powers that ultimately leads to the production of F+ or F– (§6).

Interpreters of Plato’s Euthydemus have often detected apparent Eleatic allegiances in the dialogue’s eponymous character and his brother Dionysodorus. However, according to another prominent line of interpretation, we should not attribute any doctrinal commitments to the eristic brothers in the Euthydemus. Indeed, the latter view seems to gain support from Socrates’ claim that the brothers’ ‘eristic wisdom’ enables them to refute whatever their interlocutor says, regardless of whether it is true or false (Euthyd. 272a7-b1). In this paper, I show that Plato does in fact attribute certain doctrinal commitments to Euthydemus and argue that these commitments are closely related to his larger argumentative practice. On the view I propose, Euthydemus’ aim in refuting his opponents is not simply to propound contradictions and paradoxes. He instead reduces his interlocutors to self-contradiction with the ultimate aim of defending a philosophical doctrine that provides one with a way out of these paradoxes. More precisely, I take the philosophical doctrine that Euthydemus defends to be a radical form of monism, often associated with the Eleatics and I suggest that the argumentative practice by which he defends this doctrine to also has Eleatic pedigree. On the reading I propose, Euthydemus’ ultimate aim in propounding his refutations is to reveal that his interlocutor’s apparently commonsense opinions are likewise paradoxical, and thus do not enjoy a greater plausibility than the radical monism that he espouses.

In Metaphysics Γ.3, Aristotle argues that it is impossible to deny the PNC. However, as several commentators—including Code, Barnes, Priest, Kirwan, and Dancy—have objected, Aristotle’s argument appears to rely on the invalid inference from 1 to 2 as follows: 1. For all p, it is impossible to believe that p and not-p. 2. Therefore, it is impossible to believe that it is possible that there is a p such that p and not-p. We argue that this objection turns on a misunderstanding of Aristotle’s text, and that Aristotle's argument is valid and quite strong.

Scholars often suppose that those who employ sophistical refutations seek argumentative victory alone. By surveying Aristotle’s testimonies about this argumentative practice, I argue that, in Aristotle’s strict sense of the term, sophistry involves using refutations in order to support certain controversial doctrines, thereby gaining a reputation for wisdom. In particular, sophists support these doctrines by presenting them as the solutions to the contradictions and paradoxes in which they ensnare their interlocutors.

According to the Standard Definition ‘a fallacious argument, as almost every account from Aristotle onwards tells you, is one that seems to be valid but is not so’ ( Hamblin 1970 : 12). Scholars take this definition to be problematic in part because ‘appearances can vary from person to person, thus making the same argument a fallacy for the one who is taken in by the appearance, and not a fallacy for the one who sees past the appearances’ ( Hansen 2020 : §4.2). We argue that Aristotle's treatment of fallacy is not subjective in the way that critics of the Standard Definition allege.

This paper considers the use that Plato makes of the Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC) in his engagements with eristic refutations. By examining Plato’s use of the principle in his most detailed engagements with eristic—in the Sophist, the discussion of “agonistic” argumentation in the Theaetetus, and especially the Euthydemus—I aim to show that the pressure exerted on Plato by eristic refutations played a crucial role in his development of the PNC, and that the principle provided him with a much more sophisticated means of demarcating philosophical argumentation from eristic than he is generally thought to have. In particular, I argue that Plato’s qualified formulation of the PNC restricts the class of genuine contradictions in such a way that reveals the contradictions that eristics produce through their refutations to be merely apparent and that Plato consistently appeals to his qualified conception of genuine contradiction in his encounters with eristics in order to demonstrate that their refutations are merely apparent. The paper concludes by suggesting that the conception of genuine contradiction afforded by the PNC did not just provide Plato with a way of demarcating genuine from eristic refutations, but also with an answer to substantive philosophical challenges that eristics raised through their refutations.

Interpreters of Isocrates’ Busiris tend either to think it is an unsuccessful work because it represents the very sort of paradoxical literature that Isocrates frequently criticizes, or to take the speech to be a serious work only insofar as it demonstrates pure encomiastic form. I argue that the Busiris is an educational tract whose content Isocrates takes seriously. In his encomium of Busiris (XI.10-29) and his defense of that encomium vis-à-vis Polycrates’ Defense of Busiris (XI.30-43), Isocrates uses an engagement with the rival rhetorician Polycrates to advance two pieces of propaganda: the superiority of his own education in persuasive speeches on important political matters over the education offered by Polycrates as well as the relevance and importance of the Panhellenic political agenda that his education ultimately serves.

This paper examines the way in which Plato, in the Euthydemus, exposes sophistical refutations that exploit various forms of linguistic ambiguity. In arguing that Plato is capable of doing this, the argument of this paper challenges a common view according to which Plato lacks the technical resources necessary to diagnose fallacious arguments that turn on ambiguity. I argue instead that Plato has a much more robust sensitivity to ambiguity and its pernicious effects on philosophical arguments than has been recognized, that he has at his disposal various strategies for exposing the eristic refutations that exploit linguistic ambiguity as merely apparent refutations, and that Plato's treatment of these arguments laid important groundwork for Aristotle’s understanding of genuine refutation in the Sophistici Elenchi.

Abstract:In this paper, I evaluate the possibility of convergence between animal welfare and environmental ethics. By surveying the most prominent views within each of these respective camps, I argue that animal welfare ethics and ecological theories in environmental ethics are incommensurable in virtue of their respective individualistic and holistic value theories. I conclude by arguing that this conceptual clarification allows us to see that animal welfare ethics can nevertheless be made commensurable with theories in environmental ethics according to which value primarily resides in individuals, rather than in collectives and communities.