•  3
    Pistor’s Code of Capital: Wealth Inequality and Legalism About Capital
    Journal of Business Ethics 1-6. forthcoming.
    In The Code of Capital, Katharina Pistor seeks to trace out the ultimate sources of wealth and capital. Her central claim—that wealth and capital are ultimately created by law—is at once more commonsensical and intuitive, on the one hand, and more insightful and provocative, on the other hand, than it might initially seem. At a time when there is deep and widespread interest in and concern about wealth inequality, Pistor argues that much inequality can be traced back to oft-ignored legal fixture…Read more
  •  18
    Bribery and Business
    Encyclopedia of Business and Professional Ethics. 2021.
    The concept of bribery is important to our thinking about ethics, especially in professional contexts. This is in no small part due to the thought that, as Seamus Miller has put it, bribery is “a paradigm of corruption”. Business persons and corporate entities are often evaluated by how well they remain free from, root out, and punish corruption – especially in democratic societies. It is a common thought, for example, that a democratic institution ought to be free from corruption. Since bribery…Read more
  •  46
    Particularism for Generalists: A Rossian Business Ethic
    Business Ethics Quarterly. forthcoming.
    A standard framework for business ethics views the inquiry as an application of major ethical theories to specific issues in business. As these theories are largely presented as being principled, the exercise therefore becomes one of applying general principles to business situations. Many adopting this standard approach have thus resisted the implementation of the most prominent development in ethical theory in recent history: that of particularism. In this article, I argue that particularist t…Read more
  •  300
    Motivating Reason to Slow the Factive Turn in Epistemology
    In Veli Mitova (ed.), The Factive Turn in Epistemology, Cambridge University Press. pp. 1-22. forthcoming.
    In this paper I give a novel argument for the view that epistemic normative reasons (or evidence) need not be facts. I first argue that the nature of normative reasons is uniform, such that our positions about the factivity of reasons should agree across normative realms –– whether epistemic, moral, practical, or otherwise. With that in mind, I proceed in a somewhat indirect way. I argue that if practical motivating reasons are not factive, then practical normative reasons are not factive. If it…Read more
  •  223
    Doxastic permissiveness and the promise of truth
    Synthese 194 (12): 4897-4912. 2017.
    The purpose of this paper is to challenge what is often called the “Uniqueness” thesis. According to this thesis, given one’s total evidence, there is a unique rational doxastic attitude that one can take to any proposition. It is sensible for defenders of Uniqueness to commit to an accompanying principle that: when some agent A has equal epistemic reason both to believe that p and to believe that not p, the unique epistemically rational doxastic attitude for A to adopt with respect to whether p…Read more