Iris Berent

Philosophical discussions of the “hard problem” often invoke “problem intuitions”, as consciousness intuitions and consciousness are believed to be “closely connected” (Chalmers, 2018). Here, I challenge this assumption. In two experiments, I demonstrate that consciousness intuitions are illusory—they shift across different “problem intuitions”, akin to perceptual illusions. When presented with a duplication scenario, people do not view consciousness as physical (i.e., they believe that copying one’s physical body will not copy one’s conscious states). But when probed about a second scenario (that of Mary in the Black-and-White Room), consciousness now seems squarely physical, as people expect Mary's novel experience of color to "show up" in a brain scan. I trace this shift to two psychological biases—intuitive Dualism and Essentialism. The shift in consciousness intuitions demonstrates that consciousness judgments are illusory, and as such, they cannot be trusted to reflect what consciousness is.

Philosophical discussions of the “hard problem” often invoke “problem intuitions”, as consciousness intuitions and consciousness are believed to be “closely connected” (Chalmers, 2018). Here, I challenge this assumption. In two experiments, I demonstrate that consciousness intuitions are illusory—they shift across different “problem intuitions”, akin to perceptual illusions. When presented with a duplication scenario, people do not view consciousness as physical (i.e., they believe that copying one’s physical body will not copy one’s conscious states). But when probed about a second scenario (that of Mary in the Black-and-White Room), consciousness now seems squarely physical, as people expect Mary's novel experience of color to "show up" in a brain scan. I trace this shift to two psychological biases—intuitive Dualism and Essentialism. The shift in consciousness intuitions demonstrates that consciousness judgments are illusory, and as such, they cannot be trusted to reflect what consciousness is.

People naturally intuit that an agent's ethereal thoughts can cause its body to move. Per intuitive physics; however, one body can only interact with another. Are people, then, covertly puzzled by the capacity of thoughts to command the body? Experiment 1 first confirms that thoughts (e.g., thinking about a cup) are indeed perceived as ethereal—as less detectible in the body (brain), and more likely to exist in the afterlife relative to matched percepts (e.g., seeing a cup). Experiments 2–5 show that thoughts are considered less likely to cause behavior than percepts (e.g., thinking of a cup vs. seeing one). Furthermore, mind–body causation is more remarkable when its bodily consequences are salient (e.g., moving an arm vs. brain activation). Finally, epistemic causes are remarkable only when they are ascribed to mental‐ (e.g., “thinking”) but not to physical states (“activation”). Together, these results suggest that mind–body interactions elicit a latent dualist dissonance.

Few questions are as controversial as the origins of knowledge. Chapter 5 demonstrates that laypeople are systematically biased against innate ideas, and that this bias arises from intuitive Dualism and Essentialism. Specifically, if per Dualism, ideas are immaterial, whereas, if per Essentialism, ideas must be material, then it follows that ideas cannot be innate. Experiments 1–4 suggest that people view epistemic traits (i.e., ideas) as less material (e.g., less localized in the brain, in line with Dualism). Experiments 5–8 suggest that traits presented as innate (i.e., essence-defining) are viewed as more material (in line with Essentialism). Finally, Experiments 9 and 10 suggest that the effect of Dualism and Essentialism is causal: when people are presented with evidence of either mind-body Physicalism, generally, or of the materiality of individual traits, specifically, their presumption of innateness increases. These results open the possibility that empiricism is natural: it arises from principles that lie deep within human cognition.

People are systematically biased against the possibility that ideas are innate. Berent (2020) traces these attitudes to an ontological dissonance, arising from the collision of two fundamental principles of human cognition -- dualism and essentialism. Carruthers (this issue) challenges this hypothesis and attributes our empiricist bias primarily to mindreading intuitions. Here, I counter Carruthers' concerns and show that mindreading cannot be the sole source of the empiricist bias. Specifically, mindreading fails to explain why our empiricist intuitions depend on the perceived immateriality of ideas. The ontological dissonance hypothesis accounts for these facts. Because essentialism requires innate traits to be material, and because, per dualism, ideas are immaterial, people conclude that ideas cannot be innate.

Do newborns think-do they know that 'three' is greater than 'two'? Do they prefer 'right' to 'wrong'? What about emotions--do newborns recognize happiness or anger? If they do, then how are our inborn thoughts and feelings encoded in our bodies? Could they persist after we die? Going all the way back to ancient Greece, human nature and the mind-body link are the topics of age-old scholarly debates. But laypeople also have strong opinions about such matters. Most people believe, for example, that newborn babies don't know the difference between right and wrong-such knowledge, they insist, can only be learned. For emotions, they presume the opposite-that our capacity to feel fear, for example, is both inborn and embodied. These beliefs are stories we tell ourselves about what we know and who we are. They reflect and influence our understanding of ourselves and others and they guide every aspect of our lives. In a twist that could have come out of a Greek tragedy, Berent proposes that our errors are our fate. These mistakes emanate from the very principles that make our minds tick: our blindness to human nature is rooted in human nature itself. An intellectual journey that draws on philosophy, anthropology, linguistics, cognitive science, and Berent's own cutting-edge research, The Blind Storyteller grapples with a host of provocative questions, from why we are so infatuated with our brains to what happens when we die. The end result is a startling new perspective on our humanity.

People exhibit conflicting intuitions concerning the mind/body links. Here, I explore a novel explanation for these inconsistencies: Dualism is a violable constraint that interacts with Essentialism. Two experiments probe these interactions. In Experiment 1, participants evaluated the emergence of psychological traits in either a replica of one's body, or in the afterlife—after the body's demise. In line with Dualism, epistemic (i.e., disembodied) traits (e.g., knowing the contrast between good/bad) were considered more likely to emerge (relative to sensorimotor/affective traits) only in the afterlife. However, so were innate traits (in line with Essentialism). To further gauge Essentialism, Experiment 2 presented the same traits to innateness judgments. Here, sensorimotor/affective (i.e., embodied) traits were considered more likely to be innate, suggesting that innateness intuitions are informed by embodiment. Moreover, innateness judgments (in Experiment 2) and embodiment intuitions (in Experiment 1) correlated. These results suggest that Dualism tacitly constrains reasoning about one's innate origins and its persistence after death. But since Dualism is “soft” and interacts with Essentialism, supernatural intuitions are chimeric, not purely ethereal.