J. J. Kole

Future artificial reproductive technologies, including mitochondrial replacement therapy, in vitro gametogenesis, and ectogenesis raise important legal and ethical questions, such as: Who should be considered the parents of children born from these technologies? The concept of biological parenthood is commonly used as a basis for answering this question. Therefore, this study assesses the use and meaning of biological parenthood in relation to these future artificial reproductive technologies. Searches were conducted in six databases, including PubMed, PsycINFO, Web of Science, HeinOnline, Westlaw Classic, and Philosopher’s Index. Articles were included only if they met one of the following conditions: 1) a definition of biological parenthood, 2) a definition of genetic parenthood, 3) a definition of gestational parenthood, 4) a definition of biological, genetic, or gestational parenthood combined with either mitochondrial replacement therapy, in vitro gametogenesis, or ectogenesis. Of the 6,304 studies retrieved, 131 results were included for analysis. The review found multiple meanings of biological parenthood, encompassing different biological ties (genetic, gestational, and postnatal) and diverse conceptual methods of interpreting its meaning. The definition of gestational parenthood appears to be less univocal than the term initially suggests, and that of genetic parenthood has evolved. The lack of consensus on the meaning and definition of biological parenthood leads to inconsistent determinations of biological parenthood in relation to future artificial reproductive technologies. This raises serious doubts about whether biological parenthood can continue to play the fundamental role in ethical and legal perspectives on parenthood that it has held for a long time.

The method of reflective equilibrium (RE) is well known within the domain of moral philosophy, but hardly discussed as a method in professional ethics education. We argue that an interpersonal version of RE is very promising for professional ethics education. We offer several arguments to support this claim. The first group of arguments focus on a changed practice that is more team-oriented, inter-professional and aims at shared decision-making with patients and clients. The second group of arguments relate to the core aim of professional ethics education, namely to stimulate critical moral reflection. This central aim is a core professional moral competence that entails both a dialogical approach to practice and one’s own moral beliefs as well as a more detached viewpoint on practice, reflection on types of cases and one’s attitude as a professional in practice.

Apart from their responsibility to serve the goals of their organization, employees also have a personal and professional responsibility to work ethically. Ideally, these responsibilities of employee, professional and person coexist in harmony, but in practice they can also be at odds with one another.As members of a profession with a collective professional morality, professionals are expected to follow their own moral judgement about how to work. They have professional moral autonomy. This independent capacity to judge should be considered as their moral capital. If companies create free space for internal ethical debate and dialogue, this professional moral capital can improve the corporate moral climate and lead to business-ethical gains. In companies that create such space, the voice of potential whistle-blowers will be taken seriously, and the risk that problems of many hands occur might diminish. Business ethics should, thus, acknowledge the importance of the personal and professional moral responsibility of employees in business.

Part of being a good professional is, so we contend, to have ideals. Ideals essentially complement the deontic considerations that are usually taken as the main components of professional moral deliberation. Yet the notion of professional ideals is problematic. As professional ideals they refer to a profession collectively, while as professional ideals they are first of all strong personal commitments of individual professionals. As collective aspirations, professional ideals have a kind of external normative thrust on individual professionals, but people cannot be forced to identify with ideals on demand. Endorsing ideals can only come from within. On the basis of an analysis of ?professional ideals? and ?professional identity?, we conclude that professional ideals are necessary constituents of the personal identity of professionals. This explains the dual character of professional ideals: they are pursued by a collective and constitute the group professional identity but they also need to be endorsed by individual professionals in order to be able to say that the ideals are their own. We end with a short and tentative description of some practical implications for the fostering and education of professional ideals