Ilya Zrudlo

The role of philosophy has gradually been minimized in initial teacher education (ITE) despite the benefits it can bring to teachers. One of the reasons it has been marginalized is because of the way it was being offered. I outline some relatively neglected critiques R. S. Peters laid out against the historical survey method of teaching philosophical foundations, as well as some of his suggestions for how to integrate philosophy of education into ITE. Backed up by more recent proposals by philosophers of education, I argue that some of Peters’ suggestions could help address some of the pressing challenges facing teacher education today. I then consider how these suggestions could be incorporated into a philosophical foundations course for ITE. I argue that setting in motion and maintaining a learning process about more effective ways of integrating philosophy into ITE would help us make the case for its meaningful (re)introduction.

Growth mindset theory and interventions have become nearly ubiquitous in education, especially in Western countries. While a vigorous debate has been underway in the field of psychology about the merit of the theory and interventions based upon it, there have been few if any focused treatments of the topic in philosophy of education. This paper illustrates four complementary ways in which growth mindset theory and interventions can be critically assessed, drawing on literature in both psychology and philosophy. The four critical angles are: (1) reviewing available empirical studies, especially through the lens of insights drawn from statistics and philosophy of science; (2) carefully considering the context of in which the research is carried out and the nature of its conclusions; (3) paying attention to its conceptual integrity, in part by (re)turning to ordinary language; and (4) analyzing the way in which mindset theory is embedded in and influenced by idiosyncratic features of Western culture. The paper concludes that the empirical research on growth mindset interventions is mixed; contextual factors make it difficult to evaluate their effectiveness; the central concepts of mindset theory are rife with problems; and the theory aligns with and may inadvertently perpetuate Western ideological trends.

ABSTRACT This article takes up three interrelated elements of Iris Murdoch’s moral philosophy into an initial conceptual framework for moral education and explores a practical application of this framework to a lesson plan. The three elements are moral vocabulary, moral perception, and the quality of our states of consciousness. The framework constituted by these three elements suggests that moral education should enrich the moral vocabulary of students, sharpen their moral perception, and expand their consciousness. To provide a concrete example of what it would look like to advance these aims, the author shares their experience using Aesop’s fable The Fox and the Crow in community education programs with adolescents.

The literature on teacher leadership tends to omit mention of the dark side of leadership. This is troubling since, after all, examples of bad leaders come readily to mind. This paper delves into the literature on bad leadership, illuminating it with reference to Iris Murdoch’s moral psychology, to elaborate an explanation as to why leaders often go bad. This framework is then applied to teacher leadership in order to lay out certain ethical and educational risks associated with the indiscriminate promotion of teacher leadership, as well as concerns related to the theme of social change. The paper concludes that we should be careful if we decide to promote teacher leadership, lest such efforts lead to the proliferation of bad leaders.

In this essay, I ask what form of historical consciousness schools should nurture in students. The two criteria I set up in this regard are plausibility—is the account of history plausible—and practicality—does the form of historical consciousness help young people contribute to the betterment of society. The level of my analysis is that of modernity, a novel interpretation of which I gradually develop. I begin by drawing on Nietzsche to assess three forms of historical consciousness that are on offer: the belief in the old age of humankind, a forward-looking rebellion, and a backwards-looking rebellion. All three are found wanting according to my criteria. I retain from Nietzsche the idea that a certain degree of ‘presentism’ is inevitable in historical consciousness. I then use Paul Ricoeur’s reflections on modernity as a springboard for outlining a different account, which mobilizes the metaphor of modernity as a period of transition akin to adolescence. The form of historical consciousness that is associated with this metaphor is more plausible and practical than the three competitors I assessed. I conclude by defending this account from potential objections.

Indoctrination is an ongoing concern in education, especially in debates about moral education. One approach to this issue is to come up with a rational procedure that can robustly justify potential items of moral education content. I call this the ‘rationalistic justification project’. Michael Hand’s recent book, A Theory of Moral Education, is representative of this approach. My essay has three parts. First, I show that Hand’s justificatory procedure – the problem-of-sociality justification – cannot serve the purposes he has in mind; it fails on its own terms and may even cause the teacher to inadvertently slide into indoctrination. Second, I argue that the causes of this failure lie deeper than Hand’s particular approach to the rationalistic justification project; rather, it is the broader project itself that is misguided, largely due to its narrow conceptions of morality and rationality. Third, I offer an alternative way of framing the issue of indoctrination, by drawing on Aristotle’s philosophy of rhetoric. My suggested approach recontextualizes the issue of indoctrination and brings into focus a broader set of relevant features of the teaching–learning situation.