Isaac Record

דמיון מתחולל בחלקו מחוץ לראש באמצעות עזרים טכנולוגיים. עובדה זו כשלעצמה אינה חדשה, אולם ‏טכנולוגיות חדשות משנות את טיבו של הדמיון. מחוללי מדיה סינתטית, כגון דָאלִי, ופריטי מדיה סינתטיים, ‏כגון זיופים עמוקים (‏דיפ-פייקס; תמונות וסרטונים ריאליסטיים שנוצרו באופן אלגוריתמי ושמציגים אנשים ‏מבצעים או אומרים משהו שלא עשו או אמרו) מערערים על אמות המידה האפיסטמיות הבסיסיות שלנו. עם ‏זאת, טבעו של האיום האפיסטמי החדש הנשקף מהם נותר חמקמק, שכן ייצוגים בדיוניים או מעוותים של ‏המציאות הם עתיקים לפחות כמו הצילום עצמו. אפיונים קיימים באפיסטמולוגיה חברתית של האיום הגלום ‏בזיופים עמוקים מתקשים לזהות מה בעצם חדש בו. למאמר זה שתי מטרות: לאפיין את האיום האפיסטמי ‏החדש הנשקף ממדיה סינתטית, ולזהות את התנאים שבהם פריט מדיה סינתטית הוא בעייתי מבחינה ‏אפיסטמית. אנו טוענים שהאיום האפיסטמי הגלום בזיופים עמוקים בפרט, ובמדיה סינתטית בכלל, הוא ‏שלראשונה למשתמשי מחשב רגילים זמינה האפשרות המעשית ליצור בזול וללא מאמץ עולמות בדיוניים שלא ‏ניתן להבחין ביניהם לבין העולם האמיתי ולשתפם בתפוצה רחבה. פריט מדיה סינתטי הוא רעיל מבחינה ‏אפיסטמית בהקשר נתון כאשר אדם בעל הכרה כלשהי של ההקשר עלול לבלבל את העולם הבדיוני המתואר בו ‏עם העולם הממשי או עם ייצוגים מהימנים שלו בנושאים בעלי חשיבות מוסרית או אפיסטמית. ‏ Imagination takes place partly outside the mind, through technological aids. This fact is not new in ‎itself, but new technologies are changing the nature of imagination. Synthetic media generators, ‎such as DALL·E, and synthetic media items, such as deepfakes (realistic images and videos ‎algorithmically generated to depict people doing or saying things they never actually did or said), ‎challenge our fundamental epistemic standards. But the nature of the new epistemic threat they ‎pose remains elusive, since fictional or distorted representations of reality are at least as old as ‎photography itself. Existing characterizations in social epistemology of the threat posed by ‎deepfakes struggle to pinpoint what exactly is novel about it. This paper has two aims: to ‎characterize the new epistemic threat posed by synthetic media, and to identify the conditions ‎under which a synthetic media item is epistemically malignant or toxic. We argue that the ‎epistemic threat posed by deepfakes in particular, and by synthetic media more broadly, lies in the ‎unprecedented practicable possibility afforded to ordinary computer users to cheaply and ‎effortlessly create fictional worlds that are indistinguishable from the real world and share them ‎widely. A synthetic media item is epistemically toxic or malignant in a given context when a person ‎acquainted with the context is liable to confuse the fictional world depicted in it with the real ‎world or with credible representations thereof on matters of moral or epistemic significance.‎

Synthetic media generators, such as DALL-E, and synthetic media artifacts, such as deepfakes, undermine our fundamental epistemic standards and practices. Yet, the nature of their epistemic threat remains elusive. After all, fictional or distorted representations of reality are as old as photography. We argue that the novel epistemic threat of synthetic media is that, for the first time, synthetic media tools afford ordinary computer users the practicable possibility to cheaply and effortlessly create and widely share fictional worlds indistinguishable from the real world or credible representations of it. We further argue that a synthetic media artifact is epistemically malignant in a given media context for a person acquainted with the context when the person is misled to confuse the version of the world depicted in it with the real world in an epistemically or morally significant way.

Leading prescriptions for addressing the spread of fake news, misinformation, and other forms of epistemically toxic content online target either the platform or platform users as a single site for intervention. Neither approach attends to the intense feedback between people, posts, and platforms. Leading prescriptions boil down to the suggestion that we make social media more like traditional media, whether by making platforms take active roles as gatekeepers, or by exhorting individuals to behave more like media professionals. Both approaches are impracticable and wrong.

