Iwao Hirose

If a potential person would have a good life if he were to come into existence, can we coherently regard his coming into existence as better for him than his never coming into existence? And can we regard the situation in which he never comes into existence as worse for him? In this paper, we argue that both questions should be answered affirmatively. We also explain where prominent arguments to differing conclusions go wrong. Finally, we explore the relevance of our answers to issues in population ethics.

In Broome’s _Weighing Goods_, separability of time plays an important role in establishing the utilitarian principle of distribution. However, in _Weighing Lives_, Broome rejects separability of time because it cannot accommodate the value of longevity. This chapter argues that if the value of longevity is understood as the disvalue of premature death, the disvalue of premature death can be dispersed to temporal parts of people’s life in a way consistent with separability of time. However, despite this fact, the chapter goes on to argue that separability of time can already be rejected according to Broome’s general analytical framework, specifically, his principle of personal good.

The axiological version of sufficientarianism contends that the disvalue associated with well-being below sufficiency is to be minimized, regardless of the aggregate value of well-being at and above sufficiency. This is called the sufficientarian ethos. This chapter offers the first axiological formula of the sufficientarian ethos, which reveals the following points. The disvalue of sub-sufficiency well-being is measured by a weighted sum of shortfall from sufficiency for individuals below sufficiency. The value of above-sufficiency is measured by an unweighted sum of well-being. The relative goodness of states of affairs is determined by, first, the aggregated disvalue of sub-sufficiency well-being and, second, the value of above-sufficiency well-being when the disvalue of sufficiency well-being is the same. In the variable-population-size cases, sufficientarianism avoids the repugnant conclusion, but it encounters the very sadistic conclusion.

If a potential person would have a good life if he were to come into existence, can we coherently regard his coming into existence as better for him than his never coming into existence? And can we regard the situation in which he never comes into existence as worse for him? In this paper, we argue that both questions should be answered affirmatively. We also explain where prominent arguments to differing conclusions go wrong. Finally, we explore the relevance of our answers to issues in population ethics.

Critics of utilitarianism and other forms of consequentialism often reject the aggregation of goods and bads across different individuals. This chapter critically examines their arguments against interpersonal aggregation. It begins by offering a clear definition of interpersonal aggregation and elucidating its theoretical structure. Then it argues against two types of objections to aggregation. The first is the argument from counterexamples and the other is the argument from the separateness of persons. The chapter then surveys the recent literature on the number problem, provoked by John Taurek’s seminal paper, to show skepticism about interpersonal aggregation implies counterintuitive conclusion. However, the chapter argues that there are two nonaggregative solutions to the problem.

This introduction characterizes and positions value theory, or axiology, as a philosophical discipline. It identifies its central issues and explains how value theory overlaps partly with other areas of moral philosophy, such as metaethics and normative etics, and how it relates other areas of philosophy. The introduction also explains how value theory branches out to disciplines outside of philosophy, especially to economic theory. The Handbook is divided into three main parts, and section I.1 closes with a brief explanation and motivation of this thematic division. Sections I.2–I.4 summarize the individual chapters, give brief backgrounds to their subject matters, and explain how they are interrelated.

Suppose that A and B are two kinds of goods such that more of each is better than less. A is strongly superior to B if any amount of A is better than any amount of B. It is weakly superior to B if some amount of A is better than any amount of B. There are many examples of these relations in the literature, sometimes under the labels “higher goods” and “discontinuity.” The chapter gives a precise and generalized statement of Strong and Weak Superiority and discusses different ways in which these relations can be relevant to the aggregation of welfare. It also proves a number of general results. One of the results gives rise to a dilemma: It can be used as an argument against the existence of value superiority or, alternatively, as an argument against the view that superiority entails a radical difference in value.

