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11Against cognitive homelessnessHumanitas Hodie 2 (1). 2019.Williamson claims that we are cognitive homeless, and for most aspects of our cognitive life it is not the case that if we are in the mental state S we know or are in a position to know that we are in said mental state. In this paper, I critically examine Williamson’s argument, some common misconceptions, and provide a different understanding of the way we relate to our own mental states that shows how we are not always in a condition of cognitive homelessness.
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52Against Radical Enactivism’s narrowmindedness about phenomenalitySynthese 198 (Suppl 1): 213-228. 2019.Radical Enactivism rejects representationalism but nonetheless allows the phenomenal character of perceptual experience as supervening on brain bound elements. In this paper, I argue that Radical Enactivism should reject the possibility of wholly brain-bound phenomenal experience. I propose a way of individuating perceptual experiences that does not depend on representationalism and raises a problem to the view defended by Hutto and Myin according to which, with respect to phenomenality, it is p…Read more
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66The Limits of Stanley and Williamson’s Attack on Ryle's View About Know-HowKriterion - Journal of Philosophy 32 (3): 59-88. 2018.The purpose of this paper is to discuss Stanley and Williamson’s take on Ryle’s argument against know-how being know-that. For this, I provide an initial consideration of the possibility of isolating Ryle’s argument from his overall philosophical outlook and Stanley and Williamson’s purpose in their discussion of Ryle. I then examine in detail Stanley and Williamson’s reconstruction of Ryle’s argument with the specific aim of showing where they have introduced extraneous elements: I examine what…Read more
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38Gilbert Ryle claimed that intelligent actions and activities are not merely the external signs of inner mental workings but rather that such actions and activities are the workings of the mind itself. In this thesis I propose an interpretation and defence of sich claim, against a common an, in my view, mistaken way of understanding Ryle's position. In chapter [1]. I introduce the argumentative thread of this thesis and a more detailed overview of the chapters. In chapter [2], I criticise Stanley…Read more
J. C. Espejo-Serna
Universidad de La Sabana
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Universidad de La SabanaRegular Faculty
Areas of Specialization
Knowledge How |
Gilbert Ryle |
Philosophy of Perception, General |