Inken Titz

This chapter aims to challenge the cognitivist bias in debates surrounding AI-based and general moral enhancement and introduces the concept of moral identity as an alternative. The primary objective is to establish moral identity as an important and empirically adequate focal point for moral enhancement interventions. While an emphasis on cognition might preserve autonomy, it fails to present an adequate picture of moral self-governance. As the chapter argues, cognition does not play the central role in moral conduct we may desire. This also applies to higher-order abilities.The focus on identity aligns with philosophical perspectives that place identity at the core of moral agency and recognizes that often it is our will, not reasoning ability, that affects our moral behavior. Furthermore, moral identity captures the agential dimension of enhancement in a potentially morally neutral and autonomy-respecting manner. As such, it offers a promising approach for improving moral conduct through AI-based interventions while being grounded in evidence from state-of-the-art empirical research.

This book addresses a fundamental issue at the intersection of practical and theoretical philosophy: Does what we ought to do depend on our perspective as epistemic agents? Against the backdrop of this fundamental question, the author defends a new variant of perspectivism. 0Answering this question is essential to a theory of normative reasons, and the book thereby provides important insights for our understanding of rational deliberation and right action. One major upshot is a new explanation of phenomena where we are guided by facts outside of our perspective, such as deliberation and advice-giving. 0'Why perspective matters' engages with current debates from a wide range of philosophical areas, such as metaethics, epistemology, and moral psychology, to develop a novel account of perspectivism.

According to perspectivism, what I ought to do depends on my perspective. While recently popular, perspectivism faces a central puzzle. In some deliberative practices, facts outside our perspective are clearly relevant. In deliberation, we are concerned with acquiring new information. In advising, a better-informed adviser possesses relevant information I do not have. The latter case distinctly highlights the challenge: even if you possess better information than me, if your advice is not supported by my available reasons, it is wrong. In this paper, I argue that this puzzle can be solved by a zetetic approach to perspectivism. To that aim, I introduce close reasons, which are facts knowable under specific bounded conditions that can be inferred from intuitive assumptions about inquiry. They can explain the directedness of deliberation and how better-informed advisers speak truly given perspectivism. This paper brings together the hitherto separate debates about reasons perspectivism and zetetic norms.