Ibrahim Bahçi

Do scientific theories truly describe the world, or are they merely useful instruments? Do the successes of modern science compel us to believe that scientific theories correspond to reality, or does the history of science undermine this confidence by showing that theories once regarded as true may later be abandoned? The debates shaped around these questions extend far beyond a purely theoretical problem; the relationship between scientific theories and reality is continually reassessed through different perspectives and opposing arguments. This book aims to approach these debates as a dynamic intellectual field in which diverse arguments, critiques, and interdisciplinary perspectives intersect. To this end, the book is divided into three main sections. It first introduces the conceptual framework of scientific realism, discussing its different forms and the realist turn in contemporary philosophy. It then examines major anti-realist challenges—such as pessimistic meta-induction, the problem of underdetermination, and constructive empiricism—in order to question the limits of realism. In the final section, the book demonstrates how these debates take concrete form across various disciplines, including quantum mechanics, cognitive science, biology, mathematics, and the social sciences. In this way, it offers a multilayered intellectual journey that extends from theoretical philosophical discussions to scientific practice itself. In this context, Scientific Realism stands as the first comprehensive study to bring the realist turn in contemporary philosophy of science into Turkish literature. More than simply enabling readers to follow these debates, the book invites them to rethink what science represents and how it represents it, to explore its applications across different disciplines, and to test their own intellectual stance. Bilimsel teoriler gerçekten dünyayı mı anlatır, yoksa yalnızca işe yarayan araçlar mıdır? Modern bilimin başarıları, bizi bilimsel teorilerin gerçekliğe karşılık geldiğine inanmaya mı zorlar; yoksa bilim tarihi, bugün doğru kabul edilen teorilerin yarın terk edilebileceğini göstererek bu güveni sarsar mı? Bu soruların etrafında şekillenen tartışmalar, yalnızca teorik bir problem olmanın ötesine geçer; bilimsel teorilerin gerçeklikle ilişkisi, farklı bakış açıları ve karşıt argümanlar üzerinden sürekli yeniden değerlendirilir. Elinizdeki kitap, bu tartışmaları farklı argümanların, eleştirilerin ve disiplinler arası yaklaşımların kesiştiği dinamik bir düşünsel alan olarak ele almayı amaçlar. Bu amaç doğrultusunda kitap üç ana bölüme ayrılır. Önce bilimsel realizmin kavramsal çerçevesiyle tanıştırır; realizmin farklı türlerini ve çağdaş felsefedeki realist dönüşümü tartışır. Ardından pesimist meta-endüksiyon, yetersiz belirlenim sorunu ve yapıcı ampirizm gibi güçlü antirealist meydan okumaları ele alarak realizmin sınırlarını sorgular. Son bölümde ise bu tartışmaların kuantum mekaniği, bilişsel bilim, biyoloji, matematik ve sosyal bilimler gibi farklı disiplinlerde nasıl somutlaştığını gösterir. Böylece, teorik felsefi tartışmalardan bilimsel pratiğin kendisine uzanan çok katmanlı bir düşünsel güzergâh sunar. Bu bağlamda Bilimsel Realizm kitabı, çağdaş bilim felsefesindeki realist dönüşümü Türkçe literatüre taşıyan ilk kapsamlı çalışma olarak, okura yalnızca tartışmaları takip etme imkânı sunmakla kalmıyor; bilimin neyi ve nasıl temsil ettiğini yeniden düşünmeye, farklı disiplinlerdeki uygulamalarını keşfetmeye ve kendi entelektüel duruşunu sınamaya davet ediyor.

Abstract This study explores the long-standing philosophical question of whether reality and knowledge are constructed or discovered, analyzing the issue through the lens of constructivist and realist thought. It first outlines the conceptual framework of constructivism, distinguishing between its epistemological and ontological dimensions as well as its various strands, such as social, radical, and biological constructivism. The discussion situates constructivism within realism–anti-realism debates, emphasizing its influence across disciplines like sociology, psychology, and epistemology. In its second part, the article examines the “argument from facticity,” a realist counter-argument developed by philosophers such as Paul Boghossian, Markus Gabriel, and John Searle, which challenges radical or global forms of constructivism. According to this argument, even the most comprehensive constructivist theories presuppose a minimal realist foundation: certain facts must exist independently of human conceptual or linguistic frameworks for any theory, including constructivism itself, to hold coherence. The analysis shows that denying all objective facts results in performative contradictions, as constructivist claims rely on factual presuppositions about their own validity. Through Boghossian’s critique of fact-constructivism, Gabriel’s ontological realism, and Searle’s external realism, the study demonstrates that a minimal commitment to factuality is unavoidable. Ultimately, the “argument from facticity” reveals that any coherent theory of knowledge and reality must presuppose at least a minimal realist ontology to avoid self-refutation. Keywords: Constructivism, Realism, Markus Gabriel, Paul Boghossian, John Searle, Argument from Facticity.