We present a novel model of individual people, online posts, and media platforms to explain the online spread of epistemically toxic content such as fake news and suggest possible responses. We argue that a combination of technical features, such as the algorithmically curated feed structure, and social features, such as the absence of stable social-epistemic norms of posting and sharing in social media, is largely responsible for the unchecked spread of epistemically toxic content online. Sharing constitutes a distinctive communicative act, governed by a dedicated norm and motivated to a large extent by social identity maintenance. But confusion about this norm and its lack of inherent epistemic checks lead readers to misunderstand posts, attribute excess or insufficient credibility to posts, and allow posters to evade epistemic accountability—all contributing to the spread of epistemically toxic content online. This spread can be effectively addressed if people and platforms add significantly more context to shared posts and platforms nudge people to develop and follow recognized epistemic norms of posting and sharing.

David Chalmers thinks his iPhone exemplifies the extended mind thesis by meeting the criteria ‎that he and Andy Clark established in their well-known 1998 paper. Andy Clark agrees. We take ‎this proposal seriously, evaluating the case of the GPS-enabled smartphone as a potential mind ‎extender. We argue that the “trust and glue” criteria enumerated by Clark and Chalmers are ‎incompatible with both the epistemic responsibilities that accompany everyday activities and the ‎practices of trust that enable users to discharge them. Prospects for revision of the original ‎criteria are dim. We therefore call for a rejection of the trust criterion and a reevaluation of the ‎extended mind thesis.‎

My aim in this paper is to give a philosophical analysis of the relationship between contingently available technology and the knowledge that it makes possible. My concern is with what specific subjects can know in practice, given their particular conditions, especially available technology, rather than what can be known “in principle” by a hypothetical entity like Laplace’s Demon. The argument has two parts. In the first, I’ll construct a novel account of epistemic possibility that incorporates two pragmatic conditions: responsibility and practicability. For example, whether subjects can gain knowledge depends in some circumstances on whether they have the capability of gathering relevant evidence. In turn, the possibility of undertaking such investigative activities depends in part on factors like ethical constraints, economical realities, and available technology. In the second part of the paper, I’ll introduce “technological possibility” to analyze the set of actions made possible by available technology. To help motivate the problem and later test my proposal, I’ll focus on a specific historical case, one of the earliest uses of digital electronic computers in a scientific investigation. I conclude that the epistemic possibility of gaining access to scientific knowledge about certain subjects depends (in some cases) on the technological possibility for making responsible investigations

People increasingly form beliefs based on information gained from automatically filtered Internet ‎sources such as search engines. However, the workings of such sources are often opaque, preventing ‎subjects from knowing whether the information provided is biased or incomplete. Users’ reliance on ‎Internet technologies whose modes of operation are concealed from them raises serious concerns about ‎the justificatory status of the beliefs they end up forming. Yet it is unclear how to address these concerns ‎within standard theories of knowledge and justification. To shed light on the problem, we introduce a ‎novel conceptual framework that clarifies the relations between justified belief, epistemic responsibility, ‎action, and the technological resources available to a subject. We argue that justified belief is subject to ‎certain epistemic responsibilities that accompany the subject’s particular decision-taking circumstances, ‎and that one typical responsibility is to ascertain, so far as one can, whether the information upon which ‎the judgment will rest is biased or incomplete. What this responsibility comprises is partly determined by ‎the inquiry-enabling technologies available to the subject. We argue that a subject’s beliefs that are ‎formed based on Internet-filtered information are less justified than they would be if she either knew how ‎filtering worked or relied on additional sources, and that the subject may have the epistemic ‎responsibility to take measures to enhance the justificatory status of such beliefs.‎.

Information providing and gathering increasingly involve technologies like search ‎engines, which actively shape their epistemic surroundings. Yet, a satisfying account ‎of the epistemic responsibilities associated with them does not exist. We analyze ‎automatically generated search suggestions from the perspective of social ‎epistemology to illustrate how epistemic responsibilities associated with a ‎technology can be derived and assigned. Drawing on our previously developed ‎theoretical framework that connects responsible epistemic behavior to ‎practicability, we address two questions: first, given the different technological ‎possibilities available to searchers, the search technology, and search providers, ‎who should bear which responsibilities? Second, given the technology’s ‎epistemically relevant features and potential harms, how should search terms be ‎autocompleted? Our analysis reveals that epistemic responsibility lies mostly with ‎search providers, which should eliminate three categories of autosuggestions: those ‎that result from organized attacks, those that perpetuate damaging stereotypes, and ‎those that associate negative characteristics with specific individuals.‎.

To one side of the wide third-floor hallway of Victoria College, just outside the offices of the Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology, lies the massive carcass of a 1960s-era electron microscope. Its burnished steel carapace has lost its gleam, but the instrument is still impressive for its bulk and spare design: binocular viewing glasses, beam control panel, specimen tray, and a broad work surface. Edges are worn, desiccated tape still feebly holds instructive reminders near control dials; this was once a workhorse in some lab. But it exists now out of time and place; like many of the scientific instruments we study, it has not been touched by knowing hands in decades.