İhsan Gürsoy

Söz dönüp dolaşıp yine modern okurun kabul etmeyeceği fikirlere gelmişti. “Nefsin çevrilmesini (psukhagôgia) mi kastediyorsunuz?” dedim mecburî bir kabullenişle. “Neden hafife alıyorsun bu fikri?” dedi babacan bir edayla, “Söylev (logos) marifetiyle nefsin çevrilmesinden başka bir şey midir retorik? Söylevin yetisi nefsin çevrilmesi değil midir? Âdili, iyiyi ve güzeli öğretmek ya da dinleyenlerin nefslerine nakşetmek amacı taşıyanlar dışında hangi söylev konuşmaya ya da yazmaya değer?” “İyi ama” diye kekeledim, “nefsin çevrilmesi felsefenin de yöntemi değil miydi?” “Niye şaşırdın?” dedi, “Kendini bilmenin aslî yolu olarak philosophia faaliyeti aynı zamanda bir kendilik sanatı değil midir ve tam da bu nedenle en yüksek sanat (megistes mousikês) değil midir? Bak, böylece senin Lutetialı çocuğun da meseleyi doğru anladığını göstermiş olduk: Kendilik sanatı, hem epistemolojidir hem etiktir hem de estetiktir.”

This article reframes the question ‘Can education liberate us?’ by shifting attention from education’s capacity to produce emancipated individuals to its capacity to enable—or foreclose—liberation within the experience of subjectivation. Instead of proposing new educational theory or conducting empirical research, it examines how normative frameworks in educational discourse limit possibilities for thinking about freedom and self-relation. Drawing on Martin Heidegger’s and Michel Foucault’s respective critiques, the article argues that liberation must target not just the individual, but the very experience by which one comes to recognize oneself as an educational subject. Through critical analysis of Paulo Freire, critical pedagogy traditions, and Gert J. J. Biesta’s vision of democratic education, it shows that the most explicitly critical approaches operate within normative frameworks that presuppose specific forms of subjectivity, and predetermine what liberation means. As a counterpoint, the article returns to Plato’s paideia, reinterpreting it through Foucault’s ‘technologies of the self’, and Heidegger’s analysis of the Cave Allegory. This reinterpretation considers whether education might function not as formation, but as a practice of freedom—one that frees the relation to self from normative constraints.

Given Aristotle’s response to Plato’s views by positing a cathartic function for tragedy, it is understandable that an author opposing him through the development of a non-Aristotelian theatrical theory would spontaneously draw closer to Platonic thought. However, Brecht’s stance goes beyond this spontaneous proximity in this debate. This article challenges those critics who have overlooked the direct relationship between Plato and Brecht, and it offers a reasoned decision on Walter Benjamin’s verdict that epic theatre is a form of Platonic drama. Moreover, it argues that Brecht’s endeavour aimed to create a theatre that remained impervious to Plato’s critiques. The article analyzes Brecht’s achievements in epic theatre as an expression of disenchantment, demonstrating how, through the techniques he developed, he radically dismantled the magical effect that was essential to Aristotelian theatre.

[Oulipo: A Test of Creativity Through Constraint] In this article, which delves into Oulipo—an extensive and profound branch of experimental literature—we will first explore the definitions of Oulipo, due to the constraints imposed by the article format. We will then discuss a fundamental issue, at least in our view, in the consideration of Oulipo: the relationship between constraint and creativity. Finally, as a gentle reminder to those who mistakenly label us as Francophones, we will attempt to demonstrate that a local and traditional literary form epitomises the pinnacle of Oulipo.

[Plato’s “Impossible” Aesthetics and Art] Although it seems impossible to derive an aesthetic theory from Plato’s thought in the sense defined by Baumgarten, it is possible to come closer to the language and the sense of the ancients, who were well aware of the division of cognition into aisthêta and noêta, if we follow Kant’s first advice, accepting this term again and preserving it for that doctrine, which is true science. Therefore, the way to see whether Plato’s views amount to a theory of aesthetics is to investigate the relationship between the things that can be felt and the things that can be perceived in his thought. Although he says in advance that one cannot gain knowledge from sensible things, the experience of beauty and its effect have a central role in Plato. In fact, when we continue our investigation through the experience of beauty in Plato’s thought, we see that the activity of philosophia is an aesthetics per se in the context of both the “highest art” and the love of beauty; philosophos, according to Plato, is the same as philokalos. Contrary to the baseless interpretations of the mainstream commentators on mimêsis, a creative activity that is not subject to mimêsis is not possible according to Plato’s thought; not only human creative activity, but primarily the Divine act of creation itself in the context of the birth of the world, is a mimetic activity. The important thing for Plato is the model upon which the creative activity is based: when an artist, who takes the self as a model, creates works by holding on to the truth, he will create the true virtue in himself, and in doing so, his creations on the outside become monuments of virtue. This activity is, in fact, synonymous with his self-knowledge and self-transformation processes. The sense of beauty experienced from such an act of creation brings out the best qualities in the audience’s soul while pointing to a path that will lead them to true nobility, rather than paralyzing their reasoning and judging abilities by imitating what are themselves imitations of virtue produced by deceptively imitative art. Monuments of virtue that are perfect examples of the beautiful itself turn the soul of the audience towards the beautiful itself and encourage them to take action to get closer to it. In Plato’s thought, true art is a call for liberation that shows the prisoners their chains, declaring that the ‘understanding’ of the world they have is merely a conception compelled by this imprisonment, just a presumption. It proclaims that they can never truly observe the truth until they free themselves from these bonds; tempting their souls, it calls them to escape to the Beautiful.

