Igor Agostini

Questo studio si presenta come un’introduzione al problema del rapporto fra san Francesco di Sales e la filosofia. Esso parte, da un lato, dal presupposto che non solo in san Francesco di Sales si trovino dei concetti, ma anche che la sua opera intrattenga un preciso rapporto con la filosofia e, in particolare, con la metafisica; e, dall’altro, all’assunto metodologico secondo cui e possibile accertare lo statuto filosofico di un determinato corpus dottrinale attraverso la sua recezione filosofica successiva. Lo studio si propone pertanto di conferire al corpus salesiano uno statuto propriamente filosofico leggendolo alla luce di problematiche pascaliane e cartesiane, avanzando l’ipotesi ermeneutica secondo cui, in primo luogo, e staccandosi da un salesianismo iniziale che Pascal e diventato Pascal; e, in secondo luogo, che questo distacco e passato attraverso il concetto cartesiano di volonta ovvero attraverso la definizione cartesiana dell’amore.

This article inquiries into the concept of res in the Cartesian metaphsyics. It argues, on the one hand, that res should not be interpreted in line with the traditional scholastic concept of substratum, and on the other hand, that it is nevertheless a technical notion. In particular, the determination of the ego as res cogitans in Descartes' Second Meditation (AT VII 27) must be interpreted in the light of the ontology of the verœ naturœ of the Fifth Meditation. The subsistence of the ego is indeed grounded on the criterion of identification of the true natures, that is on the inseparability of concepts. The ontology of the verœ naturœ is therefore already at work both in the Second and in the Third Meditation before becoming explicit in the Fifth Meditation.

A questão sobre o homem e a II Meditação Resumo: Neste artigo, analiso a noção pré-filosófica de “homem” discutida por Descartes na Segunda Meditação. Apesar da atenção dirigida a esse tópico pelos contemporâneos de Descartes, em particular Bourdin, os pesquisadores não se demoram sobre tal questão. Argumentarei nas páginas seguintes que a análise da noção pré-filosófica de homem, por parte de Descartes, constitui um caso paradigmático do procedimento seguido na Segunda Meditação para encontrar a distinção. Esse procedimento consiste, de fato, em um movimento que, retomando uma noção pré-filosófica, encontra, através da atenção e, por conseguinte, da clareza, a distinção: concentrando a atenção na noção pré-filosófica de homem em que “descobre” a cogitatio, o meditador torna tal noção clara; depois, a separa das determinações às quais está unida, tornando-a distinta. Palavras-chave: Descartes; Meditações; Homem; Clareza e distinção. La domanda sul l’uomo e la II Meditazione Riassunto: In questo articolo analizzo la nozione pre-filosofica di ‘uomo discussa da Descartes nella Seconda Meditazione. A dispetto dell’attenzione rivolta su questo punto dai contemporanei di Descartes, in particolare Bourdin, gli studiosi non si sono particolarmente soffermati su tale questione. Argomenterò nelle pagine seguenti che l’analisi, da parte di Descartes, della nozione pre-filosofica di uomo costituisce un caso paradigmaico della procedura seguita nella seconda Meditazione per giungere alla distinzione. Questa procedura consiste, infatti, in un movimento che, regredendo da una nozione pre-filosofica, giunge, attraverso l’attenzione e, quindi, la chiarezza, alla distinzione: dentro la nozione pre-filosofica di uomo in cui il meditante ‘scopre’ la cogitatio, egli sofferma l’attenzione rendendo tale nozione chiara, poi la separa dalle determinazioni cui è unita nella medesima nozione rendendola distinta. Parole-chiave: Descartes; Meditações; Homem; Clareza e distinção. The question about man and II Meditation Abstract: In this paper I will focus on the pre-philosophical notion of ‘man’ discussed by Descartes in the Second Meditation. In spite of the attention addressed on this very point by Descartes’s contemporaries, especially by Bourdin, scholars have not much dealt with this topic. In what follows, I will argue that Descartes’s analysis of the pre-philosophical notion of ‘man’ constitutes a paradigmatic case of the procedure followed in the Second Meditation in order to attain distinction. This procedure consists in a movement by which the meditator, by regressing from a pre-philosophical notion, obtains clearness through attention, and therefore distinctness through clearness: by focusing his attention on the pre-philosophical notion of ‘man’, in which he discovers the ‘cogitatio’, the meditator makes such a notion clear; then, by internal means of separation, he makes this notion distinct as well. Keywords: Descartes; Meditações; Homem; Clareza e distinção.

