J. David Velleman

In this new edition of Foundations for Moral Relativism a distinguished moral philosopher tames a bugbear of current debate about cultural difference. J. David Velleman shows that different communities can indeed be subject to incompatible moralities, because their local mores are rationally binding. At the same time, he explains why the mores of different communities, even when incompatible, are still variations on the same moral themes. The book thus maps out a universe of many moral worlds without, as Velleman puts it, "moral black holes". The six self-standing chapters discuss such diverse topics as online avatars and virtual worlds, lying in Russian and truth-telling in Quechua, the pleasure of solitude and the fear of absurdity. Accessibly written, this book presupposes no prior training in philosophy.

“Not Dead Yet” is the name of a disability-rights organization that opposes legalizing assisted suicide. It contends that if assisted suicide is legal, then people who decide against it despite living in circumstances cited as reasons in favor will feel obliged to justify their continued existence, a burden of justification that will fall not only on the terminally ill but also on the healthy disabled. Some anti-abortion activists claim that abortion is often chosen for the purpose of preventing the birth of a disabled child, a practice that they suggest implies that the life of a disabled person is not worth living—the same implication that would threaten the disabled if paired with a right to assisted suicide. Although sympathizing with the argument against assisted suicide, this chapter rejects the analogy to abortion. Deciding not to initiate a new life is different from deciding not to continue an existing one.

“What do you see when you look at your face in the mirror?” asks J. David Velleman in introducing his philosophical theory of action. He takes this simple act of self-scrutiny as a model for the reflective reasoning of rational agents: our efforts to understand our existence and conduct are aided by our efforts to make it intelligible. Reflective reasoning, Velleman argues, constitutes practical reasoning. By applying this conception, _Practical Reflection_ develops philosophical accounts of intention, free will, and the foundation of morals. This new edition of _Practical Reflection_ contains the original 1989 text along with a new introduction and is the latest entry in The David Hume Series of Philosophy and Cognitive Science Reissues, which keeps in print previously published indispensable works in the area of cognitive science. _ _ _ _.

Buddhists believe that the existence of an enduring self is an illusion and that this illusion is the root of the suffering inherent in the human condition. I want to explore whether this particular Buddhist thought can be understood in terms familiar to analytic philosophy. How might the illusion of an enduring self lie at the root of human suffering? After explaining the sense in which the enduring self is indeed an illusion, I argue that this illusion goes hand-in-hand with another — namely, the illusion of the passage of time. Seeming to be an enduring self, even though one is not, is what makes time seem to pass, even though it does not. And the appearance that time passes, I argue, is the source of the suffering that is alleviated when both illusions are dispelled.

The Possibility of Practical Reason explores the foundational questions of moral psychology: How can any of our behaviour qualify as acting for a reason? How can any considerations qualify as reasons for us to act? David Velleman argues that both possibilities depend on there being aconstitutive aim of action - something that makes for success in action as such, in the same way that truth makes for success in belief. Considerations qualify as reasons for acting by virtue of their relevance to the constitutive aim; and our behavior qualifies as acting for a reason when itresponds to such considerations in pursuit of the aim. The eleven papers that make up this book (two of them previously unpublished) discuss such topics as the relation between value and practical reasoning, the foundations of decision theory, freedom of the will, shared intention, and themotivational role of the imagination.

The Possibility of Practical Reason explores the foundational questions of moral psychology: How can any of our behavior qualify as acting for a reason? How can any considerations qualify as reasons for us to act? David Velleman argues that both possibilities depend on there being a constitutive aim of action―something that makes for success in action as such. These twelve essays―five of which were not included in the previous edition, two of them previously unpublished―discuss topics such as freedom of the will, shared intention, the relation between value and practical reasoning, the foundations of decision theory, and the motivational role of the imagination.