[Notes on the Traditionalist School's Understanding of Civilisation] In numerous works, Guénon characterises modern Western civilisation as an anomaly, asserting that all that is spoken of in the modem world as 'civilisation', all that one likes to think of as 'the civilisation' par excellence, could only be considered as a caricature of true civilisation. He contends that these forms do not really deserve the name of civilisation and, indeed, represent the very antithesis of true civilisation. When asked what constitutes 'true civilisation', Guénon highlights the necessity for each city or human society to adopt the 'Divine City' as a model in order to be considered valid from a traditional standpoint. Thus, this article aims to elucidate the traditionalist school's conception of civilisation by exploring their interpretation of what is meant by the 'Divine City'. Our exploration will not be limited to Guénon's “The Divine City” but will also encompass a reading of Ananda K. Coomaraswamy's article "What is Civilisation?", to which Guénon frequently refers in his article. Additionally, we will examine pertinent sections of Plato's Politeia, a work referenced by both authors in their discussions.

[The Mechanics of Sorcery in the Context of Deceptive-Imitative Poetry] When we inquire as to how people could have a perverted preference for ignorance over knowledge, Plato’s statement that people are deprived of true opinions only against their will provides us with an essential clue for starting out: Depriving a person of something against their will is only possible by theft, by spells of sorcery, or by force. Victims of sorcery alter their opinions under the spell of pleasure or are terrified by fear. However, the “sorcery” mentioned here is not a mysterious effect, but rather the deterioration of the harmony established between the three aspects of the soul in favor of appetite. The measure and harmony in the cosmos apply to the fundamental principles of the human soul, and rhythm is engraved on the soul as the protector of measure and harmony. Rhythmic speech is the reflection of “divine language” in the human world; the poet of the ancient period was the interpreter of the “sacred language” through which the divine word appeared. When the poet and the poetry both degenerate, the poet is reduced to nothing more than a common diviner or sorcerer. Since he knows nothing but how to imitate, he embellishes his work with colors from ancient arts. He speaks his words in rhythm, measure, and harmony in order to deceive reason, which is the aspect of our soul that is most prone to measurement and calculation. This is how the poet paralyzes it. Therefore, imitative poetry vitiates our soul “without even our souls hearing it”.

[Falling of Modern Hero] In this book, which deals with the modern stage of the "hero's journey" that Campbell identified in the traditional narrative and added to the literature, Gökdemir İhsan deals with the transformation of the journey in modern literature. The author, who describes the journey of the modern hero as a "fall" or in more direct terms as a "fall into oneself", discusses concepts such as enlightenment, religion, individuality, modernity, and Eurocentrism through stories, novels, and poems written at different times and in different countries.

[Langauge and Idea: An Introduction to an Imaginary Platonic Philosophy of Language] Although Plato, in his Cratylus, did not dwell clearly on such issues as the origin of language or the identity of that which gives the names (nomothétês), he did reveal his opinions about being and knowledge in the context of language, as many commentators unanimously point out. I will primarily explain my reading of Cratylus and then argue that Plato holds an original opinion about name, naming, and the correctness of names and that he cannot be either a naturalist or a conventionalist. The reason for this is, the proponents of both the naturalistic and the conventional opinions as well as their contemporary commentators confuse name with sound or concept, albeit unlike the ancients, who confused it with the named. By reminding the quadruple classification scheme, known about name since ancient times —a scheme based on the comprehension of being as ontological levels— and then by adding Plato's ideas to it, I will argue that it is possible to achieve an “original language” philosophy, and I will try and demonstrate some of the possible consequences of this imaginary philosophy of language through an anachronistic course. In the addendum chapter, I will summarize the discussions of Muslim linguists about origin of language, and then I will review the possibilities of coherence between the resulting data from this summary and Plato's understanding of both language and soul. As a result of this sub-section, I will argue that the investigation into the original language cannot have any other meaning except that of a historical investigation, because the original language —contrary to the hopes of those seeking it— cannot be anything other than the first of all vernacular.