• Berent Enç
    Felsefe Tartismalari 30 5-6. 2003.
  •  10
    Curiosity, Truth and Knowledge-Inan
    In Ilhan Inan, Lani Watson, Deniis Whitcomb & Safiye Yiigit (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Curiosity, Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 11-34. 2018.
  •  18
    Awareness of ignorance
    SATS 20 (2): 141-173. 2020.
    Despite the recent increase in interest in philosophy about ignorance, little attention has been paid to the question of what makes it possible for a being to become aware of their own ignorance. In this paper, I try to provide such an account by arguing that, for a being to become aware of their own ignorance, they must have the mental capacity to represent something as being unknown to them. For normal adult humans who have mastered a language, mental representation of an unknown is enabled by…Read more
  •  25
    Afterthoughts on Critiques to The Philosophy of Curiosity
    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 16 (3): 419-439. 2016.
    In this paper I respond to and elaborate on some of the ideas put forth on my book The Philosophy of Curiosity as well as its follow-up “Curiosity and Ignorance” by Nenad Miščević, Erhan Demircioğlu, Mirela Fuš, Safi ye Yiğit, Danilo Šuster, Irem Günhan Altıparmak, and Aran Arslan.
  •  14
  •  136
    Rigid general terms and essential predicates
    Philosophical Studies 140 (2). 2008.
    What does it mean for a general term to be rigid? It is argued by some that if we take general terms to designate their extensions, then almost no empirical general term will turn out to be rigid; and if we take them to designate some abstract entity, such as a kind, then it turns out that almost all general terms will be rigid. Various authors who pursue this line of reasoning have attempted to capture Kripke’s intent by defining a rigid general term as one that applies to the objects in its ex…Read more
  •  54
    How Often Do We Use a Definite Description to Talk About its Semantic Referent?
    Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 22 (1): 7-12. 2009.
    In this paper I respond to the objections put forth by Kresimir Agbaba 22: 1-6) against my earlier paper 20: 7-13) in which I argue that given Donnellan's formulation|as well as Kripke's and Salmon's gen- eralized accounts|an attributive use of a denite description is a very rare linguistic phenomenon
  • Küreselleşme Özgürlük Getiriyor mu?
    Felsefe Tartismalari 28 115-119. 2001.
  •  29
    Curiosity and Ignorance
    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 16 (3): 285-303. 2016.
    Though ignorance is rarely a bliss, awareness of ignorance almost always is. Had we not been able to develop this powerful skill, there would have been no philosophy or science, nor advanced forms of religion, art, and technology. Awareness of ignorance, however, is not a motivator; but when it arouses curiosity that is strong enough, it causes what may be called an “epistemic” desire; a desire to know, to understand, to learn or to gain new experiences, which is a basic motivator for inquiry. T…Read more
  •  74
    Are “Attributive” Uses of Definite Descriptions Really Attributive?
    Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 20 (1): 7-13. 2006.
    In this essay I argue that given Donnellan’s formulation of the attributive uses of definite descriptions, as well as Kripke’s [6] and Salmon’s [10] generalized accounts, most uses of definite descriptions that are taken to be attributive turn out not to be so. In building up to my main thesis, I first consider certain problematic cases of uses of definite descriptions that do not neatly fit into any category. I then argue that, in general, a complete definite description we use is complex, in w…Read more
  •  133
    The Philosophy of Curiosity
    Routledge. 2011.
    In this book, Ilhan Inan questions the classical definition of curiosity as _a desire to know._ Working in an area where epistemology and philosophy of language overlap, Inan forges a link between our ability to become aware of our ignorance and our linguistic aptitude to construct terms referring to things unknown. The book introduces the notion of inostensible reference. Ilhan connects this notion to related concepts in philosophy of language: knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by descrip…Read more
  •  11
    How to Predict Future Contingencies
    Yeditepe’de Felsefe 4 152-158. 2005.
  •  73
    Inostensible Reference and Conceptual Curiosity
    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (1): 21-41. 2010.
    A lot has been said about how the notion of reference relates to the notion of knowledge; not much has been said, however, on how the notion of referencerelates to our ability to become aware of what we do not know that allows us to be curious. In this essay I attempt to spell out a certain type of reference I call ‘inostensible’ that I claim to be a fundamental linguistic tool which allows us to become curious of what we do not know. In the first part, I try to explicate the notion of inostensi…Read more
  •  115
    Unanswerable questions for Millians
    Philosophical Studies 154 (2): 279-283. 2011.
    I argue that Millianism has the very odd consequence that there are simple direct questions that Millians can grasp, but they cannot answer them in the positive or the negative, or in some other way, nor could they say that they do not know the answer.
  •  43
    ‘The Referential’ and ‘the Attributive’: Two Distinctions for the Price of One
    Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 12 (2): 137-160. 2006.
    There are two sorts of singular terms for which we have difficulty applying Donnellan’s referential/attributive distinction: complex definite descriptions, and proper names. With respect to the uses of such terms in certain contexts we seem to have conflicting intuitions as to whether they should be classified as referential or attributive. The problem concerning how to apply Donnellan’s distinction to the uses of certain complex definite descriptions has never been debated in the literature. On…Read more
  •  23
    Rigid Designation and Theoretical Identities (review)
    International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 28 (2): 217-220. 2014.
  •  13
  • Aynıların Ayırdedilmezliği
    Felsefe Tartismalari 26 15-20. 2000.