While often overlooked, loss and grief play a fundamental role in Spinoza’s practical philosophy. In this paper, I offer the first comprehensive reconstruction of Spinoza’s account of loss and grief, focusing on the Latin term desiderium and the Dutch term beklag. Three main theses are advanced. First, Spinoza regards loss not just as one affection among many but as the fundamental event underlying all sad passions, distinguishing between two determinations of desire: cupiditas and desiderium. S…
Read moreWhile often overlooked, loss and grief play a fundamental role in Spinoza’s practical philosophy. In this paper, I offer the first comprehensive reconstruction of Spinoza’s account of loss and grief, focusing on the Latin term desiderium and the Dutch term beklag. Three main theses are advanced. First, Spinoza regards loss not just as one affection among many but as the fundamental event underlying all sad passions, distinguishing between two determinations of desire: cupiditas and desiderium. Second, Spinoza provides a rich and philosophically significant account of grief, structured around three key claims: (1) The object of loss is the powers and capacities constitutive of one’s individual striving: in experiencing loss, we do not lose something we possess but something we are; (2) Grief arises when a unique and irreplaceable configuration of powers central to one’s striving is lost permanently or for an indeterminate time; (3) Accommodating loss involves a transformation of one’s individual striving, such that the desires and powers defining one’s existence change radically; Third and finally, his analysis of loss and grief supports nuanced interpretations of Spinoza that assign sad affects a crucial constitutive role in the cultivation of the good life, both at the individual and collective levels.
