Ivanilde Fracalossi

In spite of Schulze’s attacks, Reinhold led Kant’s defense and became the first thinker to interpret the moral law as a fact of consciousness. The question of the thing-in-itself was one of the systematic problems that occupied Reinhold in the elaboration of his Elementary Philosophy. Evidently, such a question was also decisive for his connection with Fichte’s Doctrine of Science in 1797, in which his philosophical system no longer proceeds from consciousness or the subject-object relation, but rather a strictly monistic conception. At this time, Reinhold self-critically argued that his earlier postulation of the thing-in-itself as an object of consciousness – that is, as an object in itself conceived in the sense of mere matter existing independently of any form – led to a serious inconsistency and therefore should be abandoned. In the Elementary Philosophy, a distinction is drawn between the subject in itself and the representing subject – which, from the theoretical point of view, was conceived sometimes as transcendental, sometimes as an empirical subject. From a practical point of view, the representing subject is understood as the person who wants – and possesses – an absolute power to decide for or against the moral law. The subject in the sense of self-consciousness and the desiring subject are both reevaluated with the transition to Fichte, but the subject in itself is not explicitly eliminated. This text intends to concentrate on this transition from Elementary Philosophy to the Doctrine of Science, as well as on trying to explain what conclusions should be drawn from the thing-in-itself as subject in itself.

This article takes a look at some key-texts from Karl Leonhard Reinhold’s philosophical course in order to show that although the author often changes the theoretical outline of his writings, there is always a fixed unity of thought that remains in all the reworked stages, namely, the search for an absolutely first and universally valid cause for all philosophy, which could put an end to the fruitless metaphysical controversies of that historical moment. For this, he does not hesitate to investigate different sources, or even change the conceptual content already used by himself, but always remains extremely faithful to his greater interest, even if it were necessary to adapt himself to the theory of whoever approached this project more closely.

O grande número de cartas trocadas entre Jacobi e Reinhold demonstra uma forte relação intelectual entre os dois autores. A frequência dessas cartas se intensifica principalmente nos anos de 1793 a 1800, bem no período em que Reinhold questionava sua própria doutrina da liberdade e se dedicava aos estudos da Wissenschaftslehre, para a qual migra efetivamente em 1797. Menos de dois anos depois, no entanto, converte-se à filosofia de Jacobi, com quem cultiva, na verdade, maior conexão de pensamentos, pois nutriam a mesma visão iluminista sobre a razão. Este artigo se propõe a analisar os pontos conceituais convergentes do pensamento de ambos os autores.

It is a question of ascertaining, at first, the difficulties that prevented Reinhold from carrying out the long-sought deduction of a free and absolute cause for freedom of will within the framework of elementary philosophy, or in the plan of the faculty of representation in general. In a second moment, I briefly analyze the author's new strategy when trying to carrying out, or at least to deepen, his foundational approach through practical philosophy. These two movements have Kantian philosophy as a background. In fact, Reinhold takes this starting point after analyzing Kant’s work and considering it problematic in some points, mainly the foundation of the effectiveness of freedom in the fact of reason. Keywords: Reinhold, Kant, freedom, representation, foundation

Partindo das máximas do entendimento comum presentes nas três faculdades superiores do homem, tentaremos pensar a capacidade do senso comum para se expressar sobre regras universais, o que o obriga a abstrair-se de toda comoção e inclinação trazidas do mundo sensorial. Como faculdade de ajuizamento, o senso comum, ao refletir, considera “em pensamento , o modo de representação de qualquer outro como que para ater o seu juízo à inteira razão humana” . Nosso intuito com isso é conferir que o homem em Kant é um ser político, pensa e é sujeito dos seus atos, mas sempre considera o outro.Taking the common understanding maxims presents in the three human being supreme faculties as a starting point, we will try to think about the common sense capability of expressing itself over universal rules, what forces this common sense to abstract itself from all commotion and tendency brought from the sensory world. As a judgement faculty, the common sense, through the reflection, considers “in thought , the representation way of any other as an attempt of holding its judgement to the entire human being rationality” . Our purpose with this is to reflect about the human being for Kant as a political human being, who thinks and is subject of his acts, although always considering the other one

Firstly, this article will examine in the text of 1786, Was heisst: sich im Denken orientieren?, the chaining of the argumentation used by Kant to reply to the critique arised during the pantheism controversy about the passage from the finite to the infinite which became manifest in Germany in 1785 with the publication of: Über die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn, where the author shows that his moral argument of God offers an alternative for both the supernatural anti-rationalism of Jacobi and the uncritical rationalism of Mendelssohn. And it also intends to examine the critique of Jacobi to the text above mentioned of Kant contained in Appendix of the: David Hume über den Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus, ein Gespräch.