Ian James Kidd

This paper explores the relationship between suffering and pessimism in its philosophical forms. I argue that the heterogeneity of both of those concepts means that there are no simple relations between them. One can trace several distinct relationships between (forms of) suffering and (varieties of) philosophical pessimism. Suffering can be evidence for one’s pessimistic judgments, or feature among the bad-making features of human life, but also be a consequence of adopting pessimism. Indeed, one risk in being philosophically pessimistic is that can be contribute to our suffering, whether by disrupting our agency, undermining our convictions about the value of our own existence or that of humankind, or by contributing new negative emotions and experiences. If so, scholars working in philosophy of suffering and on philosophical pessimism have much work to do in cataloguing the variety of ways of becoming and being pessimistic and tracing their relations to forms of suffering.

Assigning responsibility for terrorist actions requires, among other things, understanding of the factors that motivate and entrench terrorist beliefs. This chapter endorses a normative approach to the epistemology of terrorism called multidimensionalism, focusing on etiological questions about the sources and causes of terrorist beliefs. The chapter offers a description of multidimensionalism informed by recent work by Quassim Cassam, exemplified in terrorism studies by Richard English and Lisa Stampnitzky, among others. When etiological studies of terrorist beliefs fail to be properly multidimensional, they run the risk of becoming epistemically myopic, a concept elaborated in terms of failures of explanatory breadth and depth. The dangers of epistemic myopia are illustrated with a critical discussion of two influential models of the etiology of terrorism, the radicalization model and the rational agent model. The author concludes that properly multidimensional approaches to the etiology of terrorism are vital to attempts to assign responsibility for terrorist actions.

This chapter interprets Confucius' life of moral action as an expression of a kind of deep courage. This is the courage that sustains a steadfast commitment to a way of life in a world hostile to its values and aspirations. Confucius evinces at least two related aspects of deep courage: (i) the courage to pursue an assailed way of life and (ii) the courage to promote that way of life to other people. This deep virtuous courage is related to Confucius's suffering due to his pursuit of an assailed way of life within a world increasingly hostile to his moral ideals.

In this chapter we explore Feyerabend’s relationship to Karl Marx, with a focus on their respective views on politics. Throughout Feyerabend’s writings, there are references to Marx and his written work, to the historical Marxist tradition and to later scholars of Marxist philosophy. After a brief discussion of the intellectual-historical, disciplinary and personal contexts behind these engagements with Marxism, we develop a comparison of their views on politics. We identify two points of major divergence in their views, namely those regarding the dynamics of political change and those regarding the ultimate end of politics. We conclude by offering several themes for ‘dialogue’ between Marx and Feyerabend, suggesting the possibility of future work.

The world’s spiritual traditions incorporate a variety of types of exemplar, persons who exemplify a life of aspiration to, or attainment of, spiritual goods. Within Buddhism, the range of exemplars includes monastics, bodhisattvas, the Zen masters and the Buddha himself. Spiritual exemplars are typically described as having a distinctive form of bodily beauty, closely related to their ethical and spiritual qualities, that manifests as a form of radiance, luminosity or charisma. Drawing on recent work on beauty, virtue and the body in the Buddhist tradition, I propose an aesthetics of spiritual exemplarity, arguing that certain spiritual traditions – including Buddhism – are distinctive by virtue of their capacity to generate new forms of experiences of embodied moral beauty.

Most historians explain changes in conceptions of the epistemic virtues and vices in terms of social and historical developments. I argue that such approaches, valuable as they are, neglect the fact that certain changes also reflect changes in metaphysical sensibilities. Certain epistemic virtues and vices are defined relative to an estimate of our epistemic situation that is, in turn, defined by a broader vision or picture of the nature of reality. I defend this claim by charting changing conceptions of the virtue of epistemic humility in nineteenth century intellectual culture, focusing on claims about the humility or hubris of the Victorian scientific naturalists.

