This paper focuses on Thorstad’s striking claim in Chapter 4 of Inquiry Under Bounds that there are no epistemic norms of inquiry. While we do not find the claim convincing, engaging with Thorstad’s arguments has forced us to take a closer look at assumptions and principles that we, no doubt like many others, have been too quick to take for granted. The paper clarifies different types of norms governing activities such as inquiry and argues that that, even when cognitive frailty, boundedness, an…
Read moreThis paper focuses on Thorstad’s striking claim in Chapter 4 of Inquiry Under Bounds that there are no epistemic norms of inquiry. While we do not find the claim convincing, engaging with Thorstad’s arguments has forced us to take a closer look at assumptions and principles that we, no doubt like many others, have been too quick to take for granted. The paper clarifies different types of norms governing activities such as inquiry and argues that that, even when cognitive frailty, boundedness, and the practical nature of inquiry are taken into account, there still remains a space for what might be termed the project of pure inquiry, governed by purely epistemic norms.