Value theory, or axiology, looks at what things are good or bad, how good or bad they are, and, most fundamentally, what it is for a thing to be good or bad. Questions about value and about what is valuable are important to moral philosophers, since most moral theories hold that we ought to promote the good. This Handbook focuses on value theory as it pertains to ethics, broadly construed, and provides a comprehensive overview of contemporary debates pertaining not only to philosophy but also to other disciplines-most notably, political theory and economics.The Handbook's twenty-two newly commissioned chapters are divided into three parts. Part I: Foundations concerns fundamental and interrelated issues about the nature of value and distinctions between kinds of value. Part II: Structure concerns formal properties of value that bear on the possibilities of measuring and comparing value. Part III: Extensions, finally, considers specific topics, ranging from health to freedom, where questions of value figure prominently

In decision-theory, the notion of regret enters into the minimax decision-rule and has a determinate usage in this context. However, there are many alternative ways of conceiving of regret. The chapter constructs the einmalist- nicht-keinmal ('once is not never') game, in which a single sampling radically changes the expected value of the game in a way that is quite counterintuitive, as the basis for studying regret after a loss following the choice of an uncertain action. Crucially, the very loss affects the posterior expectation of the game and the posterior credence about the objective chances of a win. Our taxonomy of regret contains regret over the action chosen and regret over the outcome obtained as its main categories, and is mirrored by a taxonomy of joy after a win following the choice of an uncertain action, and is used to critique of Krähmer and Stone's analysis of risk aversion for uncertain actions.

In Global Health Impact: Extending Access to Essential Medicines, Nicole Hassoun argues that the concept of a minimally good life grounds the human right to health, which in turn implies the human right to access essential medicines in developing countries. This article argues that Hassoun's argument must be revised. If the temporal unit of a minimally good life is identified, her argument faces a substantive problem, which undermines an important part of her argument. This article then proposes a solution to this problem. If this proposed solution is accepted, Hassoun's project turns out to be more radical than her argument is supposed to be.

In this article, I will propose a theoretical argument for the prohibition of unequal treatment of disabled and non-disabled individuals in health care resource allocation. I will first consider an argument for unequal treatment, which was put forward by Singer et al, and elucidate its far-reaching scope. I will then use the same argument in order to derive an argument that would prohibit unequal treatment of disabled and non-disabled individuals in almost all cases of health care allocation.Resumen:En este artículo propongo un argumento teórico para prohibir el trato desigual entre personas discapacitadas y no discapacitadas en la distribución de recursos médicos. En primer lugar analizaré un argumento que apoya un trato desigual, el cual fue presentado por Singer y otros, y trataré de establecer sus alcances. Después utilizaré ese mismo argumento para derivar otro que nos llevaría a prohibir el trato desigual entre discapacitados y no discapacitados en casi todos los casos de distribución de recursos médicos.

The recent Covid-19 pandemic has brought a broad range of ethical problems to the forefront, raising fundamental questions about the role of government in response to such outbreaks, the scarcity and allocation of health care resources, the unequal distribution of health risks and economic impacts, and the extent to which individual freedom can be restricted. In this clear introduction to the topic Iwao Hirose explores these ethical questions and analyzes the central issues in the ethics of pandemic response and preparedness such as: The general nature of pandemics and the ethics of preparedness Ethical questions about general goals of pandemic response and preparedness The distribution of scarce resources, e.g., ventilators, hospital beds, antiviral drugs and vaccines Restrictions on individual freedom Ethical questions in the wake of pandemics, including contact-tracing, vaccine passports and socioeconomic inequalities. With the use of real-life examples and a clear philosophical approach, The Ethics of Pandemics is a much-needed introduction to some of the most important ethical issues surrounding pandemics. It is essential reading for students of ethics, bioethics, and political philosophy and will also be of interest to those working in related areas such as public policy, public health, health law, nursing and life sciences.

