Iris Zezelj

This paper highlights an ideological neglect in the scientific community’s study of trust in science. While science skepticism (e.g., science denial, anti-scientific conspiracy theories, belief in pseudoscience) has deservedly received vast attention, the opposite extreme - uncritical trust in science (scientism) - is largely overlooked. Scientism idealizes science as all-powerful, capable of establishing absolute truth and solving all problems, while simultaneously exhibiting an unwillingness to accept criticism of its limitations. Despite being notably under-researched, rare findings suggest scientistic beliefs share a similar cognitive footprint with anti-scientific beliefs, being positively related to dogmatism and negatively to cognitive reflection and general cognitive abilities. Outcomes of this uncritical trust include vulnerability to “scientific signaling”, i.e., to meaningless claims using quasi-scientific language or overestimating data value due to irrelevant illustrations or formulae. Furthermore, blind trust can lead to societal polarization, with those who uncritically trust science and scientists being prone to supporting punitive measures against science skeptics. This ideological neglect is potentially driven by scientists’ self-defensive motivations, despite recognizing its contradiction to science’s core principle of organized skepticism. An integral approach to studying trust in science is proposed, with epistemic and political implications. These suggest studying similarities between trust and distrust in science, and urging for critical engagement with science, acknowledging its entanglement with economic and political interests. Practical recommendations include thorough conceptual and empirical exploration of uncritical trust, moving beyond simplistic “trust us” messaging and ensuring scientific authority remains accountable and open to scrutiny.

Irrational beliefs encompass a broad set of beliefs that lack verifiable empirical evidence and contradict scientific principles, often grouped into conspiratorial, pseudoscientific, and paranormal domains. This paper investigated whether these beliefs are rooted in a set of cognitive biases. Across four studies, low socioeconomic status, right-wing political orientation, and religiousness accounted for a substantial portion of irrational beliefs variance. However, cognitive biases consistently contributed incrementally to their prediction, with naturalness bias, omission bias, commitment bias, and the overconfidence effect emerging as the most robust predictors. Our findings indicate the nuanced nature of these relationships, as the predictive power of cognitive biases was consistently higher for conspiracist and pseudoscientific beliefs in comparison to paranormal ones.