Ícaro Machado

The aim of this study is to provide a defense of Naïve Realism/Disjunctivism, offering a new response to Michael Martin's Causal Argument that withstands its subconclusion that perceptions instantiate the fundamental property of hallucinations. To achieve this goal, we conduct a critical analysis of the argument's premise, which asserts that mere mental processes are sufficient for the instantiation of the fundamental properties of hallucinations. Our inquiries are directed at the reasons presented by proponents of the argument, which are based on the conjunction of two propositions. The first proposition states that experiences, in general, are exclusively caused by brain processes. This reason is primarily supported by regularities observed between the brain and mental events. However, we challenge this last step based on the notion that it implies an inadequate conclusion from empirical data. Firstly, this occurs by disregarding possible additional causal hypotheses that, according to the model of causation of determinable properties, allow for overlapping extra patterns. Secondly, the reason ignores some fundamental observations about empirical underdetermination.

Naïve Realism is well-regarded for its explanatory advantages over competing theories of perception. However, it faces serious challenges, particularly from the “Causal” or “Screening off” Argument. This paper critically examines a recent response to this argument, termed the “Causal Theory of Hallucinations” (CTH), which posits that one of the fundamental features of hallucinations is their causation through deviant means. After discussing the core assumptions of the Causal Argument, along with orthodox responses and their limitations, I introduce non-orthodox strategies, which deny Local Supervenience to offer a fresh perspective. This paper analyzes key premises behind this non-orthodox approach, particularly the traditional Causal Theory of Perceptions and the claim that being perceptual is a fundamental property of perceptions. For the former, a counterexample challenges the central claim that “perception” is a causal concept; for the latter, I question, among other aspects, the move from modal necessity to fundamentality regarding the perceptual property. The analysis culminates in a revised version of the Causal Argument and a modified “Local Supervenience” principle that upholds original intuitions. The argument proved damaging because CTH, treating causation as an extrinsic property of events, lacks the resources to counter the local supervenience of intrinsic aspects of hallucinations. As a result, CTH cannot prevent intrinsic properties of hallucinations from spreading to perceptions, leading to the explanatory overdetermination of it, as a non-orthodox strategy, originally seeks to avoid. Finally, I suggest alternatives to CTH that may more effectively address these issues, although they face distinctive justificational issues as well as distinctive associated challenges.

Este artigo teve como objetivo fornecer uma discussão abrangente e uma análise crítica do trabalho de Sollberger, concentrando-se especificamente na premissa da "Superveniência Local" e explorando maneiras plausíveis pelas quais os realistas ingênuos poderiam contestar suas conclusões. Para alcançar esse objetivo, identifico e abordo criticamente três justificativas diferentes que Sollberger apresenta para esse princípio. Em primeiro lugar, critiquei o que chamei de “argumento do cirurgião”, que apresenta razões para acreditar que alucinações são exclusivamente causadas por processos cerebrais. Argumento que esse argumento falha em reconhecer que a “suficiência” atribuída às alucinações diz respeito a alucinações concebidas em uma tipificação “neutra”, não em sua tipificação específica "mental". Além disso, destaco que a possibilidade alucinações e percepções correspondentes mina a suposta suficiência neurológica atribuída pelo argumento. Em segundo lugar, examino a intuição de Sollberger de que causas intrinsecamente idênticas deveriam resultar em efeitos intrinsecamente idênticos. Desafio essa noção enfatizando os papéis de fatores relacionais e ambientais, afirmando que as alucinações podem ser razoavelmente argumentadas como tendo conteúdos externamente individuados. Por fim, analiso criticamente o raciocínio de Sollberger para a tese de superveniência local, que deriva da ideia de que, em geral, as experiências mentais são exclusivamente causadas neurologicamente. Essa ideia é supostamente baseada na pressuposição metodológica da Ciência Perceptual e em descobertas empíricas sobre a relação entre mente e cérebro. Para contestar isso, forneço contraexemplos das Ciências Perceptuais que se concentram nas amplas interações do organismo com seu ambiente. Além disso, demonstro que observações empíricas possíveis sobre a relação entre cérebro e mente não são capazes de sustentar a ideia de exclusividade causal. Elas são igualmente compatíveis com hipóteses alternativas que permitem que Disjuntivistas expliquem causalmente as experiências.

O Realismo Ingênuo postula que as percepções envolvem a consciência direta de entidades independentes da mente. Essa perspectiva sobre a percepção é frequentemente elogiada por suas supostas vantagens sobre teorias concorrentes, incluindo sua capacidade de dar conta de aspectos cognitivos, epistêmicos e fenomenais. No entanto, o Realismo Ingênuo enfrenta objeções, especialmente provenientes do Argumento Causal. Uma versão específica desse argumento, proposta por Howard Robinson, e amplamente negligenciada no discurso acadêmico, é criticamente examinada aqui. No presente estudo, ela passou por inúmeras discussões exegéticas, revelando que sua proposição central afirma que os efeitos que compartilham o mesmo padrão causal geral devem ser intrinsecamente idênticos, entrando em conflito com o realismo ingênuo. Nossa avaliação crítica do argumento mostra que essa ideia é criticada por ser um princípio causal geral implausivelmente equivocado, considerando vários contraexemplos, especialmente sobreposição de padrões causais.

