J. Jeremy Wisnewski

Saturday Night Live's comedy and philosophy have something fundamental in common: both re‐tune attention by challenging assumptions about the world and each other. Comedy reveals assumptions by exploiting them in exaggerated form – and boy do we have a lot of assumptions, particularly about race and racial identity. “Black Jeopardy” reminds people that many things affect identities, not just the putative race to which we belong. The “neighborhood” we're exposed to is one of pure fancy: a comedic rendering of all the stereotypes and biases that are carried by notion of “black.” In “Mr. Robinson's Neighborhood,” which appeared multiple times from Season 6 to Season 10, Eddie Murphy plays the ghetto version of Fred Rogers, from the PBS show Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood. The sketches usually end with Mr. Robinson leaving his apartment by fire escape, typically to avoid violence or arrest.

abstract My aim in this paper is to argue that we have at least some obligations to the dead. After briefly considering some previous (unsuccessful) attempts to establish such obligations, I offer a reductio argument which establishes at least some obligations to the dead. Following this, the surprising extent of these obligations (given a few roughly Kantian assumptions) is considered. I then argue that there are and must be some significant limitations on the duties of the living in relation to the dead. My aim in this paper is not to sort out how we should deal with all of the particular cases in which the question of obligations to the dead emerge — in archaeological digs, research involving the newly dead, the execution of wills, or the fulfilment of last requests — but I will attempt to lay some groundwork for the future assessment of these questions.

The most common argument in favor of torture in the current literature is the ticking bomb argument. It asks us to imagine a case where only torture can prevent the detonation of a bomb that will kill millions. In this paper, I argue that the seeming effectiveness of this argument rests on two things: 1) the underdetermined semantic content of the term ‘torture,’ and 2) a philosophical attitude that regards the empirical facts about torture as irrelevant. Once we pay attention to the facts about torture, and particularly about the role time plays in actual torture, the ticking bomb argument becomes incoherent, and hence cannot provide a basis for accepting torture.

Reeently, a man in Germany was put on trial for killing and consuming another German man. Disgust at this incident was exacerbated when the accused explained that he had placed an advertisement on the internet for someone to be slaughtered and eaten-and that his ‘vietim’ had answered this advertisement. In this paper, I will argue that this disturbing ease should not be seen as morally problematic. I will defend this view by arguing that (1) the so-called ‘vietim’ of this cannibalization is not in fact a victim of murder, and that (2) there is nothing wrong with cannibalism.

My aim in the dissertation is to provide an argument for re-conceiving the way we understand theories of human agency, broadly construed. Traditional approaches to theories of agency have emphasized epistemological concerns when we attempt to spell out what constitutes human existence. My primary concern is to show that this traditional methodological premise concerning human agency is at best misleading, and at worst false. The traditional emphasis on the accuracy of a given theory of human agency has systematically obscured the normative dimension within said theories. Recognizing this normative dimension, I argue, allows us to see that a 'therapeutic' approach to theories of agency, be it in social science or in philosophy, is more appropriate to the explanandum. ;The key to the analysis I offer lurks in a threefold distinction between empirical propositions, constitutive rules, and recommendations for adopting constitutive rules. Most theories of agency present themselves as empirical assertions, capable of being verified or falsified. I argue that theories of human agency cannot be captured in this traditional manner. Human activity is characterized by an understanding of the actions in which agents engage. Theoretical reflection can shape this understanding by drawing our attention to what had hitherto remained unnoticed. To put this point polemically: our description of human agency can change the thing described. To claim that we are thus to construe theories of agency as articulating the constitutive rules of human practice, however, is too quick. One and the same activity can be captured under differing, or even incompatible, constitutive rules. Rules exist under interpretations, and interpretations emphasize differing features of the conduct they aim to capture. It is in virtue of this that we can view theoretical accounts of human agency as recommendations for understanding a range of human activity, or human agency generally, in a particular manner. Deciding between competing theories, then, amounts to deciding between competing recommendations. This suggests that we must assess theoretical accounts of agency in terms of the values we have, and not in terms of the epistemology we revere

Hier erfahren Sie, wieso Stephenie Meyers Liebesgeschichte so viele Menschen fasziniert und warum es sich dabei um so viel mehr als oberflächliche Jugendliteratur handelt: - Wieso fühlen sich Menschen von Vampiren magisch angezogen? - Sollte Edward seine Fähigkeit zum Gedankenlesen einsetzen? - Ist Edward ein romantischer Held oder einfach nur ein Stalker? - Was sagt der Kampf der "vegetarischen" Cullen-Familien gegen ihren Durst nach menschlichem Blut über den freien Willen aus? - Wird das ewige Leben nicht sogar an der Seite einer geliebten Person irgendwann langweilig?

X-Men is one of the most popular comic book franchises ever, with successful spin-offs that include several feature films, cartoon series, bestselling video games, and merchandise. This is the first look at the deeper issues of the X-Men universe and the choices facing its powerful "mutants," such as identity, human ethics versus mutant morality, and self-sacrifice. J. Jeremy Wisnewski (Oneonta, NY) is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Hartwick College and the editor of Family Guy and Philosophy (978-1-4051-6316-3) and The Office and Philosophy (978-1-4051-7555-5). Rebecca Housel (Rochester, NY) is a professor at Rochester Institute of Technology, where she teaches about writing and pop culture. For William Irwin's biography, please see below.

Reeently, a man in Germany was put on trial for killing and consuming another German man. Disgust at this incident was exacerbated when the accused explained that he had placed an advertisement on the internet for someone to be slaughtered and eaten-and that his ‘vietim’ had answered this advertisement. In this paper, I will argue that this disturbing ease should not be seen as morally problematic. I will defend this view by arguing that (1) the so-called ‘vietim’ of this cannibalization is not in fact a victim of murder, and that (2) there is nothing wrong with cannibalism.