Iwan Alijew

This chapter lays a philosophical foundation for exploring how corporations navigate polarized public debates. Far from being a purely theoretical endeavor, it provides concrete insights into both business and business ethics. To this end, it first develops a so-called “philosophy of practice” by drawing on the political-philosophical writings of Richard Rorty, Mark Lilla, and Raymond Geuss. Second, it investigates polarized public debates and distinguishes fundamental debates from distractions to illustrate how politics and business align. Against this background, it considers the implications of this practice-oriented lens on polarized public debates for business and business ethics. It concludes with a hopeful yet realistic outlook on how corporations navigate polarized public debates.

This article introduces a new account of morality and power in business ethics called “business realism”. To this end, it first outlines the political realism literature—a view in political philosophy that deals with the question of the relation between morality and politics. This view stresses the importance of power in politics and of a political ethics guided by political practice. Second, it uses the concept of change to argue, by analogy, for a realist view of business—a view in (what we might call) business philosophy that stresses the importance of power in business and of a business ethics guided by business practice. Third, it maps influential business ethics frameworks through a lens of business change. Fourth, it states business realism—a new account of morality and power in business ethics. Against this background, it considers the implications of this new account for business ethics and business.

In Everyone’s Business, Ron and Singer (2024) develop a political account of business ethics that assigns normative priority to democracy. They argue that firms owe democratic societies a “concern for democracy,” which they largely interpret as duties of restraint aimed at avoiding corruption and undue influence over democratic procedures. This short review reconstructs the central reasons underlying this predominantly negative account and proposes a limited extension within their framework. It argues that, under strict conditions, a concern for democracy may also entail positive obligations oriented toward sustaining the procedural and epistemic conditions of democratic agency, particularly in light of the scale and reach of corporate power.