Cet article se propose de retracer quelques étapes essentielles du grand débat du thomisme des xvi e et xvii e siècles sur la question de la distinction entre essence et suppôt chez Thomas d’Aquin et, notamment, sur le problème de la conciliation entre l’enseignement de l’article 3 de la quaestio III de la Prima Pars de la Summa theologiae et la doctrine du Quodlibet II. Le but est de reconstruire un moment crucial de l’histoire du thomisme et, en même temps, de montrer la contribution possible que son étude peut apporter aux lectures contemporaines, qui doivent plus qu’elles ne le croient ou ne le reconnaissent à la tradition thomiste.

According to Descartes, vegetative and sensitive activities, which in the Aristotelian tradition were considered dependent on the soul, are pure effects of corporeal dispositions. What is, however, the relationship between this doctrine and Descartes’s metaphysical claim in the Meditations, namely, that the mind is the only cause of thought? In the Meditations, Descartes does not provide a doctrine of vegetative and sensitive functions, and he does not even establish the canonic Cartesian thesis that they are not dependent on the soul. In claiming that the lowest functions cannot be attributed to the soul, the Second Meditation is not making an ontological point. Nevertheless, in spite of this, the Meditations teach us something very important about the lowest functions: that both vegetative and sensitive functions depend on the soul is not, and never will be, a necessarily true proposition.

This article proposes to read the passage of Descartes’s Meditation II from AT VII 27, l. 18 to AT VII 29, l. 18 (B Op I 716-718) as a sort of ‘phenomenological description’, made by the meditator, of his mental acts, aiming at a redefinition of sensibility and imagination. This redefinition does not simply lead to their inclusion in the res cogitans (as cogitationes), but to a resignification which allows their unification and, at the same time, their distinction under the cogitatio ; or in other words, which allows to distinguish each of them from the other and both from the intellection.

This chapter presents some important facets of the scholastic background to Descartes’s conception of infinity. In particular, this chapter considers Francisco Suárez’s role in the late medieval debate over the concept of the relationship between God’s status as a perfect being and God’s status as an infinite being. Although I do not argue that Descartes knew Suárez’s position when he originally wrote the Meditations, I show that Suárez’s position lies behind Caterus’s criticisms of Descartes in the Objections and Replies that Descartes published with the Meditations. Thus, knowledge of Suárez’s position is important for assessing both the reception and success of Descartes’s proofs of God’s existence in the Meditations.

In this article I argue that although the prevailing interpretation within the Thomistic contemporary critical literature, claiming the inaccessibility of God’s quid sit, is faithful both to Saint Thomas and to John Capreolus’s account of Aquinas’s doctrine, it is far from being uncontroversial in the first steps of the history of Thomism. A central step in this history is marked by the Parisian Condemnation of 1277, which is at the origin of relevant debate within the Dominican Order on the question of the knowledge of God’s quid sit. Aquinas’s contemporaries, indeed, interpreted the condemnation of Proposition 214 as a measure taken against Saint Thomas’s negative theology, as confirmed by John Capreolus’s testimony. Capreolus defends Aquinas, claiming that Saint Thomas’s doctrine is not a radical negative theology; in spite of this, he maintains that we cannot know God’s quiddity. In the following history of the debate, however, two influential representatives of the Dominican Order, Tommaso de Vio and Francesco Silvestri will affirm the accessibility of God’s quid sit, restoring an old doctrine by Durand of Saint Pourçain and Hervé of Nédellec.

Dan Arbib's book follows the numerous studies devoted, in the last twenty years, to the topic of the infinite in Descartes. For the first time, however, with Arbib's work, this question is addressed thematically.Its fundamental purpose is the demonstration of what Arbib calls an "induction a priori" : the Cartesian infinite belongs, and at the same time does not belong, to metaphysics as ontotheology. The verification of this hypothesis depends on a "non-negotiable condition" : the infinite belongs to metaphysics insofar as it is subordinated to the ego, and for this reason is supremely representable. The infinite, indeed, arises along the metaphysical path of Duns Scotus that, in the...

