My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Lean toward: no
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Accept: nominalism
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Accept: objective
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no Accept an intermediate view
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism Accept an intermediate view virtue epistemology
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism Lean toward: non-skeptical realism
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will Lean toward: compatibilism
God: theism and atheism Lean toward: atheism
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism Accept: rationalism
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism Accept: invariantism
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean Accept: non-Humean
Logic: classical and non-classical Accept: classical
Mental content: internalism and externalism Accept: externalism
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Accept: moral realism
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism Accept an intermediate view
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism Agnostic/undecided
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Accept: cognitivism
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Accept: externalism
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes Agnostic/undecided
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics Accept: virtue ethics
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory Accept: disjunctivism
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view Agnostic/undecided
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism Lean toward: egalitarianism
Proper names: Fregean and Millian Agnostic/undecided
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism Accept: scientific realism
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death Skip
Time: A-theory and B-theory Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Lean toward: correspondence
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible Lean toward: metaphysically possible