Ian Lambert

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. ;The first two chapters are concerned with the philosophy of natural science and I defend a realist position. One of the aims of developing an alternative to the positivist conception of science is to replace positivism in the philosophy of social science where it has reigned supreme since Comte. It has always been assumed that positivism was the only conception of science and social scientists have consciously and conscientiously pursued the positivist ideals of science both in their idea of correct science and in their social scientific practice--at least this is the picture portrayed by some realists. I examine these claims in chapter 3 and find that by contrast, many so-called positivist sociologists adopt a quasi-realist approach in their practice whilst espousing a positivistic ideal that is rather different. I argue also that Keat and Urry deploy an historically inappropriate concept of positivism with which to identify earlier social positivists but I find Benton's conception of positivism better suited to its task. Some realists have sought to sustain a Marxian approach in sociology and this is achieved by their conception of science. This is because Marxism, for so long at the receiving end of positivistic criticisms that it is unscientific, is rendered a paradigm case of social science by realism. However, in subsequent clarifications it is clear that realism does not or should not imply any particular substantive ontology