Isabelle Keßels

This paper critically examines so-called “epistemic Frankfurt cases” (see e.g., Kelp 2016; Zagzebski 2001) against the backdrop of the original Frankfurt case. A distinction is drawn between two ways of deserving “epistemic credit,” which are subsequently compared to the concept of moral responsibility that is in play within the original Frankfurt case. Based on this analysis, Zagzebski's claim that agents in “epistemic Frankfurt cases” can be considered epistemically credible for the same reason as the agent in the original version is said to be morally responsible is challenged; raising doubts as to whether these cases really are best described as instances of knowledge. The paper concludes with the construction and discussion of a case that is a genuine epistemic analogue to the original Frankfurt case.

In traditional reward systems, managers’ key performance indicators must surpass an agreed target in order to achieve a financial bonus. This system is designed to motivate high performance; yet adverse behavioural effects are often observed. These include middle managers becoming incentivised to game the reward system and target negotiation process they are subject to. This paper discusses three approaches to preventing such undesirable behavioural effects: Firstly, a linear pay-for-performance system without a target floor for receiving a performance bonus. Secondly, a bonus banking system where managers participate at the company’s losses as well as its gains. Thirdly, a proposal that uses the Beyond Budgeting approach which radically negates the core premises of the traditional reward system and replaces rewards for individual manager performance with those for wider team performance. These three approaches are compared and evaluated with respect to their potential to prevent unwanted manager behaviour, and on consideration of how effectively they may be operationalised.

Within this paper, we argue that Audi’s transmission principle for testimony-based knowledge is untenable, while proposing an alternative route for him to take. We will first set out the core tenets of Audi’s general epistemology before we examine his account of testimony more specifically. Then, we proceed by showing that Audi’s transmission principle for testimony-based knowledge falls prey to a number of prominent counterexamples discussed in the recent literature. In reaction to this, we will put forward the thesis that in cases of testimonial knowledge propositional justification, in contrast to knowledge, is being transmitted. Finally, we conclude that Audi loses sight of this option due to his overly strict classification of knowledge in externalist and justification in internalist terms.