Ilia Onegin

This article shows what difficulties are connected with the enactivist interpretation of Heidegger and what options can be found to overcome them. First of all, the epistemological attitude of enactivism is outlined. This attitued forced the enactivist theoreticians (i.e. Francisco Varela and Evan Thompson) to turn to the “cognitive” understanding of Heidegger. The rejection of cognitivism and connectionism as equally “disembodied” ways of understanding consciousness in favor of an “embodied” approach led enactivist theorists to turn to the phenomenological tradition and, in particular, to the cognitive interpretations of Heidegger. Secondly, the reasons for disappointment in the Heideggerian heritage, expressed by the theorists of enactivism, are considered. It is shown that the main reason for this disappointment was the basic incompatibility of the enactivist approach to consciousness, based on the Husserlian concept of intentionality, with Heidegger's approach. Natalie Depraz' non-intentional approach based on her interpretation of the concept of Gelassenheit is named as an example of overcoming the contradictions that arise in enactivism.

This article reconstructs the normative strategy of interpretation of Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time in modern analytical philosophy, and also proposes a theoretical framework for understanding this strategy as a historical phenomenon. The article describes the development of the normative direction in the interpretation of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. Its first branch—the socio-normative, or the neopragmatist one—is associated with such philosophers as John Haugeland and Robert Brandom. The second one—the ethico-normative, or postneopragmatist one—branch is represented by Steven Crowell and Sacha Golob. It is shown that the first group of normativists focused mainly on implicit social norms and structures of conformity, while the second—focuses primarily on Kantian ethics and Christina Korsgaard’s interpretation of Kant, as well as on the inferentialist philosophy of language of Robert Brandom. The conceptual schemes used by each of the representatives of these approaches are reconstructed. The connections of different approaches within the framework of the normative direction with each other are shown. The concept of a relay race is proposed, which can describe normative Heideggerianism as a historical phenomenon. It is shown that the development of normative Heideggerianism can be characterized as theoretical progress in relation to the accuracy of the interpretation of Heidegger’s texts. The grounds for the comparative “progressiveness” of different normative approaches in the updates of the basic normative conceptual scheme that they involve are clarified. It is also shown that the progress of the normative conceptual scheme in the direction of flexibility and adaptation to Heidegger’s text is fraught with a loss of meaningfulness of the very concept of norm. It is argued that the concept of norm, despite the loss of its empirical content, can be used to translate Heidegger’s concepts for pragmatic reasons.