J. Lambert

The basic theory of scientific understanding presented in Sections 1–2 exploits three main ideas.First, that to understand a phenomenonP (for a given agent) is to be able to fitP into the cognitive background corpusC (of the agent).Second, that to fitP intoC is to connectP with parts ofC (via arguments in a very broad sense) such that the unification ofC increases.Third, that the cognitive changes involved in unification can be treated as sequences of shifts of phenomena inC. How the theory fits typical examples of understanding and how it excludes spurious unifications is explained in detail. Section 3 gives a formal description of the structure of cognitive corpuses which contain descriptive as well as inferential components. The theory of unification is then refined in the light of so called puzzling phenomena, to enable important distinctions, such as that between consonant and dissonant understanding. In Section 4, the refined theory is applied to several examples, among them a case study of the development of the atomic model. The final part contains a classification of kinds of understanding and a discussion of the relation between understanding and explanation.

Free logic is an important field of philosophical logic that first appeared in the 1950s. J. Karel Lambert was one of its founders and coined the term itself. The essays in this collection explore the philosophical foundations of free logic and its application to areas as diverse as the philosophy of religion and computer science. Amongst the applications on offer are those to the analysis of existence statements, to definite descriptions and to partial functions. The volume contains a proof that free logics of any kind are non-extensional and then uses that proof to show that Quine's theory of predication and referential transparency must fail. The purpose of this collection is to bring an important body of work to the attention of a new generation of professional philosophers, computer scientists and mathematicians.

This paper deals with the Meinong-Russell controversy on nonsubsistent objects. The first part notes the similarity of certain contemporary semantical developments to Meinonj;'s theory of nonsubsistent objects. Then it lays out the major features of Meinong's famous theory, considers Russell's objections to same and Meinong's counter-objections to Russell, and argues that Russell's well-known argument fails. However, it is possible to augment Russell's argument against Meinong with sound Russellian principles in such a way that it presents at least a strong inclining reason against Meinong's theory of impossible objects.

Free logic, an alternative to traditional logic, has been seen as a useful avenue of approach to a number of philosophical issues of contemporary interest. In this collection, Karel Lambert, one of the pioneers in, and the most prominent exponent of, free logic, brings together a variety of published essays bearing on the application of free logic to philosophical topics ranging from set theory and logic to metaphysics and the philosophy of religion. The work of such distinguished philosophers as Bas van Fraassen, Dana Scott, Tyler Burge, and Jaakko Hintikka is represented. Lambert provides an introductory essay placing free logic in the logical tradition beginning with Aristotle, developing it as the natural culmination of a trend begun in the Port Royal logic of the 1600s, and continuing through current predicate logic--the trend to rid logic of existence assumptions. His Introduction also provides a useful systematic overview of free logic, including both a standard syntax and some semantical options.

Those who want to interpret the quantifier ? (3 x) (. . .x. . .)'as having no existence commitment often fail to distinguish between this objective and that of merely changing the values of the variables. The confusion vitiates solutions of the singular existence anomalies which purport to be based on a non?existential interpretation of the quantifier. An example of one who makes the distinction but still interprets the particular quantifier non?existentially is offered by Czeslaw Lejewski. Objection to the classical interpretation of the quantifiers often runs hand in hand with aversion to extensional logic. However, it is at least arguable that such an aversion is the result of underestimating the resources of extensional logic. These points arc discussed in the wake of Professor Marcus's recent paper in this journal ?Interpreting Quantification?

A 'free logic' for singular terms with restrictions on existential generalization and universal instantiation is set out and argued for. Weaker logics, Such as lambert's fd and fd1 are held incapable of proving instances of tarski's truth schema for languages containing non-Denoting terms. Stronger logics, Such as scott's and lambert's fd2, Are held to yield false theorems when given natural interpretations. The logic defended conforms essentially to russell's semantical intuitions. Some consequences are drawn for the theory of identity

It is an historical fact that one of Russell's greatest philosophical contributions was to highlight the role that premises about logical form play in ontological arguments. A pair of quotations will introduce his point that great metaphysical systems are often not only based on, but are debased by, the belief that certain statements of philosophical discourse are logically subject-predicate in form.Speaking of Hegel's Absolute Idealism, Russell wrote in Our Knowledge of The Extemal World:Mr. Bradley has worked out a theory according to which, in all judgment, we are ascribing a predicate to Reality as a whole; and this theory is derived from Hegel. Now the traditional logic holds that every proposition ascribes a predicate to a subject, and from this it easily follows that there can be only one subject, the Absolute, for if there were two, the proposition that there were two would not ascribe a predicate to either. Thus Hegel's doctrine, that philosophical propositions must be of the form, “the Absolute is such and such,” depends on the traditional belief in the universality of the subject-predicate form. This belief, being traditionaL scarcely self-conscious, and not supposed to be important, operates underground, and is assumed in arguments which, like the refutation of relations, appear at first sight to e;tablish its truth.

This essay lays out the leading principles of the theories of definite descriptions advocated by Frege, Russell, and Hilbert and Bernays, and discusses various difficulties, philosophical and otherwise, with each treatment, fixing especially on the treatment of singular existence claims. Then the leading principles of free (definite) description theory are presented and it is shown how it resolves difficulties confronting the more traditional approaches. Finally, a pair of technical problems in free (definite) description theory are addressed. They help to show the fecundity of this treatment of definite descriptions

A free logic is one in which a singular term can fail to refer to an existent object, for example, `Vulcan' or `5/0'. This essay demonstrates the fruitfulness of a version of this non-classical logic of terms (negative free logic) by showing (1) how it can be used not only to repair a looming inconsistency in Quine's theory of predication, the most influential semantical theory in contemporary philosophical logic, but also (2) how Beeson, Farmer and Feferman, among others, use it to provide a natural foundation for partial functions in programming languages. Vis à vis (2), the question is raised whether the Beeson-Farmer-Feferman approach is adequate to the treatment of partial functions in all programming languages. Gumb and the author say No, and suggest a way of handling the refractory cases by means of positive free logic. Finally, Antonelli's solution of a problem associated with the Gumb-Lambert proposal is mentioned.

Darwin's “mystery of mysteries,” the origin of species, is caused by the evolution of speciation phenotypes, i.e. phenotypic differences that depress gene flow between daughter species during speciation. Postmating, prezygotic (PMPZ) differentiation characterizes many closely related species causing conspecific sperm precedence (CSP), wherein a female preferentially utilizes conspecific over heterospecific sperm in fertilization. Until recently, the components of CSP have been difficult to observe and study in internally fertilizing organisms. Research into the mechanisms of CSP is now progressing rapidly with the help of new innovative research tools. With the recent development of a sperm labeling system enabling distinct labels for different males, direct observations of competing male sperm within the female reproductive tract are possible, revealing multiple PMPZ phenotypes that combine to cause CSP. The discovery of mechanisms underlying CSP predicts an exciting future for studies of PMPZ speciation phenotypes and possible general principles underlying the origin of species.

In Russia a monotheism - Orthodox Christianity - and atheism in its Marxist version have succeeded each other as state systems of rites and representations. Rather than contrasting one with the other, term with term, this paper proposes to bring in a third term: the local religious systems of Russia’s animist minorities. We examine how Christianity and atheism tried one after the other to get established there and also consider the reactions they encountered. The analysis as planned is undertaken on two levels: on an overall level we look at the strategies and aims of the state and its representatives, and on the local level - illustrated by the particular example of the Nenets - concrete and always specific mechanisms are presented, which application of general policy has implemented on the ground