The terms `endurance' and `perdurance' are commonly thought to denote distinct ways for an object to persist, but it is surprisingly hard to say what these are. The common approach, defining them in terms of temporal parts, is mistaken, because it does not lead to two coherent philosophical alternatives: endurance so understood becomes conceptually incoherent, while perdurance becomes not just true but a conceptual truth. Instead, we propose a different way to articulate the distinction, in terms of identity rather than temporal parts: an object endures if its identity is determined at every moment at which it exists. We make precise what it means for the identity of an object to be determined at a moment. We also discuss what role the endurance / perdurance distinction, so understood, should play in the debates about time, material objects and personal identity

In nine lively essays, bioethicist J. David Velleman challenges the prevailing consensus about assisted suicide and reproductive technology, articulating an original approach to the ethics of creating and ending human lives. He argues that assistance in dying is appropriate only at the point where talk of suicide is not, and he raises moral objections to anonymous donor conception. In their place, Velleman champions a morality of valuing personhood over happiness in making end-of-life decisions, and respecting the personhood of future children in making decisions about procreation. These controversial views are defended with philosophical rigor while remaining accessible to the general reader. Written over Velleman's 30 years of undergraduate teaching in bioethics, the essays have never before been collected and made available to a non-academic audience. They will open new lines of debate on issues of intense public interest."--Publisher's website.

Every author cares about being understood, but for reasons that Hagop Sarkissian has explained, I can be expected to care more than most. I'm delighted to say that Sarkissian has understood my book thoroughly and provided an accurate and charitable summary. I am also delighted to learn from him how closely my view echoes strains of classical Confucianism.I was especially interested by Sarkissian's characterization of my view as implying that "morals do indeed seem to collapse to mores, or perhaps mores rise to the status of morals." I wish I had put it that way myself. I didn't put it that way because I assumed that mores are generally understood as normative only derivatively, because they depend for their...

A moral philosopher’s meditations on some of life’s most important questions We’ve all had to puzzle over such profound matters as birth, death, regret, free will, agency, and love. How might philosophy help us think through these vital concerns? In On Being Me, renowned moral philosopher J. David Velleman presents a concise, accessible, and intimate exploration into subjects that we care deeply about, offering compelling insights into what it means to be human. Each of Velleman’s short, personal chapters begins with a theme: “Being Glad I Was Born,” “Wanting to Go On,” “Fearing the End,” “Regretting What Might Have Been,” “Aspiring to Authorship,” “Making Things Happen,” and “Wanting to Be Loved.” Reflecting on how daily life presents us with thorny riddles that need working out, Velleman arrives at unexpected conclusions about survival and personal identity, the self and its future, time and morality, the rationality of regret, free will and personal efficacy, and goodness and love. He shows that we can rely on our own powers of thought to arrive at a better understanding of the most fundamental parts of ourselves—and that the methods of philosophy can help get us there. Beautifully illustrated by New Yorker contributing artist Emily Bernstein, On Being Me invites us to approach life philosophically.

Georg Konrad Morgen (1909–1982) war von 1941 bis 1945 Richter in der SS-und Polizeigerichtsbarkeit. Er ermittelte gegen hochrangige SS-Offiziere wegen Korruption; ab Juni 1943 ermittelte er auch wegen Verbrechen in den Konzentrationslagern (Buchenwald, Dachau, Auschwitz). Im November 1943 konnte sich Morgen persönlich von den Vernichtungsanlagen in Auschwitz-Birkenau überzeugen. Nach eigenen Angaben versuchte er im Rahmen seiner Möglichkeiten als SS-Richter gegen diese Verbrechen vorzugehen. So verhaftete Morgen den Chef der Gestapo in Auschwitz, Maximilian Grabner, und er versuchte auch, einen Haftbefehl gegen Adolf Eichmann zu erwirken. Dennoch war Morgen der SS verbunden. Das Buch versteht sich als moralische Biographie eines zutiefst ambivalenten Charakters: es zeichnet anhand der verfügbaren Archivmaterialien nach, wie Morgen dachte und urteilte. In der theoretischen Einleitung und im Nachwort analysiert das Buch den philosophisch-normativen Kontext des Falls Konrad Morgen.