Inigo Ongay De Ongay De Felipe

El presente trabajo ofrece un análisis de las razones que explican el relativo éxito social de la figura de Gustavo Bueno y de algunos de sus filosofemas tanto dentro como fuera del contorno de Asturias. Tras defender que el grado de éxito de un sistema filosófico no queda explicado tan solo por la potencia teórica de su doctrina, el autor introduce el prisma teórico de la sociología cultural del posicionamiento de los intelectuales dramáticos y la psicología social de los dinamismos intergrupales para dar cuenta de las contingencias relativas a la penetración social de una filosofía. Se concluye que por razones muy comprensibles las partes y dimensiones de la obra de Bueno que han resultado más influyentes no han sido recepcionadas en tanto que segmentos de un sistema filosófico crítico sino como motivos retórico-ideológicos engranados con los sesgos intergrupales de las subculturas de nuestra sociedad urbana contemporánea.

Este ensayo ofrece un desarrollo de lo que Gustavo Bueno denomina argumento zoológico contra el idealismo. Tras rastrear la historia conceptual de este argumento en la tradición escéptica de Sexto Empírico o en la tradición idealista de Arthur Schopenhauer, el autor sitúa el foco de atención en la paradoja aparente de que Gustavo Bueno emplea el argumento zoológico para sustentar una epistemología y una ontología materialista que sin perjuicio de reconocer el carácter zootrópico y antrópico de morfologías decisivas de nuestro mundo subraya que este mismo desborda por múltiples puntos toda escala subjetual, superando así las aporías del idealismo y del correlacionismo.

This paper explores the genesis of the concept of time, analysing how the initial methods, techniques and institutions employed by early human groups to measure environmental changes became increasingly aligned with human activities, thereby forming the basis of our modern understanding of time. Adopting a discontinuous materialist perspective, this work posits that complex ideas like time often have simple technological origins. We introduce the term chronogenetic institutions to describe the early mechanisms used by human groups for measuring world transformations before having a clear concept of time. These chronogenetic institutions are grouped according to the cyclical phenomena they represent, primarily natural occurrences such as the movement of celestial bodies, changing weather patterns, and seasonal variations in flora and fauna. This study challenges the view that temporal concepts were purely theoretical at their inception, highlighting that they initially emerged and spread through institutional practices in social contexts. It promotes a refined understanding of time’s complexity, advocating for a transition from a singular “Nature Time” to a conception of multiple temporalities, constructed both socially and technologically. Furthermore, it advocates for an objective and pluralistic examination of early human groups’ initial attempts to synchronise their activities with the changing and unpredictable world around them.

Este artículo propone un análisis de las relaciones entre una idea clave del pensamiento filosófico moderno como es la del llamado cogito cartesiano y un trastorno de naturaleza psiquiátrica descrito por el médico francés Jules Cotard en las últimas décadas del siglo XIX. Mientras que Descartes, y toda la estela de sus descendientes, habrían tendido a situar en la existencia auto-trasparente del sujeto el fundamento de la filosofía en la Modernidad, los pacientes aquejados del síndrome de Cotard piensan, con el mismo grado de evidencia clara y distinta, que no existen. El ensayo termina por sugerir que trastornos psicopatológicos como el de Cotard tienden a disolver la hipóstasis cartesiana del ego apuntando en la dirección de un sujeto concebido como anómalo y atravesado por discontinuidades.

This discussion focuses on whether Mario Bunge’s emergent materialism implies continuism or not. Íñigo Ongay defends that Bunge’s emergent materialism implies continuism. In his response, Javier Pérez-Jara argues that Bunge’s emergent materialism explicitly assumes structural ontological and epistemological discontinuities in the universe. The question is more than a Scholastic one, concerning only a particular system of philosophy, however relevant for current philosophical materialism. Rather, what is at stake is the ability of non-reductionist ontologies to explain (non-miraculous) novelty and plurality.

This article shows that the modal ontological argument as proposed by Gottrieb Leibniz was very much anticipated in its logical articulation by John Duns Scotus in his work De Primo Principio. To this end, the author analyzes some of the various versions of the argument present in the philosophical thought of authors such as Scotus, Leibniz, Malcom and Plattinga, and demonstrates that those versions are based on the hidden premise of the possibility of the idea of God. In this respect, the Spanish philosopher Gustavo Bueno defends what he calls an “inverted ontological argument” which, if viable, would prove not so much the non-existence of God but that the idea of God does not exist itself.

This chapter examines the contrast between Ernst Mach’s and Mario Bunge’s accounts of parsimony as a principle in theory evaluation. The point is argued that simplicity, central as it undoubtedly is to Mach’s philosophy, does not constitute a proper epistemic virtue within his framework. In his 1963 book The Myth of Simplicity, Mario Bunge endorses a very different position. Bunge begins by noticing that simplicity is not that simple. Indeed, the notion can be accorded a plurality of distinct meanings whether they are semantic, logical, epistemic, ontological, syntactic, or even aesthetic. Thus, doubts do inevitably arise regarding what sort of simplicity is accorded epistemic importance. Unlike Ernst Mach, Mario Bunge adopts a critical realist position and so he argues that scientific theories aim at representing the world. Importantly however, Bunge does not mean to claim that the principle of parsimony is devoid of any relevance. Nonetheless, replacing this modest and transitional usage of the principle with a cult of simplicity coupled with the ungrounded metaphysical assumption that the world is intrinsically simple conflicts with other heuristic goals of science. I will show that Bunge’s analysis deserves credit for reminding us that research customarily unveils the multiple -fold inner complexity of reality and so it is always good advice to recall that our best theories are to be kept simple enough but not simpler.