Although bullshit has gained significant attention in philosophy, there remains a lack of consensus regarding its characterization. I contend that a feminist approach could provide valuable insights into this issue. Bullshit is commonly characterized by its indifference toward truth, distinguished from lying. I posit that this indifference can be interpreted as an indifference toward the responsibility one's utterances entail. According to Frankfurt (2005), bullshitters often enjoy greater toler…
Read moreAlthough bullshit has gained significant attention in philosophy, there remains a lack of consensus regarding its characterization. I contend that a feminist approach could provide valuable insights into this issue. Bullshit is commonly characterized by its indifference toward truth, distinguished from lying. I posit that this indifference can be interpreted as an indifference toward the responsibility one's utterances entail. According to Frankfurt (2005), bullshitters often enjoy greater tolerance than liars. I argue that this tolerance enables speakers to engage in careless discourse. However, by analyzing various examples of bullshit, I show that this tolerance is heavily influenced by social and identity factors that shape our evaluation of speakers. By focusing on these factors, we can gain a deeper understanding of the underlying dynamics of bullshit, as well as recognize parallels between these dynamics and those associated with epistemic injustices.
