We need a sharp shift in our theories of metaphors. Traditionally, theories of metaphors struggle to reconcile metaphors' unique phenomenology with their explanatory value. I argue that this struggle stems from the presupposition of a language-based theory of conceptual thought. I also emphasize that current dual theories of conceptual thought - and the theories of metaphors which rely on them - (Camp,2015,2020), fall short of specifying the crucial details about the presumed reconciliation that…
Read moreWe need a sharp shift in our theories of metaphors. Traditionally, theories of metaphors struggle to reconcile metaphors' unique phenomenology with their explanatory value. I argue that this struggle stems from the presupposition of a language-based theory of conceptual thought. I also emphasize that current dual theories of conceptual thought - and the theories of metaphors which rely on them - (Camp,2015,2020), fall short of specifying the crucial details about the presumed reconciliation that they are trying to achieve.
In light of these problems for language-friendly theories, I dedicate the majority of the text for the development of a new theory of metaphors. I show that by combining a perception-based theory of concepts (Prinz,2002) with a structuralist theory of intentionality (Gładziejewski & Miłkowski, 2017), we can make sense of the phenomenology of metaphors (Davidson,1978; Walton,1993; Chasid & Pelman,2021) in terms of structured-by-attention gestalt experiences and epistemically virtuous cognitive penetration (Stokes,2018,2020).
