J. Mikael Olsson

Although many libertarians share similar moral foundations, they disagree about whether the state can be justified. The most famous libertarian attempt to justify the state is that of Robert Nozick. This attempt has been criticized by, among others, the libertarian anarchist Murray Rothbard. In this article, Nozick’s theory and Rothbard’s critique are discussed, as well as some other attempts to justify the state from libertarian premises. Keeping the criticisms of those theories in mind, an alternative theory, which attempts to bypass the criticisms, is put forward. This alternative theory explains how a state—most probably a nonminimal democratic state—can legitimately be formed in a condition of anarchy without violating anyone’s libertarian rights. One result of this is that the rights-based case for minarchism is severely weakened.

Much of Leo Strauss's scholarship focused on the possibilities of moral knowledge and the quality of rulers, and these interests guide his readings in the history of political philosophy. I suggest that this is a fruitful way of studying political thought. It will, however, be argued that Strauss's belief in objective morality should be discarded. Thus, our judgments on past thinkers may have to be reversed or modified. Strauss's belief that only objective values can lend a firm support to democracy is also discussed and refuted. How this "inverted" Straussianism might be applied is briefly exemplified with the case of Hobbes.

The argument is that if we assume a non-cognitivist outlook in metaethics then we should also adopt a way of reading classics in political philosophy that focuses on moral knowledge and its link to political authority. By distinguishing between Plato and Socrates on these matters we are provided with two ideal types that may serve as useful models when clarifying past and present controversies over one of the most important questions in political philosophy: the justifiability (or non-justifiability) of majority rule. As a by-product of the discussion of Plato and Socrates a path to an interesting defence of majority rule based on non-cognitivism will become visible.