J. Carl Ficarrotta

This dissertation seeks a grounding in contract theory for international moral rules. After a preliminary discussion of contract theory, I examine the approaches of Hobbes and Rawls, and try to extend them to include international obligations. I argue that Hobbes, and those who follow him closely, are caught in a dilemma. If the laws of nature apply between states, then states do not provide us with adequate security and it is rational to work toward world government. And this is incompatible with much of what Hobbes has to say. Otherwise, the laws of nature do not apply between states. While this would be no embarrassment for a realist, it is nonetheless at odds with Hobbes's explicit assertions to the contrary. Rawls's approach fares far better, even though it relies on thicker normative assumptions to begin with. I reconstruct a Rawlsian justification of international morality, and defend it against criticism

In assigning the benefits and burdens of society, we sometimes discriminate using a broad category (age, gender, race, etc.) we think correlates well with the possession of some other skill, qualification, or character trait. In this essay, I explore one rationale for this type of discrimination. I suggest a method for determining when this rationale provides a moral justification for the discrimination, and when it does not. I defend the method against some potential criticisms, and point out some exceptions to its application.