My research centres on the normativity of belief. Is it rational for me to believe that p if believing that p would destroy me? The traditional epistemologist’s answer has been: yes, if believing that p is epistemically warranted. I find such an answer problematic.
I approach the issue primarily through contemporary pragmatist theories of rationality; in addition, I also draw inspiration from Nietzschean philosophy, especially his critique of the unconditional value of truth and the salience he assigned to nihilism about life’s meaning. Accordingly, I am working on a form of pragmatism based upon agential empowerment, and on the formulation …
My research centres on the normativity of belief. Is it rational for me to believe that p if believing that p would destroy me? The traditional epistemologist’s answer has been: yes, if believing that p is epistemically warranted. I find such an answer problematic.
I approach the issue primarily through contemporary pragmatist theories of rationality; in addition, I also draw inspiration from Nietzschean philosophy, especially his critique of the unconditional value of truth and the salience he assigned to nihilism about life’s meaning. Accordingly, I am working on a form of pragmatism based upon agential empowerment, and on the formulation of nihilism as a problem concerning the governance of belief-like attitudes.
