Ioannis Trisokkas

ABSTRACTConsulting Heidegger's other texts composed during 1936–1942, this article employs a principle of charity and constructs a consistent discourse about an inceptual negativity Heidegger articulates through a confrontation with Hegel in GA 68. Heidegger deliberately differentiates his use of denial that bears Being-historical significance from Hegel's Negation that allegedly aims at synthesis or elevation as a dialectical movement. Being unsatisfied with his approach that remains entangled with metaphysics in the Contributions, Heidegger attempts to transform the question of the Nothing from a subsidiary question to Beyng to an abyssal question. One needs to go under toward the Nothing in its concealed, conjoined, and most intimate relation to Beyng. The movement of going under is fundamentally significant for transitions that could occur from out of the history of Beyng. Never being the fullness of essence, the Nothing places a limit on Beyng, constantly thwarts its unfolding, and maint...

One of Heidegger’s enduring concerns was to develop an original meditation on the meaning of (the presence of) the present. Integral to this attempt is his critique of the understanding of the being of beings in terms of the objectivity of the object. In this paper, I trace Heidegger’s analyses of objectivity, through which Heidegger consistently establishes objectivity as non-primordial and derivative. In order to do this, however, Heidegger had to identify a specific, narrow (spatio-temporalized) conception of objectivity (in terms of Gegenstehenlassen and Vorstellen) as the hallmark of modern philosophy. I show that it is unclear whether that conception is a justified result or rather an unjustified presupposition of his approach. I then suggest what meanings of objectivity might be lost after Heidegger, by pointing to several aspects of Hegel’s notion of objectivity that are incompatible with Heidegger’s account, to wit: the lack of ‘subject-object’-terminology in his definitions of objectivity; the special language of ‘forms of’ objectivity; Hegel’s critique of representation; his notion of Gegenstand as a content with a categorical form, and, finally, that Aristotle’s notion of hypokeimenon might provide a clue as to how Hegel’s notion of object can be understood.