Igor Cvejic

This chapter provides a brief history of the concept of emancipation and its applications in and relationship with education, starting with the Enlightenment and considering both the continuation and the critique of this tradition that has further shaped the relationship between education and emancipation. The tension between two meanings of emancipation—personal, intellectual emancipation on the one hand, and political emancipation of the oppressed and the entire society on the other—comes into view in the divergence between Kantian and Marxists paths to emancipation. The chapter goes on to consider the ideas by notable classic thinkers who further developed the Enlightenment ideal of emancipatory education by democratizing it (Freire, Habermas, Dewey, Popper), but also outright questioned some of its main aspects (Peirce, Berlin, Rancière). Nevertheless, even the critics of the Enlightenment mentioned here stay faithful to the ideals of equality and freedom that were formulated in the Age of Reason. And here we are, facing “new” and “old” challenges and media. The chapter then presents the content of this volume, commenting on each chapter and reflecting on how the book Rethinking Education and Emancipation tackles the relationship between emancipation and education by considering contemporary struggles and crises, as well as rethinking and recontextualizing the classic ideas (authors), and building on more recent work.

This edited collection responds to the contemporary need for deeper analysis and rethinking of the relation between education and emancipation in a world beset by social, digital, educational and ecological crises. Among the diverse interdisciplinary perspectives explored are: rethinking the Anthropocene in the time of environmental emergency, the concept of relational thinking as emancipatory practice and a more encompassing concept of relational pedagogy that includes questions about the environment and digitalisation, the notion of indoctrination from the perspective of political education, reconnecting with the body as a form of emancipatory education and how schools reproduce socio-cultural ideologies in synergy with material and visual culture. The book chapters also consider the role of social media, postcolonialism and feminism in understanding emancipatory education and a historical reception of John Dewey’s ideas in other than Western contexts. This volume will be of interest to those seeking well-known as well as further and novel acquaintance with the philosophical and critical issues surrounding different forms and ideas of emancipation and/or/through education, including related practical propositions and examples. Educators, scholars in education, social justice, philosophy, sociology and curriculum developers will find this collection valuable in contemplating, practising and theorising the futures of emancipatory education across contexts and themes.

In this article, our focus is on the topic of engagement and possibility of empathy with future generations. We acknowledge that empathy for future generations is practically unattainable in its strictest sense due to the lack of access to their potential mental states and the absence of direct interaction. Additionally, we will draw upon the arguments presented by Goldie and Slaby to address concerns regarding the potential paternalization that may arise in empathic relations towards future generations. However, despite these limitations, it is important to emphasize that we are still engaged with future generations. Instead of adopting a paternalizing approach where we impose expectations on how they should feel, our engagement exposes us to the anticipated but unknown judgments of future generations. Throughout this article, we will argue that engagement with future generations brings out our own social self-consciousness and provides a basis of our connectedness and responsibility towards future generations.

Our main goal is to describe the structure of engaged acts and compassion and their constitutive interrelation to explicate the key role of engaged and compassionate acts for group constitution. In the first part of the paper, we formulate our guiding idea: the key to understanding compassion lies in understanding engagement and vice versa. We then consider the problematic nature of engaged acts: On the one hand, they do not meet the conditions to be attributed to the plural subject; on the other hand, they cannot be understood without presupposing the plural subject. To understand this, we rely primarily on Helm’s theory of emotions and the classical phenomenological analyses of the constitution of the plural subject, but we also point out the limitations of the latter. In the last two sections, we build on Nussbaum’s theory of compassion to describe the parallelism in the structure of compassion and engagement and to show their constitutive connection. Finally, we examine the specific way in which engaged acts “place burden” and transform a group into an institution.

In the following chapter, I will attempt to argue that feelings, and, above all, pleasure in mere reflection, ought to be understood as intentional states, and moreover, as feeling-intentionality sui generis. In the first portion of the text, I present the fundamentals of the Kantian understanding of feelings, and attempt to demonstrate why we should reject some of the conclusions of interpretations offered by Paul Guyer and Rachel Zuckert. In part two, I outline some of the particulars of pleasure in mere reflection. In part three, I detail problems relating to the question of the object of pleasure in the context of mere reflection. Finally, in part four, I propose an approach in which intentionality of pleasure in mere reflection can be understood as feeling-intentionality sui generis, explain why this understanding should be ascribed to Kant, and discuss how this might resolve some of the problems surveyed in part three.

My focus in this text is not the general notion of vulnerability, but how one feels vulnerable. In the first part, I will sketch the structure of such an emotional experience. Then, I will try to explain why the recognition of another’s vulnerability is important in regard to emotional agency, emphasizing the difference between this kind of recognition and similar experience of empathy and social recognition. In the third section, I will concentrate on the question of intersubjectivity of recognition. However, I think that there is an inherent normative gap between the ideal of universal intersubjective mutual recognition with respect to emotional agency and the fact that in the social realm this recognition rests on culturally and socially dependent criteria of adequacy for such emotional experience. Moreover, the mentioned gap could put some persons in a situation in which they don’t have a ‘right’ to feel vulnerable in their own way. In the conclusion, I try to offer some practical possibilities to bridge this gap through emotion-oriented environmental structures.

Thomas Szanto has recently argued that hatred could not be a fitting emotion because of its blurred focus. It thus cannot trace the properties of its intentional object. Although I agree with the core of Szanto?s account, I would like to discuss two connected issues that might be of importance. First, I want to address whether the unfittingness of hatred has anything to do with the possibility that the hated person does not identify with what they are hated for. I conclude that if the focus of hatred is blurred, hatred does not trace the identification of the hated person or group. Next, I propose a possibility that criteria of adequacy of hatred are embedded in the cultural and social framework in such a way that they are not necessarily intelligibly justified by their relation to the focus and import it has. Under such circumstances, with hatred still being unfitting, these criteria create quasi-correctness of hatred. If this is correct, it will enable us to keep the thesis that hatred cannot be fitting. At the same time, we could use political vocabulary to tackle hatred that is common in cases when a group will not give up their commitment to hatred and argue that some people or group of people is not to be hated under the hating group?s own criteria.

