Some social institutions have clear epistemic aims: to create, accumulate, exchange, and disseminate knowledge, understanding, and other epistemic goods. While much recent literature in social epistemology has focused on identifying and analysing epistemic wrongs in these institutions, less attention has been paid to how institutions can realise their epistemic aims and correct for epistemic harms, wrongs, and mistakes. To this end, we introduce a framework for thinking about institutional epist…
Read moreSome social institutions have clear epistemic aims: to create, accumulate, exchange, and disseminate knowledge, understanding, and other epistemic goods. While much recent literature in social epistemology has focused on identifying and analysing epistemic wrongs in these institutions, less attention has been paid to how institutions can realise their epistemic aims and correct for epistemic harms, wrongs, and mistakes. To this end, we introduce a framework for thinking about institutional epistemic responsibilities, which we argue social institutions incur because they have epistemic power. Our account is inspired by Michel Foucault’s notion of power/knowledge, and we discuss the university as a prime example. We introduce four dimensions of epistemic power: to influence 1) epistemic norms, standards, and values, 2) the status of genuine knowers and epistemic authorities, 3) agenda setting, and 4) the dissemination of knowledge. Universities should use their epistemic power responsibly to achieve their epistemic aims and to right epistemic wrongs, mistakes, harms, and injustices. We illustrate the fruitfulness of our framework by focusing on two case studies: a case of research misconduct at the Tilburg University in the Netherlands and a case of integration and inclusion of indigenous knowledges in the University of Auckland in Aotearoa, New Zealand.