In the philosophical work of Mary Midgley, one defining theme is a careful and steadfast resistance to varieties of myopic thinking: problematically partial ways of perceiving, thinking about, and understanding the world. I argue that active resistance to myopic thinking reveals a unity and continuity to most, if not all, of her concerns, projects, and interventions. This claim is defended by exploring Midgley’s active anti-myopia as it manifests in her various contributions to philosophical discussions of the ethics and epistemology of animal life.

This paper offers an overview of the philosophical work on epistemic injustices as it relates to psychiatry. After describing the development of epistemic injustice studies, we survey the existing literature on its application to psychiatry. We describe how the concept of epistemic injustice has been taken up into a range of debates in philosophy of psychiatry, including the nature of psychiatric conditions, psychiatric practices and research, and ameliorative projects. The final section of the paper indicates future directions for philosophical research of epistemic injustices and psychiatry, concerning neurocognitive disorders, identity prejudices in psychiatric illness, concepts of epistemic privilege in psychiatry, and the prospects for combining phenomenological psychopathology and epistemic justice. We argue that much remains to be done in the conceptualization of these epistemic injustices and suggest that this future work should be multidisciplinary in character and sensitive to the phenomenology of psychiatric conditions.

I offer a new interpretation of Feyerabend’s ‘conquest of abundance’ narrative. I consider and reject both the ontological reading as implausible and the ‘historical’ reading as uncompelling. My own proposal is that the ‘conquest of abundance’ be understood in terms of an impoverishment of the richness of human experience. For Feyerabend, such abundance is ‘conquered’ when individuals internalize distorting epistemic prejudices including those integral to the theoretical conceptions associated with the sciences. I describe several ways, identified by Feyerabend, in which individuals can be led to occlude the richness of their experience in ways that are existentially impoverishing.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Religion, Psychiatry, and “Radical” Epistemic InjusticesRosa Ritunnano, MD (bio) and Ian James Kidd, PhD (bio)Hermeneutical injustice as a concept has evolved since its original formulation by Miranda Fricker (2007). The concept has been taken up in psychiatry, with its moral, epistemic and clinical premium on the interpretation of extremely complex and difficult experiences (Kidd et al., 2022). There are many varieties of hermeneutical injustice with different forms, sources, degrees, effects, and interpersonal and socio-structural aspects (Medina, 2017). José Eduardo Porcher has proposed the addition of a new form of ‘radical’ hermeneutical injustice, with a case study of psychotic symptoms involving religious content.He offers different characterizations of this injustice:a particularly radical form of injustice, namely, having their own interpretation of their experiences unjustifiably undermined.a form of hermeneutical injustice that occurs when a patient diagnosed with psychosis is denied the opportunity of interpreting their own experiences within their own religious framework.These are different things. Denying someone the opportunity to interpret their experiences in their own, preferred framework is one way of undermining their interpretations. Another is forcing someone to use your own preferred framework and then belittling their own, which seems doubly wrong. Misusing some preferred interpretive framework can be as unjust as not using it. The two definitions could be combined, but then much will depend on what it means to undermine someone’s interpretation of an experience. We think there is a form of radical hermeneutical injustice—different to the one described by Porcher. Some interpretations of kinds of experience with religious content can be undermined if one is committed to a metaphysical naturalism. In these cases, one person cannot regard someone’s interpretive framework as coherent or intelligible (one that involves supernatural entities, for instance).Most discussions of hermeneutical injustice focus on social structures. Fricker notes structural dimensions to hermeneutical injustice. In a standard case, a group has unequal participation in collective practices for making and using interpretive resources (Ritunnano, 2022). In a rich analysis, José Medina describes four ‘axes’ or dimensions for distinguishing forms of hermeneutical injustice [End Page 235] (Medina, 2017). The source of these injustices can be semantic or performative. The dynamics may be structural or interpersonal, or both. Moreover, there are different degrees of breadth and depth, defined here in terms of the ‘reach’ of the injustice across one’s life, and the depth of damage to one’s hermeneutic agency, respectively (Medina, 2017, p. 45). On this model, what might count as ‘radical’ hermeneutical injustices? Deep and broad hermeneutical injustices can be radical when they are very broad in scope and very deeply damaging. This might be what Porcher has in mind. But we think there is a further option, relevant to his case study.Porcher focuses on a case where individuals experience unusual beliefs and perceptions with religious content receive a ‘psychosis’ diagnosis. The alleged injustice is that the possibility of a genuine religious experience is not recognized and validated. The example is Femi, a young man with Christian background, who enters the mental health system following the onset of psychotic ‘symptoms’. After being found “disoriented and depleted in public” – tired and undernourished—Femi is compulsorily admitted to hospital, explaining he undertook fasting and isolation in response to orders from God. During this time, Femi devoted himself to Bible reading and stopped going to work. In hospital, where the authenticity of God’s voice is challenged by clinicians, Femi is treated for acute psychosis with pharmacotherapy. While remission of symptoms follow, there is no functional recovery, and Femi is described as “unmotivated and apathetic”.Femi interpreted his experiences in religious terms, but this interpretation is not accepted or pursued by the clinicians. Is this a hermeneutical injustice? If so, is it a ‘radical’ one? Granted, Femi’s religious interpretation may be psychologically adaptive—enhancing his sense of life as meaningful (Ritunnano & Bortolotti, 2022). But this is consistent with it being a hermeneutical injustice. Plus, a religious framing may be conducive to his functional recovery after being discharged, especially in conjunction with a supportive religious community, able to help him articulate, understand, and respond to those religious experiences (see Cottingham, 2005; Wynn, 2005). However, none of...