The place of evidence regarding joint commitment and plural action is mostly reserved for documents and explicit linguistic expressions. This paper considers the problem of evidence in cases of engaged (jointly committed) social acts where there is no explicit expression or binding document, yet can still be ascribed to a plural subject. The argument rests on the double meaning of the term factum as fact (factum brutum) and deed (factum practica), as well as contemporary debates about the topic of fact of reason in Kant. The text seeks to show that in certain cases, the execution of an act or the obligation produced by it can be considered evidence of a plural subject. Thus, these facts deserve a special position in relation to scientific evidence.

Prvi deo rada sadrzi pokusaj analize Kantovih pojmova svrhovitosti i harmonije i, u izvesnom smislu, njihovog medjusobnog odnosa, kao i odnosa sa osecanjem zadovoljstva. Toj analizi ce se pristupiti uz osvrt na Saftsberijev uvid u, danas tako nazvane,?second order affections?, i njihov znacaj u drustveno-politickoj filozofiji. Zakljucno ce se ovaj prvi deo rada baviti Kantovim shvatanjem sensus communis-a, i pokusati da ukaze na neke njegove specificnosti, koje omogucuju da se o njemu ne govori kao o empirijskom faktu. Drugi deo rada pokusace da ukaze na polozaj sensus communis-a u Kantovoj politickoj filozofiji i situaciji, i neke implikacije koje bi se iz toga mogle izvesti.

The aim of this paper is to show, contra the right-libertarian critique of social justice, that there are good reasons for defending policies of social justice within a free society. In the first part of the paper, we will present two influential right-libertarian critiques of social justice, found in Friedrich Hayek's Law, Legislation and Liberty and Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia. Based on their approach, policies of social justice are seen as an unjustified infringement on freedoms of individual members of a society. In response to this critique, we will introduce the distinction between formal and factual freedom and argue that the formal principle of freedom defended by Hayek and Nozick does not suffice for the protection of factual freedom of members of a society, because it does not recognise (1) the moral obligation to help those who, without their fault, lack factual freedom to a significant degree, and (2) the legal obligation of the state to protect civic dignity of all members of a society. In the second part of the paper, we offer an interpretation of Kant's argument on taxation, according to which civic dignity presupposes factual freedom, in order to argue that Kant's justification of taxation offers good reasons for claiming that the state has the legal obligation to protect factual freedom via the policies of social justice.

Zwei Philosophen, denen Kant am meisten zu verdanken hat, wie man mit dem Recht nimmt, sind Hume und Rousseau. W?hrend man?ber den Hume?s Einfluss einfach und eindeutig antworten kann, ist es mit dem Rousseau?s Einfluss viel mehr kompliziert. Der Haupteinfluss auf Kant hat Rousseau in der Ethik und auf der Ansicht der Menschen gemacht, deshalb es einen Anfangspunkt ist, durch welchem die Antwort auf diese Frage gesucht wird. Nach dieser Analyse wird eine einfache und eindeutige Antwort zu geben versucht, die?hnlich wie diese, die man auf dem Hume?s Einfluss geben kann, ist: welchen Einfluss hat Rousseau auf dem ganzen Kritische System gemacht. Dva filozofa kojima Kant najvise duguje su, kako se obicno s pravom tvrdi, Hjum i Ruso. Dok se o Hjumovom uticaju moze jednoznacno i jednostavno odgovoriti, sa Rusoovim uticajem situacija je vidno komplikovanija. Osnovni uticaj na Kanta Ruso je imao u sferi etike i posmatranja coveka, tako da ce to biti polazna tacka preko koje ce se traziti odgovor na ovo pitanje, da bi se posle te analize pokusao dati jedan jednostavan i jednoznacan odgovor, slican onome koji se moze dati za Hjuma, o tome kakav uticaj je Ruso ostavio na celokupan sistem kriticke filozofije.

Prvi deo rada sadrzi pokusaj analize Kantovih pojmova svrhovitosti i harmonije i, u izvesnom smislu, njihovog medjusobnog odnosa, kao i odnosa sa osecanjem zadovoljstva. Toj analizi ce se pristupiti uz osvrt na Saftsberijev uvid u, danas tako nazvane,?second order affections?, i njihov znacaj u drustveno-politickoj filozofiji. Zakljucno ce se ovaj prvi deo rada baviti Kantovim shvatanjem sensus communis-a, i pokusati da ukaze na neke njegove specificnosti, koje omogucuju da se o njemu ne govori kao o empirijskom faktu. Drugi deo rada pokusace da ukaze na polozaj sensus communis-a u Kantovoj politickoj filozofiji i situaciji, i neke implikacije koje bi se iz toga mogle izvesti.

My aim is to draw attention to the different forms of social engagement regarding the subject of import. The concept of import was introduced in the theory of action by Bennet Helm. It denotes an intentional characteristic of an object, to be viewed as worthy of pursuit or avoidance. However, according to Helm, the subject of import could be: either an individual person, the other or plural agent. Using this division in the context of social engagement, I propose to distinguish three forms of social engagement: (1) personal social engagement, (2) social engagement for the sake of others and (3) social engagement as togetherness. Social engagement as togetherness (plural agent) should not be confused with plural action with the same goal-directedness (which is part of personal social engagement). This argumentative step was enabled by Helm's complex theory about " us " as a subject of import, contrary to some contemporary theorists who dispute the possibility of plural agents.