This article addresses a classic issue in the Metaphysics of Events concerning the conditions under which a specific event remains unchanged amid possible counterfactual changes. Multiplicators, who admit little or no variation in property categories for event individuation, contrast with unifiers, who are more tolerant of such variations. Two fundamental arguments are critically analyzed. Firstly, arguments based on common linguistic practices suggesting that we speak about the same events varying over time are discussed. Counterexamples demonstrate the unreliability of these practices from the standpoint of the metaphysics of event individuation. Secondly, the argument that the non-fragilist position conflicts with the principle of alternative possibilities and the intuition that cases with very close action alternatives do not involve moral responsibility is addressed. The analysis indicates that such cases may involve numerically distinct actions, suggesting the need for a modification in the principle of alternative possibilities. It is concluded that there are no plausible reasons to reject the fragilist stance, and it is possible to decide abductively in its favor.

This study focuses on a particular type of Naïve Realism known as objectivism, which suggests that the explanation of perceptual phenomenology is based on environmental things that the subject becomes acquainted with. Section 2 introduces a subtype of objectivism, “selectivism”, which aims to overcome a traditional kind of objection. However, this section highlights that the cases these objections invoke may still posit challenges (demands for explanations) to selectivism. Section 3 discusses a recent objection to objectivism and demonstrates how it can be addressed by selectivism so becomes only a challenge of this kind. However, it is important to note that, despite not providing positive refutations, these challenges are still significant. Sections 4 and 5 present the main contribution of this study, as they provide novel arguments that conclusively refute objectivism. Section 4 presents an argument that shows the falsity of objectivism as it has been presented in the literature. Nevertheless, a modified version of objectivism is proposed that could address it, although it still faces some non-definitive challenges. This reformulated theory is a novel type within the realm of Naïve Realism as a whole, as it posits that perceptions involve acquaintance with facts relative to sense organs. In contrast, Section 5 proposes an argument that positively refutes objectivism, which cannot be salvaged by any modification. Section 6 raises objections to an alternative option of Naïve Realism and, also based on the issues raised earlier in the article regarding objectivism, concludes that Naïve Realism must be subjectivist.

Although meritorious, Naïve Realism faces theoretical issues stemming from the lack of clarity in the concepts forming its propositions and the relevant (but not usually acknowledged) diversity of its theses. In this paper, my goal is to provide a groundwork that mitigates these theoretical complications. One such distinction concerns its subject matter, in particular, whether it deals with the nature of perceptual episodes or their phenomenology. My first goal is to acknowledge such distinctions by delimiting the former option, which I refer to as “Ontological Naïve Realism”. To accomplish this, I proposed a distinctively minimal version of this position. However, a thorough characterization of the acquaintance relation was necessary for its postulation, which revealed a diversity of the corresponding relations/predicates. This informed the postulation of the minimal thesis and thus the definition of Ontological Naïve Realism. Based on this definition, I also proposed a novel classification and taxonomy of the relevant forms of Ontological Naïve Realism, based on the width of the attribution of naïve-realistic features and whether or not they identify perceptions/illusions to acquaintance instantiations.

This paper turns to the concept of constitution and some to it more immediately related notions contained in R. Carnap's Aufbau and Husserl's works that might have had some influence there, in order to find similarities and differences between them. It hopefully will contribute to this assessment of the plausible hypothesis, recently raised in the literature, of an influence of the father of phenomenology not explicitly sufficiently credited in Aufbau. The argumentative strategy was to expose, firstly in a separate way, the relevant points in each strand and then to make the comparative examination. This first analysis took place by two general aspects, namely, to address, on the one hand, the very relation of constitution and what is a system of it and, given the implicated foundationalism attributed to such notion, the data which are at the base of system like this. Then I move on to examine the differences and similarities between such expositions. As result, similarities were observed in that the two of them imply a broader thesis of foundationalism; they propose, in this, to an encompassing system. In addition, they contend that the fact that there is a difference between a lower-level object and a higher-level object does not imply between them mereological composition or some necessary commonality of properties. However, there are also differences regarding the kind of relationship that the notions of constituting imply in each case. Distinctions were also found about the role of sensations in each system; but in that sense, there is, in both perspectives, also similarities concerning their status. The paper concludes with the notion that there must be husserlian influences in the Aufbau not sufficiently credited. However, it is unreasonable the diagnosis of extreme importance of Husserl's influence.