Irley F. Franco

he article shows that several studies on the meaning of νοῦς, νόησις, νοεῖν, and derivatives in pre-Platonic literature, especially in Homer, but also in some pre-Socratic thinkers, have concluded that these terms are never used in strictly abstract situations, but, on the contrary, always appear linked to emotions connected to concrete events. Plato is certainly the main “author” to be studied when it comes to the use of this terminology in cognitive functions. Indeed, he was the first to systematize a specialized vocabulary for these functions, and emphatically use these terms in passages of the Middle dialogues, when, according to Aristotle’s account of his Philosophy, in _Metaphysics_ A 6, unlike Socrates, he began to suppose that the essence (οὐσία) of things is not in the things themselves, but lies beyond them, thus creating a separation (χωρισμός) which will be the fundamental source of all the difficulties concerning the “Theory of Ideas”. After hypothesizing the existence of the Ideas, abstract entities he considered more real than material ones, he created _a_ special type of apprehension capable of capturing invisible, intelligible entities, νόησις, thus introducing a new dimension of reality: a previously non-existent, invisible, and radically abstract one. Based on these assumptions, the article ends by raising a series of questions to be addressed in a future approach to the same subject.

In this paper I argue that Socrates' speech in Plato’s Symposium cannot by itself express Plato’s view of love. All the non-philosophical speeches, each standing for a different contemporary view of love, should be taken into serious consideration, for they are not mere pastiches of empty theories. In fact, they seem to have been placed there to have their intellectual strength tested by philosophy, for not only their contents reveal commonsensical accepted wisdom, but their discursive beauty powerfully impresses the audience, making them true challenges to the cold, though persuasive logos of philosophy. Furthermore, placing Alcibiades' speech right after Diotima’s austere account of love, when the program of speeches as proposed seemed to have arrived at an end, would be unnecessary, if Plato’s aim were simply to disapprove Alcibiades’ behavior to excuse Socrates political attitudes, as it is assumed by Leon Robin in his Notice to his famous translation to the Belles Lettres edition. On the contrary, Alcibiades’ speech sounds more like a criticism of Socratic love made by Plato himself.

Nesse artigo tento mostrar que o discurso de Sócrates no Banquete não podepor si só expressar a visão platônica do amor. Todos os discursos não filosóficos,que ali representam diferentes concepções do amor contemporâneas a Platão,devem ser considerados seriamente, e não desprezados como meros pastichesde teorias da época, introduzidos com a finalidade única de exibir asuperioridade da filosofia. Ao contrário, esses discursos parecem ter sido alicolocados como rivais verdadeiros, capazes de confrontar a filosofia e testar aforça de seu logos, pois, não somente seus conteúdos revelam “sabedorias”aceitas pelo senso comum, e, enquanto tais, ameaçadoras para a filosofia, comotambém sua beleza formal é extremamente sedutora para os ouvintes da época,que provavelmente antipatizavam com a frieza lógico-discursiva da filosofia.E mais: introduzir o discurso de Alcibíades logo em seguida ao austero discursoda sacerdotisa Diotima, quando o programa proposto pelos simposiastas pareciajá ter sido cumprido, seria totalmente desnecessário, se o objetivo de Platãofosse simplesmente desaprovar o comportamento de Alcibíades e desculpar asatitudes políticas de Sócrates, conforme sugere Leon Robin em sua Notice àfamosa tradução da Belles Lettres. O objetivo de Platão quando introduz essasétima personagem é, me parece, deixar clara sua insatisfação com a posiçãosocrática do amor.In this paper I argue that Socrates’ speech in Plato’s Symposium cannot expressby itself his perspective on love. All the non-philosophical speeches, eachstanding for a different contemporary view of love, should be taken intoserious consideration, for they are not mere pastiches of empty theories. Infact, they seem to have been placed there to have their intellectual strengthtested by philosophy, for not only their contents reveal commonsensicalaccepted wisdom, but their discursive beauty powerfully impresses the audience, making them true challenges to the cold, though persuasive logosof philosophy. Furthermore, placing Alcibiades’ speech right after Diotima’saustere account of love, when the program of speeches as proposed seemedto have arrived at an end, would be unnecessary, if Plato’s aim were simplyto disapprove Alcibiades’ behavior to excuse Socrates political attitudes, asit is assumed by Leon Robin in his Notice to his famous translation to theBelles Lettres edition. On the contrary, Alcibiades’ speech sounds more likea criticism of Socratic love made by Plato himself

Em República 509d-511e, Platão faz, pela primeira vez, uma exposição teórica completa do procedimento dialético. Nunca antes a dialética havia sido tratada como tema; em todas as demais ocasiões — quando é refutação, nos diálogos socráticos, ou método hipotético, em Mênon e Fédon, diálogos anteriores à República em que há a menção da hipótese em conexão com o procedimento metodológico— seus passos são apenas exemplificados; aqui, entretanto, ela é questão; ela é o objeto central da discussão, e Sócrates estará empenhado em esclarecer todas as suas etapas.