In this paper, I address the controversy between Henry More and René Descartes on the indefinite extension of the world. I provide a new reading of Descartes’ famous final answer of 15 April 1649. I read the entire debate in the terms of a disagreement concerning the epistemological status of the necessity of our judgement about the extension of the universe. Accordingly, the disagreement on the infinity of the world constitutes a case of a more general disagreement on the nature of the necessity of the theorems of Cartesian Physics. In particular, as concerns Descartes’ last reply, I argue that his assertion that a finite world is contradictory should be interpreted as a reply to More’s claim that the thesis of the infinity of the world, in so far as it cannot be grounded on the identity between matter and extension, does not express a logical necessity. Descartes’ assertion of the logical impossibility of a finite world, far from being, as it has always been read, a concession he made under the pressure of More’s objections, expresses the more radical element of the entire debate about the extension of the universe.

Résumé — Cet article se propose de fournir une contribution au débat interprétatif sur le principe de la limitation de l’acte par la puissance dans la démonstration de l’infinité de Dieu de la Summa theologiae de Thomas d’Aquin à travers une enquête à caractère historique qui expose quelques-unes des étapes capitales de l’histoire de cette preuve. Le désaccord qui divise les interprètes contemporains à propos du rôle joué par le principe susdit hérite, en réalité, d’une opposition séculaire parmi les commentateurs de Thomas qui remonte à la discussion qui suivit l’intervention de Tommaso de Vio et de Francesco Silvestri. D’autre part, l’incontestable présence chez certains commentateurs classiques de Thomas, Jean de Saint-Thomas in primis, d’une position qui sépare la preuve de la Summa du principe de la limitation de l’acte par la puissance réceptive, loin d’exprimer une orthodoxie par rapport à la tradition la plus ancienne, constitue un renversement par rapport à la lecture de Cajetan et de Silvestre de Ferrare, qui s’était affirmée comme l’interprétation canonique du texte de Thomas.— Questo articolo si propone di fornire un contributo al dibattito interpretativo sul principio della limitazione dell’atto attraverso la potenza nella dimostrazione dell’infinità di Dio nella Summa theologiae di Tommaso d’Aquino attraverso un’indagine di carattere storico che espone alcune delle tappe capitali della storia di questa prova. Il disaccordo che divide gli interpreti contemporanei sul ruolo giocato dal principio suddetto eredita, in realtà, un’opposizione secolare fra i commentatori di Tommaso che risale alla discussione che seguî gli interventi di Tommaso de Vio e di Francescio Silvestri. D’altra parte, la presenza, incontestabile, in alcuni commentatori classici di Tommaso, primo fra tutti Giovanni di san Tommaso, di una posizione che separa la prova della Summa dal principio della limitazione dell’atto attraverso la potenza recettiva, lungi dal configurarsi nei termini di una posizione ortodossa rispetto alla tradizione più antica, costituisce un ribaltamento della lettura di Cajetano e di Silvestro da Ferrare, che si era affermata come l’interpretazione canonica del testo di Tommaso.

L’Epistola ad V. C. de Henry More ( Epistola H. Mori ad V.C. quae Apologiam complectitur pro Cartesio, quaeque introductionis loco esse poterit ad universam philosophiam cartesianam ), publiée plusieurs fois du vivant de More, a toujours été lue, par les commentateurs, essentiellement comme une étape, tout à fait centrale, dans l’histoire des relations de More à Descartes. C’est une thèse interprétative que je partage, mais à laquelle je voudrais essayer d’ajouter une perspective de lecture. Je voudrais montrer que l’Epistola, si elle est considérée dans toutes les étapes de son histoire éditoriale, peut être lue, davantage que comme une étape, quoique capitale, comme un condensé de l’histoire du changement d’attitude de More par rapport à Descartes. En effet, l’histoire des péripéties éditoriales qui la caractérisent reproduit à petite échelle l’histoire complexe du rapport de More à la philosophie cartésienne et, en même temps, permet de mieux l’éclairer.