This paper explores the phenomenon of vulnerabilisation in relation to the experiences of persons with chronic illnesses. We distinguish a range of kinds of vulnerability, including epistemic vulnerabilities related to epistemic injustices, and describe various interpersonal and institutional processes which can create, exacerbate and intensify those vulnerabilities. The dynamics of vulnerabilisation are related to individual vices and institutional failings, the pervasive pathophobia of many societies and various contingent life-events. We conclude that susceptibility to varieties of vulnerabilisation is ultimately reflective of the fragility that is definitive of the human condition.

Life can be non-ideal in many ways. One of the central ways is in its necessarily embodied, and hence vulnerable, nature. This vulnerability includes our susceptibility to injury and disease, other types of bodily failure, and death. In this chapter, we will describe the moral and epistemic mistreatment common to the experiences of illnesses. We use the term ‘illness’ here to denote serious and life-changing irreversible conditions, which may be chronic or acute. What we say may be applicable, at least in part, to mental illness as well, but there are important differences.

Contemporary philosophical debates about the competing merits of neurological and phenomenological approaches to understanding both psychiatric illness and religious experience—and, indeed, the relationship, if any, between psychiatric illness and religious experience. In this chapter, I propose that both psychiatric illness and religious experiences - at least in some of their diverse forms - are best understood phenomenologically in terms of radical changes in a person's 'existential feelings', in the sense articulated by Matthew Ratcliffe. If so, explanatory priority should be assigned to phenomenology and not to neurology.

Linda Martín Alcoff and others have emphasised that the discipline of philosophy suffers from a ‘demographic problem’. The persistence of this problem is partly the consequence of various forms of resistance to efforts to address the demographic problem. Such resistance is complex and takes many forms and could be responded to in different ways. In this paper, I argue that our attempts to explain and understand the phenomenon of resistance should use a kind of explanatory pluralism that, following Quassim Cassam, I call multidimensionalism. I describe four general kinds of resistance and consider varying explanations, focusing on those focused on vices and social structures. I argue that vice-explanations and structural- explanations are both mutually consistent and mutually entailing. If so, there is no need to choose between vice explanations and structural explanations or any other kinds of explanation. We can and should be multidimensionalists: using many together is better.