Should organ transplants be given to patients who have waited the longest, or need it most urgently, or those whose survival prospects are the best? The rationing of health care is universal and inevitable, taking place in poor and affluent countries, in publicly funded and private health care systems. Someone must budget for as well as dispense health care whilst aging populations severely stretch the availability of resources. The Ethics of Health Care Rationing is a clear and much-needed introduction to this increasingly important topic, considering and assessing the major ethical problems and dilemmas about the allocation, scarcity and rationing of health care. Beginning with a helpful overview of why rationing is an ethical problem, the authors examine the following key topics: What is the value of health? How can it be measured? What does it mean that a treatment is "good value for money"? What sort of distributive principles - utilitarian, egalitarian or prioritarian - should we rely on when thinking about health care rationing? Does rationing health care unfairly discriminate against the elderly and people with disabilities? Should patients be held responsible for their health? Why does the debate on responsibility for health lead to issues about socioeconomic status and social inequality? Throughout the book, examples from the US, UK and other countries are used to illustrate the ethical issues at stake. Additional features such as chapter summaries, annotated further reading and discussion questions make this an ideal starting point for students new to the subject, not only in philosophy but also in closely related fields such as politics, health economics, public health, medicine, nursing and social work.

In this dissertation, I discuss two distributive principles in moral philosophy: Derek Parfit's Prioritarianism and Egalitarianism. I attempt to defend a version of Egalitarianism, which I call Weighted Egalitarianism. Although Parfit claims that Egalitarianism is subject to what he calls the Levelling Down Objection, I show that my proposed Weighted Egalitarianism is not subject to the Objection, and that it gives priority to the worse off people. The real difference between the two principles lies in how the weight of each person's well-being is determined. Prioritarianism assumes that there is a moral scale of the goodness of well-being, independently of distributions of people's well-being. I raise two objections to this claim: firstly, it is hard to believe that the choice of the level of well-being affects our distributive judgement; secondly, it is hard to believe that there is such a moral scale independently of distributions of people's well-being. On the other hand, Weighted Egalitarianism claims that the weight is given by the rank order position of the person in the ranking by well-being level. This means that, in Weighted Egalitarianism, the goodness of a distribution is an increasing, linear function of people's well-being. Weighted Egalitarianism is not affected by the choice of the level of people's well-being. Nor does it require require the moral scale of the goodness of well-being independently of distributions of people's well-being. Leximin, which might be a version of Prioritarianism, avoids my objections. But it is hard to support Leximin, because it rules out the trade off between the better off and the worse off. I conclude that Weighted Egalitarianism is more acceptable than Prioritarianism.

Some people believe that the equality of people's well-being makes an outcome better, other things being constant. Call this Telic Egalitarianism. In this paper I will propose a new interpretation of Telic Egalitarianism, and compare it with the interpretation that is proposed by Derek Parfit 1995 and widely accepted by many philosophers. I will argue that my proposed interpretation is more plausible than Parfit's. One of the virtues in my interpretation is that it shows his Levelling Down Objection does not undermine Telic Egalitarianism. I also believe that my interpretation better explains the important similarity and difference between Telic Egalitarianism and his proposed Priority View

This article considers the reach of arguments for saving the greater number without interpersonal aggregation, and argues that interpersonal aggregation is useful to encompass the proper respect due to each separate person. I first give a precise definition of interpersonal aggregation, which many non-utilitarians try to avoid. Then, I show that consequentialism and Scanlon can justify the case for the greater number without interpersonal aggregation. However, I propose the Aggregation Approach, which justifies the case for the greater number in some cases and the case for tossing a fair coin in other cases. I conclude that interpersonal aggregation does not disrespect the separate person.

John Broome has made major contributions to, and radical innovations in, contemporary moral philosophy. His research combines the formal method of economics with the philosophical analysis. Broome's works stretch over formal axiology, decision theory, philosophy of economics, population axiology, the value of life, the ethics of climate change, the nature of rationality, and practical and theoretical reasoning. Weighing and Reasoning brings together fifteen original essays from leading philosophers who have been influenced by the work and thought of John Broome.They explore Broome's works on the theory of value, and his works on practical and theoretical reasoning. This volume also includes Broome's note on his intellectual history to date.

Many critics of utilitarianism claim that we should reject interpersonal aggregation because aggregative principles do not take the separateness of persons seriously. In this article, I will reject this claim. I will first elucidate the theoretical structure of aggregation. I will then consider various interpretations of the notion of the separateness of persons and clarify what exactly those critics are trying to reject by appealing to the notion of the separateness of persons. I will argue that none of these interpretations can serve as the ground for rejecting aggregation